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**From International Cooperation to International Conflict: Statesmen, Soldiers, and
Political Coalition for Japan's National Security in 1930-1933**

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**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Science**

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Abstract

From International Cooperation to International Conflict: Statesmen, Soldiers, and Political Coalition for Japan's National Security in 1930-1933

Tomoko Sugiyama

Japan's foreign policy direction changed dramatically from international cooperation to international conflict early in the 1930s. In 1930, Japan agreed with the United States and Great Britain on naval arms reduction at the London Naval Conference. A year later, however, after the breakout of the Manchurian Incident, Japan advanced military action into Manchuria, unilaterally acknowledged the state of "Manchukuo" and withdrew itself from the League of Nations. Why did Japan shift its diplomatic course?

Because of the shift in the internal balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners in politics, in the military and the court, Japan changed its foreign policy direction. Politicians, the military, and the court made a coalition, decided policy principle, and carried out foreign policy. Civilians require cooperation from the military in order to implement security policy effectively. Even if they have a constitutional authority over certain security-related issues, the military's knowledge, information, and professional expertise may give them legitimacy for their policy choice. The military is not a monolithic organization. Some military officers may work closely with civilians while others may try to minimize civilian intervention into military affairs.

Endorsement from the emperor and the court also increase their position in domestic politics. Although the emperor did not have absolute power, the emperor and the court subtly controlled political situations. Thanks to their help, civilians could stand firm against opponents and persuade them to accept their policy. Different foreign policy outcomes in the Hamaguchi, Wakatsuki, and Inukai/Saito cabinets are the results of the different natures of domestic political coalitions during their administrations.

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Introduction

[military policy] is the product of the competition of purpose within individuals and groups and among individuals and groups. It is the result of politics, not logic, more an arena than a unity.

Samuel P. Huntington¹

I. The Argument

Japan's security policy shifted dramatically from international cooperation to international conflict during the interwar period. In 1930, Japan agreed with the United States and Great Britain on naval arms reduction. At the speech for the ratification of the arms reduction treaty, Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi stated that power competition among the Great Powers was obsolete. He declared that the era of international peace and trust was approaching.² A year later, however, after the breakout of the Manchurian Incident, Japan advanced military action into Manchuria. Despite harsh criticism from the United States and the League of Nations, Japan unilaterally acknowledged the state of "Manchukuo" and withdrew itself from the League of Nations.

Examining the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931-1933, this dissertation will ask several questions. Why did Japan change its diplomatic direction from international cooperation to international conflict? Was it the result of changes in the international system? Or was it the result of domestic politics? Did both civilian and military leaders consider Japan's

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 2.

² Hamaguchi Osachi, *Zuikanroku* (Tokyo: Sanseido Shobo, 1931), p. 111.

security in the same way? Did civilian leaders always follow the military's advice?
Did the Meiji Constitution make it clear who was responsible for national security?
What was the role of the emperor in this policy change?

This dissertation argues that because of the shift in the internal balance of power within the state, Japan's foreign policy direction changed from international cooperation to international conflict early in the 1930s. In particular, this study focuses on the domestic political coalition among politicians, the military and the Imperial Palace. Political coalition among them is central for two reasons. First, civilians require cooperation from the military in order to implement security policy effectively. Even if civilians have constitutional authority over certain security-related issues, the military's knowledge, information, and professional expertise may be essential in the policymaking process. Endorsement from the military experts may give civilian leaders legitimacy for their policy choice. In addition, support from the emperor and the court may increase their position in domestic politics. Thanks to backup from them, civilian leaders may stand firm against opponents and persuade them to accept their policy.

Second, since the military organization is not always monolithic, exploring internal cleavage within the military organization would help us understand sources of Japan's security policy well. Some military officers and politicians work together for policy implementation and for their own benefits. They may gain support from the court as well. In particular, although many political scientists have emphasized the role of coalition among politicians, the military and economic actors, few have studied internal politics within the military and the court members

such as the emperor, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlain.

Exploring new sources, this study will analyze the roles of the emperor and Imperial Court, in addition to internal dynamics within the military.

Linking to the civil-military relations literature, this study will check the following hypotheses. One is that civilian leaders are able to maximize their influence on policy outcome when they have constitutional authority in the issue of national security. To be sure, under the Meiji Constitution, the military held strong legal imperatives on military issues. Neither the prime minister nor the cabinet itself had legal authority on the issues of military command such as operational and doctrinal planning. However, national security covers a wide range of issues from grand strategy to defense budget. Therefore, civilians do have or share constitutional authority in certain issues on national security. The more civilian leaders have constitutional authority on the issue, the more influence they have on the state's policy option.

The other is that they are able to maximize their influence on policy outcome when they have a strong coalition with the military leaders and other political actors. If civilians share similar policy preferences with some military leaders, they are able to legitimize their policy choice. In addition, with support from the emperor and the court, they may persuade opponents to accept their policy demands. The more strongly civilian leaders make a political coalition with them, the more smoothly they are able to implement policy.

As for coalition politics, this study will particularly examine interaction among politicians, the military and the court members in the Hamaguchi, Wakatsuki,

and Inukai administrations. Hamaguchi formed a loose soft-line coalition with leaders in the navy and the court members. The Hamaguchi administration had strongly desired international disarmament. For him, arms reduction was a defense issue as well as an economic one. At that time, the national treasury was in extremely poor condition as a consequence of the financial depression. Thus, he appointed former Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro as the chief delegation at the conference. In London, Wakatsuki dominated the negotiation and made a compromise with his counterparts in the United States and Great Britain. In Tokyo, the soft-line leaders in the navy such as Okada Keisuke and Takarabe Takeshi, if unenthusiastically, agreed on Hamaguchi's opinion.³ In addition, the emperor and the major members of the Imperial Palace such as Suzuki Kantaro, former Chief of the Navy General Staff and Grand Chamberlain and Makino Nobuaki of the Privy Seal, and Genro Saionji Kinmochi all supported Hamaguchi's position.⁴ Although hard-liners of the Seiyukai, the Navy General Staff, and the Privy Council harshly criticized that the Hamaguchi cabinet endangered Japan's national security, a soft-line coalition was powerful enough to complete the arms reduction agreement.

Wakatsuki became the prime minister after Hamaguchi was seriously wounded by a right-winger. The Wakatsuki cabinet's major diplomatic agenda was to settle the Manchurian Incident. Prior to the Incident, local disputes between

³ Wakatsuki Reijiro, *Kofuan Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1950), pp. 361-366.

⁴ Ikiei Masaru, Hatano Masaru, and Kurosawa Fumitaka ed., *Hamaguchi Osachi: Nikki Zuikanroku* (Tokyo: Misuzu shobo, 1991) (Hereafter *Hamaguchi Diary*), p. 317.

Japanese and Chinese existed in Manchuria. While Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro made tremendous efforts to settle these disputes through diplomatic negotiations, the majority of the army believed that the use of forces was necessary. That is why the Kanto army hard-liners provoked a military dispute with China in Manchuria.⁵

When the Manchurian Incident broke out, the Wakatsuki cabinet decided to adopt the non-enlargement principle. Thanks to minimum cooperation from the army leaders, the cabinet maintained the policy principle in a short term. But Wakatsuki was unable to control the military completely because he had no authority to dismiss rebellious officers who ignored orders from Tokyo. To make matters worse, facing a coup attempt, neither the emperor nor the court members firmly backed up the Wakatsuki cabinet. They were rather disappointed with him, since he was unable to pacify the Incident quickly. Instead of backing up Wakatsuki, Genro Saionji, Makino, Kido Koichi, and Konoye Fumimaro all criticized Wakatsuki for his indecisive attitude toward the army.

In addition, Adachi Kenzo, the Interior Minister of the cabinet, declined to work with Wakatsuki. Adachi thought that if the Wakatsuki cabinet was deadlocked, it would give him an opportunity to become prime minister or vice prime minister.⁶ Without enough support from the army, the court and fellow politicians, the Wakatsuki cabinet was replaced by the Inukai cabinet in the middle

⁵ Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko eds., *Gendaishi Shiryo vol. 11: Zoku Manshu Jihen* (Tokyo: Mizuho Shobo, 1965), p. 164.

⁶ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 383-387.

of the Incident.

At the time of the Inukai administration, whereas Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi and Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo were reluctant to escalate military action in Manchuria, most cabinet members agreed with the army on Japan's dominance in Manchuria. Mori Kaku of the Secretary General of the cabinet organized meetings among different ministries and achieved consensus on Japan's expansionist policy toward Manchuria.⁷ As the hard-line coalition ruled domestic politics, it changed Japan's foreign policy direction. Japan occupied Manchuria and built the state of Manchukuo in 1932. When the League of Nations disapproved of the state of Manchukuo as an officially independent state, Japan decided to withdraw itself from the League of Nations in 1933.

When Japan changed course of diplomatic direction in the Inukai and Saito administrations, the role of the emperor and the Imperial Court was rather moderate. In the Manchurian Incident, the emperor's main concern was that Japan should avoid harsh criticism and diplomatic isolation from the League of Nations. Therefore, the emperor personally asked General Shirakawa Yoshinori and succeeded in making a truce with China in Shanghai in March 1932.⁸ However, the emperor did not strongly oppose the army's advancement and the government's

⁷ Yamaura Katsuichi, *Mori Kaku* (Tokyo: Morikaku Denki Hensankai, 1940), pp. 786-787.

⁸Terasaki Hidenari and Terasaki Miller Mariko eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku: Terasaki Hidenari Goyokakari Nikki* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Sha, 1991), pp. 28-29.

expansionist policy choices in Manchuria.

As for the League of Nations, while the emperor personally considered the Lytton Report acceptable, he hesitated to oppose the government decision to reject the Report and withdraw from the League of Nations.⁹ As the hard-line military officers became radicalized and threatened Japan's political system itself, Genro Saionji and other major members of the Imperial Court became cautious and avoided severe confrontation with them. Without strong opposition from the soft-liners, the hard-line coalition was able to change the course.

II. Definition: Soft-line Coalition versus Hard-line Coalition

This dissertation assumes that both soft-liners and hard-liners existed in political parties, the army, the navy, and the court. They formed a coalition to implement foreign policies. Sometimes this political coalition was very loose; they simply shared ideas about Japan's national security and policy preferences. In contrast, at other times a coalition was formed as a formal institutional group. Members of the coalition coordinated with each other to carry out foreign policies. Some political actors may have remained neutral. The policy outcome is the result of politics between soft-line coalition and hard-line coalition.

Soft-liners were security seekers. In their opinion, the status quo in Asia would be the best way to maintain Japan's security. International institutions, laws and agreements were important tools to maintain peace. The League of Nations, the treaties at the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact all

⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

exemplified that the world had entered into a new era of stability and peace. The arms reduction agreement would restrict unnecessary arms races among the Great Powers, weaken the financial burden of the nations, and promote international peace. As for relations with China, the soft-liners supported a non-interventionist policy in China's civil war. In carrying out such a policy, they hoped to promote economic and trade relations with China.¹⁰

In principle, Emperor Hirohito and palace entourage and Minseito political leaders such as Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki supported this view. Leaders in the navy such as Kato Tomosaburo, Saito Makoto and Okada also viewed that competing with the United States in the arms race was unrealistic and therefore endorsed the arms reduction agreement with the United States and Great Britain.

In contrast, hard-liners were power seekers. They contended that Japan had to gain military power and territories in order to maintain the empire. In their opinion, war was constant in international politics. International laws and agreements set by the Washington Conference were only useful instruments for the Western Great Powers to maintain the status quo and dominate Asia with their influence. Therefore, hard-liners in the navy and leaders at the Privy Council such as Hiranuma Kiichiro and Ito Miyoji opposed any arms control agreements with the Great Powers. As for policy toward China, they strongly advocated the

¹⁰ Usui Katsumi, *Nihon to Chugoku: Taisho Jidai* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1972), pp.138-141.

“Manchuria First” policy.¹¹ The army hard-liners, the Seiyukai hard-liners and right-wingers all stressed that Manchuria was vital for Japan because of its geographical position and the potential of its material resources. They believed that Manchuria was an area separate from China where Japan had special privileges and interests. Assuming that Japan was responsible to maintain peace and order in this region, they advocated Japan’s control in Manchuria.¹²

III. Alternative Explanations

As far as theoretical debates are concerned, this study will challenge both neorealist and organization approaches. Then it will revise a coalition approach. In the current debates on sources of the state’s behavior, the neorealist perspective contends that international pressure forces the state to choose either international cooperation or international conflict for its own security. International politics is an anarchic, self-help realm that has no central authority capable of making and enforcing rules of behavior on the states. Each state is responsible for ensuring its own security and survival. To attain security and gain power, each state engages in both internal and external balancing for the purpose of deterring aggressors. International cooperation such as arms control and alliance formation is possible but it is hard to sustain in the face of competitive pressures that are built into the

¹¹ Yamamoto Jotaro Denki Hensankai, *Yamamoto Jotaro* (Tokyo: Yamamoto Jotaro Denki Hensankai, 1939), pp. 649-657; Ito Takashi, *Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1969), pp. 229-230.

¹² Rikken Seiyukaishi Hensankyoku, *Rikken Seiyukai Shi: Tanaka Sosai*, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Jiyu Soshinsha, 1929), p. 47; Matsuoka Yosuke, *Ugoku Manmo* (Tokyo: Senshinsha, 1931), pp. 27, 40-47, 275-282; Yamaura, pp. 694-710.

structure of the international political system.¹³

As Suisheng Zhao suggests, the logic of neorealist theories tells us that Japan had carried out expansionist policies to seek security and power in East Asia since the Meiji Restoration.¹⁴ Internally, Japan promoted rapid industrialization and economic growth to strengthen the nation. Externally, while cooperating with the Great Powers when necessary, modern Japan had colonized Taiwan and Korea. After World War I, Japan advanced German controlled territories in China and the Pacific.¹⁵ In the 1930s, Japan built the state of Manchukuo and further advocated

¹³ The best review article on realist paradigm is: Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55. About neorealist paradigm, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Benjamin Frankel, ed., *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). Neorealists such as Waltz make it clear that neorealist theory is not a theory of foreign policy. Yet, this dissertation considers that the neorealist thesis aims to explain the state's choice for security policy. About debates on neorealist theory and theory of foreign policy, see Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies* vol. 6, no.1. (Fall 1996), pp. 7-53.

¹⁴ Suisheng Zhao, *Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 12.

¹⁵ Neorealists such as Waltz and Christopher Layne describe Japan as a revisionist state. Reviewing modern Japanese history, they illustrate that since late 19th century, Japan has challenged the status quo powers and tried to change the rules of the international system. See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: why new great powers will rise?" *International Security*, vol. 17, (Summer 1993), pp. 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." *International Security*, vol. 18, (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79. Zhao makes a similar argument in his book on the international system in East Asia, see Zhao, *Dynamics of Power Competition in East Asia*.

the building of the Sphere of Great East Asia Co-Prosperity in Asia for state survival.

In contrast to neorealist paradigm, organization theories stress that organization elements are the most important factors in the state behavior. It maintains that the military has a significant influence on national security policy outcomes because of its institutional autonomy, its monopoly of information and its organizational culture.¹⁶ Like any bureaucratic organization, the military organization seeks parochial bureaucratic interests and its organizational prestige. The organization resists any intervention from outsiders and tries to maintain the institutional autonomy. Because the military organizations often monopolize knowledge and information about national security, they are able to manipulate

¹⁶ There are different types of organization theories. They emphasize different elements to explain the military's significant influence on national security. Works on civil-military relations and national security, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldiers and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971); Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984; Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, (New York: Columbia University Press, Morningside Edition, 1991); Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 2001).

political situations and public perception.

Many historians and political scientists argue that Japan's self-defeating expansionism was a result of the military's high autonomy and its search of parochial interests. As Takenaka Hiroharu argues, regarding the institutional autonomy, the independence of military command from the cabinet had the Chiefs of General Staff in the army and navy free from coordinating diplomacy with military operations, especially in international crises such as the Manchurian Incident.¹⁷

As for organizational interests, prestige and monopoly of information, Japan continued to invade China because of the army's parochial interest. For example, even though the Sino-Japanese War had been deadlocked late in the 1930s, the army strongly refused to withdraw its troops from China because it would damage the army's prestige. Also, prior to the breakout of the Pacific War, the navy hesitated to make it clear that Japan would not win the war against the United States because this administration would hurt the navy's reputation. The navy was also afraid that the army would take all the resources if the navy stated that it would not fight against the United States. Even during the war, the navy kept naval operations and their consequences secret to protect the organizational interests.¹⁸

Critically reviewing these perspectives, this dissertation argues that neither

¹⁷ Takenaka Harukaru, *Senzen Nihon ni Okeru Minshuka no Zassetsu: Minshuka Tojo Taisei Hokai no Bunseki* (Tokyo: Mokutaku sha, 2002), pp. 140-145.

¹⁸ Scott Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 346-347.

international pressure nor the organizational interests resulted in the state's national security policy. Rather, it is coalition politics that shapes the state's policy choices. The coalition politics approach is important for two reasons. First, unlike the realist thesis, the state is not a unitary actor. Even when national security is at stake, the state's policy choice depends on the mixture of international and domestic situations. Therefore, examining internal bargaining among competing actors within the state is crucial to comprehend sources of Japan's security policy. Second, in the security policymaking process, civilians are able to have a great impact on national security when they make a coalition with some military and court leaders, including the emperor, even though they may not be experts of the military affairs. But political leaders try to maximize their influence by getting professional advice from the military and endorsement from the court.

This argument revises existing coalition explanations by Jack Snyder and Masayo Ohara. Both of them focus on domestic politics to explain why Japan implemented expansionist policies in the 1930s. In *Myths of Empire*, Snyder maintains that Japan's overexpansion was greatest when political decision-making was reduced to logrolling among concentrated military cartels—the army and navy elites—in the 1930s. He also focuses on the blowback effect from their self-serving imperial ideology such as the Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere for Japan's reckless adventure abroad.¹⁹

Challenging Snyder's logrolling coalition theory, Ohara argues that as the

¹⁹ Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 142-150.

Great Depression of 1929 damaged the Japanese economy, all the economic groups, including the agricultural community, the middle class and the zaibatsu joined in the promilitary coalition and supported Japan's expansionism.²⁰ It was a coalition between the military and economic actors that escalated expansionist policy in Asia.

Both of them are right in analyzing Japanese coalition politics. However, they pay little attention to the emperor and the court group as important members of political coalition. Surely, unlike politicians and the military who directly involved in Japan's security policymaking process, the emperor and the court members' involvement in policymaking was often minimal and indirect.²¹ However, their role was important. With the emperor's backup, the government may smoothly implement policies. In addition, the Imperial Court members were mediators between policymakers and the emperor. Therefore, they do influence the balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners and Japan's policy outcome. Using primary sources on the court group that are recently available, this dissertation examines the political dynamics among political parties, the military and the court. By so doing, it explains a policy shift from international cooperation to international conflict early in the 1930s.

IV. Case Studies and Methodology

1) Research Method and Materials Used

²⁰ Masayo Ohara, *Democratization and Expansionism: Historical Lessons, Contemporary Challenges* (Westport: Praeger, 2001).

²¹ A recent work that emphasizes the role of the emperor in decision making process, see Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).

As for research methodology, this dissertation will employ a process-tracing method. Closely examining the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes, this study clarifies the cause-effect links.²² I will use two types of sources to examine cases thoroughly. First, I will use primary sources—public documents, memoirs, diaries, newspapers and journals. In particular, in addition to Emperor Hirohito’s monologue, this study will investigate diaries of the court servants such as Makino, Kawai Yahachi and Nara Takeji. All became available to the public just in the last decade.²³ Based on these sources, this dissertation will study domestic politics and Japan’s policy choice in detail. Second, I have relied on a range of excellent secondary historical works, most of which are written in Japanese. Of course, it is almost impossible to know the complete political situations of the time. Yet, careful reading of these sources

²² About process-tracing method, Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown. “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making.” *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, vol. 2, 1985, pp. 21-58; Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Interference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 226-228.

²³ Regarding the role of the emperor and the court, the following two books were the only available sources for a long time. Harada Kumao, *Saionjiko to Seikyoku*, vols. 1-8 and supplementary volume of documents: Bekkan (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1956); and Kido Koichi, *Kido Koichi Nikki*, vols. 1-2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966). Yet, after the death of Showa Emperor in 1989, new sources became available. These are: Ito Takashi and Hirose Yorihiiro eds., *Makino Nobuaki Nikki* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1990) (Hereafter, *Makino Diary*); Terasaki Hidenari and Terasaki Miller Mariko eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku: Terasaki Hidenari Goyo Gakari Nikki* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju sha, 1991); Kawai Yahachi, Takahashi Hiroshi, Awaya Kentaro, and Otabe Yuji eds., *Showa Shoki no Tenno to Kyuchu*, vols. 4-6 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994) (Hereafter, *Kawai Diary*); Nara Takeji, *Jiju Bukancho Nara Takeji Nikki Kaiso Roku*, vols. 3-4 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 2000)(Hereafter, *Nara Diary*).

tells us much about coalition politics among politicians, the military, and the court.

2) Case Selection

As for case selection, I choose to examine the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident. I choose these case studies for two reasons. First, by comparing cases in which Japan chose either international cooperation or international conflict, this dissertation will analyze why Japan changed its diplomatic direction considerably. In particular, the neorealist perspective inadequately explains why Japan initially tried to settle the Manchurian Incident diplomatically, while later it decided to advance military action aggressively. This study will explore two different administrations in order to answer for Japan's policy change in the middle of the Manchurian Incident. Because Japan's expansionism had a significant influence on world politics, examining why Japan abandoned international cooperation with the Great Powers and chose expansionism is of great importance.

Second, the two case studies are "hard cases" to test civilians' influence on security policy.²⁴ Under the Meiji Constitution, the military held strong legal imperatives on military issues. In particular, military command--which involved operational and doctrinal planning, the development of forces, and intelligence activities--was exclusively exercised by the General Staffs of the Navy and the Army.

²⁴ Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds. *Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1 Political Science: Scope and Theory* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975); King, Keohane, and Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. pp. 209-212.

Yet, surprisingly, military doctrines that were developed exclusively by the army and the navy hardly became actual national security policies. While the military organizations maintained legal and professional imperatives, politicians played a major role in implementing security policies. In fact, after the universal suffrage law was established in 1925, a new election system created pressure for civilian leaders to reduce the military's sphere of influence. Political leaders whose first priority was their political survival maximized their influence on security-related policy outcomes. Some tried to shift budget shares away from the military to civilian ministries better suited for pork barrel or economic welfare for the whole nation. Japan's decision to ratify the arms reduction treaty will be best explained. In contrast, other politicians worked with the army hard-liners and appealed the mass for Japan's expansionism. Japanese hard-line politicians' commitment to the building of the state of Manchukuo may be understood in this context.

V. Contribution to Academic Debates and the Discipline

This dissertation advances academic discipline and theoretical debates in a number of ways. First of all, this dissertation will offer two kinds of historical interpretations about Japan's policy change in the 1930s. One is that it will reveal the political dynamics between soft-liners and hard-liners in party politics, the military, and the court. Political scientists and historians such as Ohara and Takenaka tended to emphasize roles of politicians, the military, intellectuals, and/or socio-economic classes when they analyze Japan's foreign policy outcome. They hardly explored to what extent court members contributed to Japan's foreign policy

direction.

Primary sources that are used in this dissertation show that the court members such as the emperor and Lord Keeper of Privy Seal were politically influential. Indeed, on occasion, they manipulated political situations subtly. At the London Naval Conference, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki helped Prime Minister Hamaguchi to complete the arms reduction agreement by delaying the meeting between the Navy Chief of Staff Kato Kanji and the emperor.²⁵ In the military dispute between China and Japan, the emperor told General Shirakawa that he strongly hoped that Japan would make a truce with China in Shanghai before the League of Nations opened the General Assembly in March, 1932.²⁶ By examining sources about the emperor and his aides in the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, this dissertation will offer a more comprehensive historical description and a new interpretation.

The other is that this dissertation will make it clear that the characteristics and policy choice in the Wakatsuki and Inukai administrations were quite different in the Manchurian Incident. Most scholars hardly distinguished Japan's policy choice in the Wakatsuki administration from that in the Inukai administration. They rather emphasized that the Manchurian Incident was escalated because civilians were unable to control the military. To be sure, neither Prime Minister Wakatsuki nor Prime Minister Inukai controlled the radical army officers. Both

²⁵ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 217.

²⁶ Terasaki and Terasaki Miller, *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 28-30.

ended up with Japan's military expansionism in Manchuria. However, while the Wakatsuki cabinet declared the non-enlargement principle, the Inukai cabinet abandoned it. Surprisingly few have discussed this point in the field of Japanese studies. In showing the different natures of these cabinets, this dissertation will offer a better historical understanding of the Manchurian Incident.

Second, this dissertation aims to bring Japanese studies into the realm of security studies. Scholars of Japanese history and politics have offered excellent works on the Japanese military and expansionism. In their historical studies on the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire, Michael Barnhart, Barbara Brooks, and Louise Young share many insights with political scientists who study the Japanese Empire literature.²⁷ But they have not explicitly made generalized arguments.

In contrast, some political scientists have offered sophisticated theoretical analyses, using Japanese cases. *The Politics of Oligarchy* by J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth is an ambitious work that builds an abstract theory based on primary sources.²⁸ But a Japanese historian pointed out that they oversimplified, misused or misinterpreted historical materials in order to strengthen their

²⁷ Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).

²⁸ J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, *The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

argument.²⁹ Indeed, as they admit themselves, they sacrificed historical richness for their parsimonious analysis.

Yet, fundamentally, the social science method and historical approach complement each other.³⁰ Japan specialists should benefit greatly from social science theories and methods because the analytical frameworks that political scientists employ help in generalizing specific historical events. They deepen our understanding of important political and social phenomena. In turn, political scientists would be greatly enriched by historians' in-depth research because a social science theory must be verified by rich and accurate pieces of evidence. Exploring empirical evidences and linking these historical details to theoretical debates, this dissertation hopes to offer an argument which strikes a good balance between historical richness and analytical rigor.

Third, it will specify when civilian leaders are able to control the military effectively. For a long time, in the civil-military relations literature, the central debate has developed around who had the most influence in national security policymaking. Deborah Avant, Elizabeth Kier and Barry Posen argue that civilians' influence is significant while Jeffrey Legro, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van

²⁹ Ito Yukio. "Rational Choice Model to Kindai Nihon Kenkyu." *Leviathan*, vol. 19, Fall 1996.

³⁰ Those who emphasize that political science and history are complementary rather than confrontational, see Jack Snyder "Science and Sovietology: Bringing the methods gap in Soviet foreign policy studies." *World Politics*, vol. 40, (January 1988), pp. 169-193; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 2000).

Evera argue that the military's role is imperative.³¹ Yet, important questions to be asked are whether or not civilian elites and the military think of national security differently, and when civilians are able or unable to control the military and influence national security policies.

Peter Feaver, Richard H. Kohn and others have recently shown a comprehensive survey on both civilians and the military leaders, in which they spell out changing dynamics between civilians and the military.³² However, their focus is exclusively on the United States in the post-Cold War period. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent their arguments can be generalized and applied to other cases. This dissertation aims to answer these questions based on Japanese historical cases.

Fourth, by comparing a case study of international cooperation (The London Naval Conference) with that of international conflict (the Manchurian

³¹ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp. 226, 234; Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*, pp. 24-30, 210; Van Evera, "Causes of Wars" Ph.D. dissertation, chapter 7, University of California, Berkeley, 1984; Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, pp. 7, 12, 17; Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*, pp. 22-26, 233-235; Kier, *Imagining War*, pp. 22-26.

³² A classical work that examines gaps between civilians and the military is; Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*. Recent works are; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, vol. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-17; Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2, (Winter 1996), pp. 149-178; Peter D. Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations," Project on U.S. Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1996; Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 25, no. 2, (Winter 1999), pp. 193-218.

Incident), this dissertation will explain why Japan changed its policy principle in international politics. It implicitly challenges the neorealists' simplistic view of Japanese imperialism. According to the neorealist approach, since the Meiji restoration, Japan continuously increased its national power in international politics by colonizing Taiwan and Korea. As a revisionist state, Japan further attempted to change the order in East Asia by building the state of Manchukuo. Yet, these case studies suggest that domestic politics determines how Japan achieves national security.³³ The process and outcome of international affairs is often the result of the balance of power between competing groups who have different policy preferences.

Fifth, by examining political cleavages between hard-liners and soft-liners, this study will criticize the organization perspective. The organization theories emphasize the significant influence of the military organizations on the state's policy choice, because of the organizational strengths such as institutional autonomy, monopoly of information and organization culture. These approaches assume that the military is a monolithic unit that seeks its bureaucratic interests and maintains its organizational culture and habit. It is a hierarchical organization that ensures some level of internal cohesion.

³³ Works that emphasize the role of domestic politics are; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 4, (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460; Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam, eds., *Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

However, the treatment of the military as a basic unit of analysis is not entirely helpful in understanding civil-military relations and the state's policy choice. Indeed, relaxing such an assumption will allow us to comprehend the policymaking processes. The case studies illustrate that the military is not a monolithic organization. The military officers do not always act for the organizational interests in the same way. Rather, they may have their own political ambitions within the organization. They may cooperate with politicians at the expense of the organization's interest. This study assumes that the military organization is a kind of political community whose members with slightly different perspectives bring their own consideration into the policy debates.³⁴ Unpacking the military is crucial to comprehending the national security policymaking process.

VI. Limitation of Analysis

This study has certain limitations of analysis. First, debates on civil-military relations and democratization are beyond this scope. This study is quite relevant to theoretical debates on democratization and civil-military relations in comparative politics.³⁵ It explores case studies which demonstrate the military

³⁴ Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, p. 19.

³⁵ Civil-Military Relations literature in Comparative Politics, see Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Westport: Praeger, 1960); Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1968); Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch eds., *Armies and Politics in Latin America Rev. 2nd ed.*, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Karen Remmer, *Military Rule in Latin America* (Boston:

became politicized and therefore Japanese democracy was declining. However, since the main academic interest was the policy shift from international cooperation to international conflict, this study will spend little time discussing the military's political participation and the decline of democracy.³⁶

Second, the study will not analyze the mechanism of the Japanese political party in detail.³⁷ One of the reasons why Japanese democracy declined and expansionism abroad escalated was that Japanese political parties were poorly institutionalized. As the Wakatsuki and Inukai administrations illustrate, the head of a political party was selected as a result of compromise between competing factions. Hence, occasionally, even the head of a political party was unable to reach a consensus on security policy choice within the party. This situation resulted in the cabinet being unable to effectively implement public policies.

Unwin Hyman, 1989); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); David Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); J. Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

³⁶ On this topic, see Takenaka Hirotsuka, *Senzen Nihon ni Okeru Minshuka no Zassetsu: Minshuka Tochu Taisei Hokai no Bunseki*.

³⁷ On the theoretical debate based on Latin American case studies, see Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

While recognizing this problem, this dissertation will not discuss the issues of political parties.

Third, this study will pay little attention to socio-economic issues.

Undoubtedly, Japan's choice of foreign policy and economic policy is closely connected to some extent. In the midst of the Showa Depression, the hard-liners' propaganda to control Manchuria was quite appealing to the public. Ohara rightly argues that the Great Depression reshuffled economic interests in the society.³⁸ Young also points out that the mass media played a significant role to promote myth of expansionism in the middle of the Manchurian Incident.³⁹ It contributed to form a promilitary coalition and promote Japan's expansionism in Asia. However, primary sources that are used in this dissertation show that analyzing politics among the Imperial Court, politicians, and the military make it easier to comprehend Japan's choice for either international cooperation or international conflict.

Finally, this study will not involve in debates on the role of the emperor in Japan's expansionism as Herbert Bix recently maintained.⁴⁰ Rather, in this analysis, the emperor and the court are considered an intervening variable. That is, the

³⁸ Ohara, *Democratization and Expansionism*.

³⁹ Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire*.

⁴⁰ Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. In addition to Bix, many Japanese historians examine the role of Emperor Hirohito and his responsibility for Asia-Pacific War. See Iyenaga Saburo, *Senso Sekinin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1985); Fujiwawa Akira ed., *Tettei Kensho: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku* (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1991); Nakamura Masanori, *Sengo to Shocho Tenno* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992); Yoshida Hiroshi, *Showa Tenno no Shusenshi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992). The emperor's monologue indicates that the emperor played much more significant role in state affairs during the Pacific War than before.

emperor and the court members did influence the balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners in politics and the military, but they were not the driving forces that shaped Japan's policy outcomes in the three case studies. Indeed, to what extent the emperor influenced policy outcome in practice is quite debatable in the case studies. Thanks to Emperor Hirohito's personal request to General Shirakawa, Japan and China made a truce quickly in 1932. Yet, in 1933, despite the emperor's order, the army continued to advance the troops in Rehe Province. Although the assessment of the role of the emperor is crucial to understand Japan's foreign policy decision-making process, this dissertation will not treat the emperor as the central actor.

VII. Plan of This Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation will be organized as follows. Chapter 1 thoroughly investigates two theoretical perspectives that would explain Japan's policy choice. One such perspective is the neorealist approach. It asserts that the international security environment shapes the state's behavior. Therefore, in response to the international environment, Japan chose either international cooperation or international conflict. The other of the two perspectives explores the organization approach. It is a set of organization theories with different emphasis such as the institutional autonomy, bureaucratic interests, information monopoly, and organization culture. The main thesis of this approach is that the military organization greatly influences Japan's policy outcomes.

While this dissertation acknowledges the analytical strengths of these approaches, it will claim that a political coalition among civilians, the court group,

and the military leaders is a key element that shapes Japan's security policies. Revising coalition approaches by Snyder and Ohara, this study will argue that Japan's choice for either international cooperation or international conflict is the result of the domestic balance of power between hard-liners and soft-liners.

Before examining the case studies, chapter 2 illustrates the Japanese political system, history of Japan's political development, and two different attitudes towards national security. One of Japan's prominent characteristics under the Meiji Constitution was a de-centralized political system. While the cabinet was the central organ in politics, the military, the Genro, and the Privy Council had veto power over government decisions. This political system made it difficult for civilians to carry out coherent policies if other groups were in disagreement. As for Japan's political development, it will describe the development of Japan's party politics and democracy, politicization of the military and of the court.

Regarding attitudes toward national security, two different views existed in Japan. Hard-liners had a revisionist view. They held that Japan had to dominate Manchuria for state survival. They opposed any international rules and agreements posed by the Great Powers. Soft-liners, however, had a status quo perspective. Their view was such that Japan could maintain security through international laws and organizations. Instead of territorial expansion, promoting trade with China would enrich the nation. Japan's policy choice depends on the domestic balance of power between these two competing views.

Chapter 3 explores the process of the London Naval Conference in 1930. It focuses on how the Hamaguchi cabinet convinced the navy to agree on the naval

arms reduction treaty. Hamaguchi chose Wakatsuki, a veteran politician who was a financial expert, as the head of the delegation. Choosing him as the head, Hamaguchi intended to avoid the naval experts' domination at the conference and structured the negotiation as an important state affair. Emperor Hirohito, Genro Saionji and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki also strongly supported the naval arms reduction. While experts of naval operations opposed any concessions, leaders at the navy agreed on the cabinet decision. Thanks to their support, the cabinet was able to conclude the treaty.

Chapter 4 explores the Wakatsuki cabinet's reaction to the Manchurian Incident. Both the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Army Minister agreed with the cabinet on the non-enlargement principle when the Incident took place. They issued strict orders and sent special missions to Manchuria to contain the military dispute. Yet, the army leaders hesitated to punish rebellious young radicals who escalated the dispute in Manchuria and who attempted a coup in Tokyo. As for the rebellion by the young officers, the emperor, Genro Saionji, and the Imperial Court members were rather wary. They avoided severe confrontation with them. They also perceived that Prime Minister Wakatsuki was not brave enough to settle this crisis. Gradually losing support from other political actors as well as from its own cabinet members, the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned in the middle of the Incident.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that the Inukai cabinet changed its course of military action. Hard-liners in the Inukai cabinet shared the military doctrine of the Manchurian settlement with the army hard-liners. They built a strong hard-line

coalition among politicians, civil bureaucrats, and the military. They promoted expansionist policies as Japan's official government policy. Furthermore, after Prime Minister Inukai was murdered by young military radicals, the Saito cabinet recognized the state of Manchukuo quickly and withdrew itself from the League of Nations. Dramatic change in this policy direction was the result of a shift in the internal balance of power within the state. In conclusion, after summarizing empirical findings and theoretical implications, this dissertation suggests further studies on current Japan's self defense forces and on the issues of civilian control.

Chapter 1

Explaining Japan's Security Policy

Remembering Japan's defeat in World War II, I have asked myself why Japan followed an expansionist foreign policy that worked to her own destruction. Was it the pressure of international rivalry or the demand resulting from domestic needs? Was it the aggressiveness of her imperialistic ideology or the defect in her political structure?

Ogata Sadako ¹

Introduction

What forms Japan's national security policy? Is it the international pressure? Is it domestic politics? Who determines national security policy? Do political leaders dominate the policymaking process? Do the military leaders significantly influence security policy outcomes? When are civilians able to maximize their influence? What is the role of the emperor?

This chapter states that neither the neorealist approach nor organization approach adequately accounts for the state's policy choice in international politics. Critically assessing these approaches, this chapter will focus on a coalition politics approach. It will maintain that Japan's security policy outcome is the result of coalition politics between soft-liners and hard-liners. In particular, in addition to politicians and the military, this study will explore the role of the court, including

¹ Sadako Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), ix.

the emperor, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlain. It will examine soft-liners and hard-liners in politics, the military, and the court.

Linking to the civil-military relations literature, this study will further assert that civilian leaders are able to maximize their influence on policy outcome when they have constitutional authority on the issue and when they are able to make a coalition with military leaders and the court.

The first two sections briefly discuss two theoretical approaches. The neorealist approach claims that the state's policy choice is its rational response to the international security environment. In order to survive in the anarchic international system, the state builds national power internally and balances against threats externally. The organization theories maintain that the military plays a significant role in defense-related policymaking processes. The military's autonomous prerogatives make it difficult for civilians to intervene in military affairs. In a country like Wilhelm Germany and Imperial Japan where the constitution grants the military independent rights on military commands, the military takes great advantages over civilians on matters ranging from tactics to politico-military strategy.

After reviewing these perspectives, the third section will point out analytical flaws in these two approaches. They are quite parsimonious and straightforward. But they are too general to explain the dynamic process of the state's policy choice. Neither the state nor the military is a unitary actor. Furthermore, the civil-military relation is not always a zero-sum relative power relation. Rather, political coalition is the key element that shapes the state's security policy outcome.

The fourth section examines coalition politics approach by Snyder and Ohara. It will also point out that exploring coalition politics among politicians, the military, and the court is crucial to understand Japan's security policy outcome. In addition to coalition politics, the fifth section will discuss Japan's civil-military relations. It will propose that two variables are crucial to assess civilian influence on policy outcome. One variable is their constitutional authority in the field of national security. The higher the constitutional authority civilians have, the more influence they have on the policymaking process. The other variable is the degree to which the civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome depends on whether or not they are able to make a political coalition with military leaders. Political leaders are more likely to make a coalition with military leaders when they share the same ideas about national security and policy preferences. In addition, as an intervening variable, this study will examine to what extent the emperor, the court aides and the Genro influence domestic balance of power and the state's policy choice.

I. Neorealism and Japan's Security Policy

Anarchy, security, and relative gains are the core elements in the neorealist paradigm. Because world politics takes place within a self-help realm, the state must rely on its own resources to protect itself and further its interests. Though the state is not in a constant state of war, it must constantly think of its own security, survival, and gains relative to others. The state can cooperate, although cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain because of relative gains and cheating problems.²

² About neorealist paradigm, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*; Frankel, ed.,

Many scholars of international relations such as John Mearsheimer and Suiheng Zhao nicely explain international politics in East Asia and Japan's security policy from 1868 to 1945 based on the logic of neorealist paradigm. According to Zhao, "...military power has always been the central concern in the region since the nineteenth century. East Asian countries have demonstrated a strong territoriality and the unilateral use of military means to defend national boundaries.... The "trading state" is tilted toward concern for territorial acquisition and military capacities rather than national goals of economic welfare and cultural hegemony. The realist approach is the most appropriate for study of East Asian international relations in the twentieth century."³

The realist approach implies that Japan followed the Great Powers for its own survival in international politics. Internally, modernization and industrialization were the main goals to achieve. Externally, however, Japan constantly searched for opportunities to expand and gain more power. In the first few decades following the Meiji Restoration, Japan focused on controlling Korea. Then Japan went to war against China in 1895. After quickly defeating China, it imposed a harsh peace treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki. After a resounding victory at sea and on land in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Portsmouth Treaty ensured that Japan would dominate the Korean Peninsula and control the Southern Manchurian Railway. When the Bolshevik Revolution took place in

Realism: Restatements and Renewal; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

³ Zhao, *Power Competition in East Asia*, p. 11.

Russia, with the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Japan sent troops to Russia to support anti-Bolshevik forces and attempted to advance its influence in Siberia. During World War I, Japan advanced German controlled territories in China and the Pacific Islands. Japan gradually increased its position in Asia.

Neorealist theory explains that Japan's foreign policy in the 1920s was rather peaceful because the United States, who was wary of Japan's rising power in Asia, forced Japan to accept the Washington treaties. The United States, the European Great Powers, and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo in the Asia Pacific. Yet, after the Great Depressions, Japan became increasingly aggressive externally, invading Manchuria and China. Japan perceived that territorial expansion would be the only way to survive in the age of total war. Japan thought that rich natural resources and spacious land in Manchuria was promising for the Japanese Empire.⁴

II. Organization Theories and Japan's Security Policy

Organization theories assert that the military organization has a significant influence on the state's security policy for various reasons. The organization interest approach emphasizes that the military tends to develop an offensive military doctrine because of its self-interest. Snyder and Van Evera argue that the military organizations tend to develop offensive military operation planning to increase its autonomy, prestige, size and wealth. Offense requires large defense budgets. The quick, decisive, and offensive campaigns make soldiers specialists in victory and increase the military organization's prestige. In addition, an offensive doctrine can

⁴ Brief description about Japan's expansionism, see Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 172-181.

structure military campaigns and reduce uncertainty. Due to these organizational interests and needs, the military influences the state's policy choice in the field of national security.⁵

According to recent studies, it is organization culture that shapes the state's security policy. Organization culture is a pattern of beliefs which prescribes action within the organization. Examining the military's organization culture with the state's use of force during World War II, Legro convincingly maintains that the state's choice for either international cooperation or conflict heavily depends on the military's organization culture. According to him, this is significant for a few reasons: the military organization is a hierarchical organization and maintains a uniform set of beliefs and customs; the military has a monopoly on expertise and information in security affairs; and the government has few alternative sources of knowledge, advice, or options when national security is at stake.⁶

Challenging this cultural perspective, based on principal-agent theory, Feaver and Avant claim that the state's choice of the use of forces is best explained by the military's strategic action to civilian leaders. The military agent has private information that the civilian principal may not possess. The military agent's status as an expert on the management of violence confers significant information

⁵ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*; Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*; Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7, Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984; Rosen, *Winning the Next War*; Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*; Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*; Kier, *Imagining War*; Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn eds., *Soldiers and Civilians*.

⁶ Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*.

advantages over civilians on matters ranging from tactics to logistics to operational art. The military may seek to manipulate the relationship so as to maximize the likelihood that their will can prevail in policy disputes with their civilian leaders.⁷ It is also possible to influence the public view and create a favorable environment by controlling information.⁸

As far as the Japanese military is concerned, pre-World War II policymakers and many students of Japanese history have pointed out that the military's institutional prerogative was a cause of its overwhelming influence on the policymaking process. Under the Meiji constitution, military leaders could bypass the cabinet in drafting regulations in making operational command decisions. The prime minister and other state ministers could participate in deciding Japan's defense principle formally, but they were unable to access enough information about concrete military operational plans.

According to Takenaka.

The most powerful office that did not fall under the control of elected political offices was the military...the military was responsible directly to the emperor and was not subject to any control by the government, which guaranteed strong autonomy for the military in the domain of military operations...the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army and the Navy as well as the army and navy ministers could directly report to the emperor on military affairs without prior consultation with the prime minister leading the government. These two legal prerogatives enjoyed by the military gave it much room to maneuver without respecting government policy. Even when

⁷ Peter Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations.": Deborah D. Avant, "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?" *Security Studies*, vol. 6 no. 2, (1996 Fall-Winter), pp. 51-90.

⁸ Van Evera, "Causes of War." pp. 215-217, 239-240.

it went against a government policy and took action on its own initiative. it could claim that it acted under the auspices of the “supreme command” of the emperor and could seek justification from the emperor.⁹

Therefore, the military was able to launch military campaigns without fully considering diplomatic options. The military’s pursuit for its organization interest, in fact, damaged national interest.

The army’s organization culture also contributed to Japan’s unrealistic expansionism. One of the prominent characteristics of the organization culture in the army was its heavy emphasis on non-scientific element—the willpower of the military—in fighting.¹⁰ Instead of developing technologically innovative weapons after World War I, the army had long indoctrinated this willpower into command and infantry manuals.¹¹ The manuals encouraged individual commanders to make troops behave according to their own judgment in the field. Troops had to obey the senior commanders’ orders, but they also had to be able to judge their situations and act independently based on their judgment.¹² The willpower had to overcome any disadvantages.¹³ A new section titled “belief of absolute winning” in the infantry

⁹ Takenaka Hiroataka, *Senzen Nihon ni Okeru Minshuku no Zassetsu*, pp. 144-145.

¹⁰ Ohashi Takeo, *Tosui Koryo* (Tokyo: Kenkosha, 1972), p. 356.

¹¹ Suzuki Soroku Taisho Denki Hensan Iin, *Suzuki Soroku Taisho Den* (Tokyo: Suzuki Soroku Taisho Denki Hensan kai, 1943), pp. 340-341; Kitsukawa Manabu, *Rikugun Uramenshi: Shogun Araki no Nanajunen, vol. 2: Arashito Tatakau Tetsusho Araki* (Araki Sadao Shogunden Hensen Kanko Kai, 1955), pp. 70-72.

¹² Sato Tokutarō, “Gunjinchokuyū to Meirei Fukuju,” *Gunji Shigaku*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1975 June), pp. 99-102; Ohashi ed., *Tosui Koryo*, p. 362.

¹³ In fact, the Army General Staff did not have a clear policy principle on modernization of the army. On the one hand, World War I taught that modern

field manual said: "Unquestionable belief of winning was the Imperial Army's brilliant tradition. It was raised through dedicated educational training. It will bring honorable results. Our Imperial Army must recall our unique history and tradition. We must heighten our patriotism and loyalty to the state. Continue to do effective training, and promote trust among the ranks. By so doing, maintain the spirit of winning and do not fear any strong enemies. Go ahead for winning."¹⁴ It is well known that due to this belief, the Japanese army carried out an unrealistic military campaign in the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War.

The navy was more scientific than the army. But the navy systematically controlled political situations in order to protect its own interests. Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor was due in part to the navy's manipulation of information. The navy refused, in the Liaison Conference, to go further than to state that the prime minister alone must decide whether Japan should continue to negotiate with the United States or go to war. Navy Minister Oikawa Koshiro hesitated to state publicly that the navy would be unable to defeat the U.S. navy. Recalling after the war, Oikawa commented: "if we were to say that we were unsure to carry out operations against the United States, it would have meant we had been lying to the

technology would be crucial in order to win battles in future warfare. On the other hand, the General Staff concluded that Germany was defeated because of its lack of confidence and patriotism. Therefore, while modernization was recognized as important, the spirit of patriotism was considered essential. Joho Yoshio, *Rikugun Daigakko* (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1973), pp. 227-231; Ohashi ed., *Tosui Koryo*, p. 356, 362; and Maehara Toru, "Showaki Rikugun no Gunji Shiso: Wagakuni Dokutoku no Yohei Shiso no Keisei Keii." *Gunji Shigaku*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1990 June), pp. 8-9.

¹⁴ Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu ed. *Kanto Gun*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun sha, 1969), p. 36.

emperor when presenting operational plans for war.”¹⁵ Moreover, the navy kept it secret about the Pearl Harbor attack plan to the full Liaison Conference. In Admiral Nagano Osami’s words, “there was no necessity to talk of the attack on Pearl Harbor since it was only a naval operation and did not involve strategy but tactics.”¹⁶ The navy’s monopoly of information and its desire to protect organizational interests and autonomy led to the careless decision to attack the United States.

III. Strengths and Weaknesses of Neorealist and Organization Theories

Both neorealist and organization approaches have a couple of analytical strengths. First of all, both analytical frameworks are quite rigorous. By deductive logic, the neorealist approach explains the nature of international politics and the state behavior in a very simple way. The organization theories are also parsimonious. They account for the military’s influence on the state’s behavior in a straightforward way. Second, while depending on deductive logic, both of them pay sufficient attention to case studies in order to verify their theories. Studies that employ neorealist paradigm often cover a wide range of history of international politics while the organization theories focus on a specific state’s military organizations in detail. Both approaches test their theories based on primary or secondary sources and explain important issues of the state’s behavior in the pre-World War II period.

¹⁵ Quotation from Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War.” p. 346.

¹⁶ Quotation from Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War.” p. 347.

Without doubt, the systemic and organization variables are important to explain Japan's policy outcomes. However, these approaches have a few analytical problems. First, the neorealist approach is too general to explain Japan's security policymaking process and changes of Japan's security policy outcomes.¹⁷ Surely, the state responds to the international systemic pressure but such a systemic variable is often a permissive cause of the state's certain policy choice.¹⁸ Even when national security is at stake, domestic groups, economic constraints, the nature of constitutions, social culture, and political institutions all play a pivotal role in the state's policy choice.

Indeed, this dissertation will maintain that domestic politics matters. Japan changed course of its foreign policy direction in 1931-33 because of the change of the internal balance of power in Japanese politics. When the Manchurian Incident took place, Japan attempted to minimize the conflict and settle the Incident through diplomatic negotiations. Political leaders in the Wakatsuki administration thought that Japan's expansionism in Manchuria was unbeneficial. In contrast, political leaders in the Inukai administration considered it in the opposite way. They

¹⁷ Regarding neorealist theory and theory of foreign policy, see Elman, "Horses for Courses."

¹⁸ Recent studies on the impact of domestic politics on international events, see Snyder, *Myths of Empire*; Rosecrance and Stein ed., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*; Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norm and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Thomas U. Berger, *Culture of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

supported the Kanto army's state-building of Manchukuo. They were hard-liners who believed that Japan's expansionism would be necessary for the survival of the empire. Japan's policy outcomes are significantly different whether either soft-liners or hard-liners rule the government.

Second, the organization approaches emphasize the significance of the military in national security policymaking process. But the extent to which the military influences policy choice depends on the issue areas. The military may indirectly influence the decision-making process by manipulating information and controlling policy options. Yet, it is impossible for the military to do so in all the defense-related areas.¹⁹

As far as the Japanese military is concerned, the Meiji Constitution granted the military institutional autonomy in the field of military command. However, some issues of military affairs such as defense budget, military readiness during peace time and international agreements are considered state affairs. Thus both political and the military leaders actually participated in the policymaking processes.

In particular, arms reduction was an important agenda for civilian leaders because it was closely linked with national budget. A serious economic drop after World War I and the Great Kanto Earthquake forced the military to accept a budget cut. Although civilian leaders were unable to intervene to reduce the size of armed forces directly, they pressed the army to reorganize the forces. In fact, despite

¹⁹ Scholars of civil-military relations in both international relations and comparative politics have argued that civilian leaders successfully control the military on the issues that are closely related to their political interests. See Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil*; Kier, *Imagining War*.

opposition within the army. Army Minister Ugaki Kazunari decided to reduce four entire infantry divisions in 1925.²⁰ Even if the military maintains the institutional autonomy, it does not have free hands in the issues of military affairs.

The third analytical problem is that the organization approaches assume that the military is a unitary actor. Analyzing politics within the military is crucial in order to understand the dynamics of civil-military relations and sources of the state's policy choice. To be sure, studies on military organizations acknowledge that internal politics exist within the military to some extent. But, in principle, the organization approach treats the military as a basic unit of analysis.

As far as the army is concerned, it was far from a unitary organization. It goes without saying that the army had developed its own organization culture, custom, beliefs, and norms. However, numerous memoirs and biographies indicate that serious factional fighting occurred in the army. For example, recalling his days in the army, Horie Kazumaro commented that "In the army, some officers thought of military strategy realistically and pragmatically in the Western way. Others considered it with an emphasis on Japanese spiritualism. Their ways of thinking about military strategy were fundamentally different. In addition, they had different

²⁰ Many officers said that the majority of the army had been dissatisfied with Ugaki because of this personnel reduction. Baba Tsunego, *Gendai Jinbutsu Hyoron* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1930), pp. 252-253; Ito Masanori, *Gunbatsu Koboshi*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju shinsha, 1958), pp. 112-115; Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu ed. *Daihonei Rikugunbu* (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun sha, 1968), p. 267; Nakamura Kikuo, *Showa Rikugun Hishi* (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1968), pp. 123-126; Joho Yoshio, *Rikugunsho Gunmukyoku* (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1979), pp. 303-308.

political beliefs. These different opinions and beliefs caused conflicts within the army.”²¹

These different opinions and beliefs within the army were often linked with personal ambition and benefit. Besides, officers could work more efficiently with colleagues who shared similar ideas and values.²² Relaxing the assumption that the military is a unitary actor may be more helpful to understand the military organization.

Fourth, the organization theories tend to conceptualize the civil-military relation as a zero-sum relationship. If the military has a significant influence on the policymaking process, it implies that civilian supremacy is weakening. However, the civil-military relation is not always a relative power relationship. Rather, civilians and the military leaders are interdependent.

Indeed, Japan's expansionism in Manchuria was the product of a political coalition between civilian and military hard-liners. Mori closely worked with the army hard-liners to architect the state-building of Manchukuo. Once the Seiyukai took the office, he organized vice minister meetings among the army, navy, and

²¹ Horike's comment in Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 126.

²² In fact, it is well known that two factions in the army —Kodo and Tosei factions severely conflicted in the middle of 1930s. Due to this factional fighting, Nagata Tetsuzan, the head of the military administration department and a promising leader in the Tosei faction, was killed in his office by a lieutenant named Aizawa Saburo. See Takahashi Masae, *Showa no Gunbatsu* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1969).

other civil ministries regularly. All of them participated in the meeting and built consensus to advance Japan's expansionist policies.²³

Considering these analytical flaws, the next section will focus on a coalition approach as the central argument in this dissertation. After reviewing studies on coalition politics, it will discuss Japan's coalition politics among party politicians, the military, and the court. Furthermore, it will suggest that two variables—civilian leaders' constitutional authority and its coalition with the military and the court—will help us understand the dynamics of Japanese civil-military relations and security policy formation.

IV. Coalition Politics and Japan's Security Policy

Criticizing both neorealist and organization theories, this dissertation will argue that examining political coalition is crucial to understand sources of Japan's security policy. Political coalition is the key element for two reasons. First, civilians require cooperation from the military in order to legitimize their policy choice. The military's knowledge and expertise is essential when civilians carry out security policies. Second, the military organization is not monolithic: all military officers do not always maintain identical security political preferences, although the military leaders may share similar ideas about national security and policy preferences. Working with civilian leaders, the military officers may gain benefits at the expense of organization interests in the security policymaking process.

²³ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 786-787.

In addition, whether the emperor and the court members support the policy principle or not would influence internal balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners. If politicians make a strong coalition with the military and the court, then they are able to stand firm against opponents and persuade them to accept their policy choice. Endorsement from both the military and the court may help implement policy.

Political scientists and historians such as Ohara and Snyder emphasize political coalition among politicians, the military, intellectuals, and/or socio-economic classes. Surprisingly, they hardly examined to what extent the emperor and the court members contributed to Japan's foreign policy direction. Revising their analyses, this study scrutinizes political coalition between soft-liners and hard-liners among politicians, the military and the court.

As far as coalition politics approach is concerned, Snyder argues that overexpansion is a product of the political and propagandistic activities of imperialist groups. Narrow imperialist interests overcome their weakness and hijack national policy in two ways. First, they gain control over national policy by joining in a log-rolled coalition, trading favors so that each group gets what it wants most, and costs are transferred to society through taxes imposed by the state. Second, coalition leaders sell myths to the society. They often enjoy an information monopoly and exploit their reputation for expert knowledge to justify their self-serving policies.

In his case study in *Myths of Empire*, Snyder points out that military cartels between the army and navy led to open-ended expansion in pursuit of autarky. The

Japanese army propagated an ideology of security and prosperity through expansion and entered into a logrolling arrangement with the navy. While the army continued to invade China, the navy launched a war with the United States.²⁴

Ohara similarly argues that Japan's expansionism was the result of the shift from antimilitary coalition to promilitary coalition in domestic politics. According to Ohara, democratization is the process of power transition from the military social groups to the economic social groups. In the middle of democratization, as the industrialization process deepens and the economic social groups become more prominent, the military social groups will face an increasing challenge from the economic social groups to cut military activities, which reduce their dominance in domestic society.

In the 1920s, Japan was forming an antimilitary coalition. Major political parties tried to gain support from the large and small bourgeoisie and labor class, thereby forming the antimilitary coalition. This antimilitary coalition carried out a series of policies that reduced the military's organizational wealth and size. In contrast, in the 1930s, the impact of the Great Depression and the radicalization of the military caused a promilitary coalition formation. After the Showa Depression, the agricultural landowners and peasants supported the military. The zaibatsu later joined to ally with the military and ended up giving ambiguous ideological approval to the military expansionism.²⁵

²⁴ Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, pp. 142-150.

²⁵ Ohara, *Democratization and Expansionism*, pp. 69-159.

Both Snyder and Ohara rightly focus on domestic coalition. This study will revise their coalition approaches, emphasizing the role of the emperor and the court. Namely, primary sources that are used in this dissertation show that in the policymaking process, the court members such as Lord Keeper of Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlain manipulated political situations. The emperor also implicitly conveyed his opinions to political and military leaders by asking questions or giving a comment. Revealing the Imperial Court's behavior in the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, this dissertation will revise existing coalition explanations. It will offer a more comprehensive historical interpretation of Japan's policy shift.

V. Civil-Military Relations and Japan's Security Policy

In addition to revising the coalition approach, this dissertation will specify when civilian leaders are able to control the military effectively. As Huntington points out, civil-military relations is one aspect of national security policy and civil-military relations is the principal institutional component of military security policy.²⁶ For a long time, in the civil-military relations literature, the central debate has developed around the question of who had the most influence in national security policymaking.²⁷ This dissertation will ask whether civilian elites and the

²⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldiers and the State*, p. 1.

²⁷ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp.226, 234; Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*, pp. 24-30, 210; Van Evera, "Causes of Wars" Ph.D. dissertation, chapter 7; Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, pp. 7, 12,17; Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*, pp. 22-26, 233-235; Kier, *Imagining War*, pp. 22-26.

military think of national security differently, and at what point civilians are able to control the military and influence national security policies.

This dissertation tries to answer these questions by exploring hard cases. Under the Meiji Constitution, the military held strong legal imperatives on military issues. The General Staffs of the Navy and Army were exclusively in charge of military command such as operational and doctrinal planning, the development of forces, and intelligence activities. The Chiefs of the General Staffs work for the Commander in Chief—the emperor, not the government. There is no doubt that the military is one of the central institutions that influence Japan's national security policy. But some important questions to ask are: 1) to what extent are civilian leaders able to maximize their influence?; and 2) under what conditions do they have a large impact on policy outcome? This study will answer these questions by analyzing 1) civilian leaders' constitutional authority and 2) civilian leaders' coalition with the military and the court.

1) Constitutional Authority

One of the key variables that explain civilians' impact on security policymaking processes is the degree of their constitutional authority in the issues of national security. In general, the more civilian leaders have constitutional authority on the issue, the more influence they have on the state's policy options.

As far as national security is concerned, since national security covers a wide range of issues from narrow military tactics to grand strategy, there are areas in

which both civilian and military leaders share authority.²⁸ To be sure, civilian leaders may have little authority in the area of narrow military professional issues. They may simply follow what the military tells them to do. But in general, they maintain or share authority with the military in areas such as national budget, the peacetime military structure, and national strategy.²⁹

Indeed, scholars who examine civilian intervention into military affairs imply that civilian leaders have authority in certain issues and are actively involved in the policy decision-making process. Posen, for example, argues that British statesmen were actively involved in changing military doctrine when national security was at stake during World War II. From late 1937 to the outbreak of the war, civilian leaders such as Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Thomas Inskip, the minister of defense, made a decision to throw progressively more resources into the production of fighters. At Inskip's request, Dowding worked up the first "ideal scheme" of air defense, specifying overall requirements for fighters, heavy and light anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and balloons. Dowding and the

²⁸ The area where political leaders maintain authority may be different from country to country. In the state like pre-World War I Germany, civilian leaders neither share authority nor participate in making military strategy before World War I. See, Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," in Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera eds., *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 37-41. Japan and many Latin American countries that emulated Prussian military system faced similar problems.

²⁹ David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 25, (October, 1992), pp. 87-95. See also, Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential Influence."

civilians worked in a kind of partnership. British civilian leaders did not necessarily have the expertise to directly change military doctrine but they had authority to appoint the military mavericks to advance doctrinal and operational innovation.³⁰

Similarly, Kier argues that French politicians of the right and the left had actively participated in debates on the structural reform of the French army. Since the French Revolution, politicians in the right and the left wings had fought over the army's organizational structure. Whereas politicians in the right wanted a professional army consisting of long-serving soldiers, those in the left advocated a national army founded on military principles or based on short-term conscription. In particular, for the left, a professional army threatened domestic liberty. Hence, after World War I and the election victory of a left-wing coalition in 1924, the French Parliament reduced the length of conscription to one year. The structure of a national army was important in the political agenda, therefore politicians, not the military leaders, significantly influenced the decision of this matter.³¹

In comparative politics, many specialists of Latin American militaries point out that although civilian leaders generally have little expert knowledge on the military affairs, they pay sufficient attention to military budget. Military budget is in the sphere of civilians' competence and their political interests. In their studies of civil-military relations in Argentina and Brazil, Wendy Hunter and David Pion-Berlin argue that civilian leaders challenge the military in order to reduce military

³⁰ Posen, *The Sources of the Military Doctrine*, pp. 71-175.

³¹ Kier, *Imagining War*, pp. 5-26, 58-66.

budgets. In Brazil, after congressional budgetary powers were bolstered in 1988, legislators supported patronage-yielding public works program over military projects. Brazilian presidents—Sarney, Collor, and Franco—also need to balance the budgetary priority they assign to the military.³² Similarly, in Argentina, believing “that the best way to invest in national defense is by safeguarding the education and health budgets of the nation, and by achieving development.” President Alfonsín initiated a reduction of military budget which plummeted by 21 percent between 1983 and 1985. President Menem also cut the defense spending because of the economic necessity.³³

In the case of the London Naval Conference, Prime Minister Hamaguchi had constitutional authority to choose Wakatsuki as the head of the delegation. Then, when the Conference was deadlocked, Wakatsuki discussed with British and American principal delegates. He directly communicated with Foreign Minister Shidehara and Prime Minister Hamaguchi. While these civilian leaders considered navy hard-liners’ advice, they judged that Japan would be secured even after making the naval arms reduction agreement. Later, Hamaguchi reported the governmental decision to Emperor Hiroshito. Based on constitutional authority, these leaders set up the political agenda as they preferred and dominated the decision-making process.³⁴

³² Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil*, pp. 109-113.

³³ Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power*, p. 117.

³⁴ Kato Yoko, “Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai no Ronri.” *Journal of Modern Japanese Studies*, no. 20, (1998), pp. 168-172.

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, civilian leaders were unable to punish rebellious military officers because it was either the Army Minister or the Chief of the General Staff that was responsible for the military personnel changes. In fact, rebellious officers and generals such as Ishiwara Kanji and Hayashi Senjuro who ignored the government's non-enlargement principle were never punished. The army leaders were unable to punish them because the Kanto and Korea armies were winning the battles in Manchuria. Ironically, once the Kanto army controlled Manchuria, they were praised as heroes in the army. Due to the military's institutional autonomy, civilian leaders were unable to intervene in military justice and personnel systems. This weakens civilian control over the military.³⁵

2) Political Coalition

Political coalition with the military and the court is as important as constitutional authority. Even if political leaders have constitutional authority to execute certain policy, they are unable to carry out it effectively unless they gain sufficient support from the military and the court. By forming a coalition with them implicitly or explicitly, they empower themselves, have legitimacy for their choice and persuade opponents to accept it.

Political leaders make a coalition with those who share ideas about national security and policy preferences. As Kathryn Sikkink and Judith Goldstein argue, ideas provide worldviews and a framework of available options for policymakers. Such ideas transform perceptions of national interests and they are present from the

³⁵ Shidehara Kijuro, *Gaiko Gojunen* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha, 1951), pp. 178-179; Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 379-380.

beginning in the process of formulating policy preferences and shaping actors perceptions of policy options.³⁶ Politicians are more likely to execute policy smoothly if they share ideas with the military leaders and form a coalition.³⁷ Support from the court may also increase their position in domestic politics.

Indeed, many scholars of Soviet foreign policy have convincingly argued that changes of the Soviet foreign policy are results of the combination of shared ideas and a political coalition between Soviet leaders and security experts. For example, Sarah Mendelson and Andrew Bennett argue that the withdrawal from Afghanistan and other subsequent reversals for foreign policy resulted because the Gorbachev coalition gained control of political resources and placed what had been misfit ideas about both domestic and foreign policies squarely on the political agenda. The Gorbachev coalition used new reformist constituencies to alter traditional institutions such as the Communist Party, and to create new ones, such as

³⁶ Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 2 ; Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Furthermore, if civilian leaders establish a formal institution with the military leaders, then, they are able to implement policies quite effectively. In Sikkink's words, "when new ideas arise, they are able to survive and flourish to the degree that they find an institutional home or sponsor. Rarely do new ideas thrive in the modern world outside of institutional networks. Ideas within an institution become embodied in its statement of purpose, its self-definition and its research or training program, which in turn tends to perpetuate and extend the ideas."

³⁷ On idea and politics, see Sarah E. Mendelson, *Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

a critical press. The leadership's mobilization of ideas and experts changed the internal balance of power and created the conditions necessary and sufficient for change in foreign policy, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan.³⁸

Kimberley Marten Zisk also explains the Soviet military innovation based on similar logic. Namely, the Soviet reaction to the Western doctrinal shifts of Follow-on Forces Attack and Airland Battle was a result of cooperation between civilian defense experts such as Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Presidential Adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev and reformists in the military.³⁹ When civilian leaders decide that they want to encourage innovation in military doctrine or any policy changes, they try to build coalitions with reformist segments of the officer corps and gain political power through the persuasive power of ideas.

In the case of the London Naval Conference, Hamaguchi cabinet and soft-line leaders in the navy formed a loose coalition to achieve the arms reduction agreement. Soft-line leaders in the navy supported that the treaty would ensure Japan's defense and gave the cabinet's decision legitimacy. They defended the cabinet's position when the hard-liners accused Hamaguchi for ignoring the navy experts' opinion at the meetings of the Privy Council. Later, Takarabe and Yamanashi who worked for the treaty were forced to leave the navy because the hard-liners in the navy

³⁸ See also Andrew Bennett, *Condemned to Repetition?: The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1999).

³⁹ Kimberley Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 151-161.

denounced that they damaged the navy's organizational interests and endangered Japan's security. Because these officers helped Hamaguchi, Japan was able to ratify the treaty.⁴⁰ Additionally, support from the emperor and the court enhanced Hamaguchi's position in domestic politics. The emperor, for instance, sent Nara to Fleet Admiral Togo Heihachiro to support the arms reduction treaty. He also asked Nara to make sure that Togo agreed that Admiral Tani would become the Chief of the Navy's General Staff.⁴¹

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, the Wakatsuki cabinet was able to maintain the non-enlargement principle initially because Chief of the Army General Staff Kanaya Hanzo and Army Minister Minami Jiro repeatedly ordered the Kanto and Korea armies not to escalate military action in Manchuria. In principle, they agreed on the non-enlargement principle that the Wakatsuki cabinet adopted. However, no close soft-line coalition existed between civilians and the army. Facing rebellion by radical officers, the army leaders appeased them, instead of punishing them strictly. In addition, the emperor was also not strict to the commanders. The court members were also intimidated by right-wingers. They came to be disappointed with Wakatsuki because he was unable to handle this crisis properly. Due to a lack of full back-up from the army, and the court, Wakatsuki was unable to settle the Incident.⁴²

⁴⁰ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 324, 365.

⁴¹ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol.3, pp. 235-236.

⁴² Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p.111; Makino, *Makino Diary*, p. 481; Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 35.

In contrast, at the Inukai cabinet, while Prime Minister Inukai hesitated to work with the army for the state-building of Manchukuo, the army and other civil ministries stated discussing Japan's control of Manchuria and reached a consensus on the issue. Vice Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Overseas, Army and Navy Ministries met regularly, exchanged opinions, and reached a consensus. Neither the emperor nor Minseito politicians strongly opposed the hard-line government's expansionist policy in Manchuria.⁴³ The strong political coalition between civilians and the military made it smooth for the cabinet to implement expansionist policies.⁴⁴

3) Typology

	Political Leaders' High Constitutional Authority on Military Issues	Political Leaders' Low Constitutional Authority on Military Issues
Strong Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is high</i>	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i>
Weak Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i>	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is low</i>

Table 1.1 Civilian Leaders' Influence on Security Policy Outcome

Combining these two variables, this dissertation will propose the following typology. In quadrant I, there is a high level of civilian leaders' constitutional

⁴³ But the emperor seriously worried about Japan's advancement in Shanghai and in Rehe Province and tried to stop military campaigns. See Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p.32, 37; Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, pp. 507, 514.

⁴⁴ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 786-787.

authority and a strong political coalition among political, the military and the court leaders on the policy issues. In this case, civilians are able to have a large influence on policy choices. In quadrant II and III, in the policymaking process, civilian influence is moderate. In quadrant II, even if civilians are willing to commit to certain issues, their impact is moderate because civilians lack active support from the military and the court. Civilians may not fully carry out security policies without full cooperation from the military and the court. In contrast, in quadrant III, the extent they influence policy outcomes depends on how they set an agenda and how much they are determined to control the issue. In quadrant IV, the level of constitutional authority is low and the level of political coalition is weak. Often type IV includes cases that are narrowly defined military issues such as military tactics, military education and training, and the military court system. Because these issues are too technical, civilians have little authority and are unable to participate actively in them. Rather, the military is the central actor to influence outcomes in such issues.

Conclusion

This chapter points out that neither the neorealist perspective nor the organization perspective fully explains sources of Japan's security policy and policy changes. Assuming that the state is a unitary actor, neorealist thesis maintains that it is the degree of international pressure which determines whether the state chooses international cooperation or international conflict. In contrast, assuming that the military organization is a monolithic unit, the organization theories argue that the military plays a significant role in shaping the state's policy choice because of its

concern for organization interests and autonomy, its monopoly of information and expert knowledge and its strong culture. Critically reviewing them, this chapter claims that political coalition among political, the military, and court leaders is crucial to understand sources of Japan's national security.

In addition, linking to the civil-military relations debates, it proposes that two variables are important to comprehend under what conditions civilian leaders are able to maximize their influence: the degree of civilian leaders' constitutional authority on the issues and the degree of their coalition with the military and the court. Civilians are more likely to increase their influence when they have constitutional authority on the agenda. At the same time, if a political coalition among civilian, military and court leaders exists, then civilian leaders can effectively carry out security policies. Before exploring case studies in detail, the next chapter will describe characteristics of major political actors and Japan's political system under the Meiji Constitution. It also depicts a brief history of Japan's political development. Then, it illustrates two different ideas about national security policy. In the end, it will propose hypotheses on sources of Japan's security policy and civil-military relations.

Chapter 2

Japan's Political System, Political Actors and Two Views of National Security

In Japan, there were two schools in foreign policies—a liberalist school and a nationalist school. Liberalists believed that liberal democracy led by Great Britain and the United States would be spread in the post World War I world and emphasized cooperation with them. Through diplomatic means, liberalists hoped to contribute to the welfare of human beings. Japan would achieve prosperity under the framework of the League of Nations and the Washington Conference. In contrast, nationalists perceived that international institutions and treaties were merely instruments for the maintenance of the existing rights held by the Great Powers. Neither the League nor the Washington Conference made any attempt to deal with the main cause of international strife.

Shigemitsu Mamoru ¹

Introduction

Before examining the case studies in detail, this chapter describes major characteristics of Japanese political actors and of the Japanese political system. It also illustrates two different views of national security. The first section depicts a de-centralized political system under the Meiji Constitution. While the cabinet was the major organ in politics, the military, the Genro and the Privy Council had a veto power in government decisions. The emperor and the Imperial Court also influenced Japan's policy outcome. The second section illustrates the rise of party politics and democracy from the 1890s to the 1920s. It will also depict the process

¹ Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Showa no Doran*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1952), pp. 28-29.

by which both the military and the Imperial Court became politicized. The final section shows two different views of national security. Hard-liners considered that Japanese expansionism was the only way to maintain the empire and survive in world politics. Soft-liners believed that the Japanese way of surviving was to respect international laws and norms, cooperate with the Great Powers, and build good political and economical relations with China and the Great Powers.

I. Japan's Political System and Political Actors

Regarding national security affairs, under the Meiji Constitution, no single political actor dominated the decision-making process. The following major political actors participated in making national security policies.²

1) The Emperor and the Imperial Court

Article 1 of the Meiji Constitution declared that "the Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal."³ The emperor was the head of the Empire and the sovereign of the state. He was ultimately responsible to all state power, including all executive, legislative, and judicial branches. He had the supreme command of the army and the navy.

² On Japanese political system in the pre-World War II period, see Harold. S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics: Introductory Study* (New York: The Century Co. 1932); Momose Takashi, *Jiten: Showa Senzenki no Nihon: Seido to Jittai* (Tokyo: Kiyokawa Kobunkan, 1990).

³ English translation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, see Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, Appendix IV, pp. 336-343. Japanese Constitution in the pre World War II period is informally called the Meiji Constitution. The official name was the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.

The emperor declared war, made peace, and concluded treaties.⁴

Although the Constitution granted overwhelming power to the emperor, in practice, he was not absolute in the decision-making process. The emperor was to act only on the counsel of his constitutional and extra-constitutional advisers. Therefore, the emperor's authority was delegated to the ministers of state, the military, the Privy Council and the Genro.

To be sure, the emperor occasionally acted decisively. In the period of early Showa, two examples are known that the emperor intervened in national and international affairs. One was that Emperor Hirohito suggested Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi to resign when he found that Prime Minister Tanaka had hesitated to make it clear that Colonel Komoto Daisaku was responsible for murdering Zhang Zuolin.⁵ Responding to the emperor's suggestion, Prime Minister Tanaka immediately resigned his cabinet in May, 1929. The other example was when Emperor Hirohito personally asked General Shirakawa to make a truce with China before he left for Shanghai in 1932. In the Shanghai Incident, the army encouraged General Shirakawa to escalate military actions while the emperor was afraid that Sino-Japanese clash in such an international city would only damage Japan's reputation in the League of Nations. Therefore, the emperor made a request to General Shirakawa to make a truce with China in a timely manner.⁶

⁴ Article 11, 13, in *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁵ Terasaki and Terasaki Miller eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 22-25.

⁶ The emperor lamented that the military was not always responded to the emperor's orders in the Manchurian Incident. The emperor personally asked Shirakawa to

However, it is debatable to what extent the emperor influenced the policy outcome. For example, the emperor believed that the Lytton Report on the Manchurian Incident was acceptable. He strongly hoped that Japan would accept the report and avoid its isolation from the League of Nations. Contrary to the emperor's wish, the Saito cabinet decided to reject the report. Following Genro Saionji's advice that the emperor should respect the cabinet's decision, Emperor Hirohito refrained himself from intervening in politics on this matter.⁷ Similarly, the emperor hoped to avoid unnecessary military expansionism in Rehe. He ordered the Chief of the Army General Staff Prince Kan'in not to advance any military operation there in February 1933. Although Prince Kan'in followed the emperor's order, the Kanto army ignored the order and made the troops enter into an area around the Great Wall.⁸

In addition to the emperor, principal officers at the Imperial Court and the Ministry of the Imperial Household such as the Minister of the Imperial Household, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Secretary to the Lord Keeper, Chief Aide-de-Camp and Grand Chamberlain were important actors in domestic politics. Surely, neither they participated in the policy decision-making process nor made explicit political statements. Yet, because they closely worked with the emperor and functioned as mediators between the emperor and bureaucrats, political and the

make truce with China. Later, appreciating Shirakawa's effort to make truce, the emperor wrote a special poem to Shirakawa's widow. Ibid., pp. 28-30.

⁷ Ibid., p. 25.

⁸ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 507.

military leaders. they were able to delicately control political situations.⁹ Indeed, implicitly conveying the emperor's opinions on certain issues to political leaders, the emperor's aides expected the cabinet and the military to act as the emperor wished. At the same time, worrying about attacks by right-wingers, they suggested the emperor not to directly involve in decision-making process.

During the London Naval Conference negotiation, for instance, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki played an important role in achieving the treaty. Knowing that navy hard-liners asked Prince Fushimi to oppose the treaty, he advised Prince Fushimi that it would be better for him to support the treaty and respond to the emperor's wish. Suzuki also delayed the Chief of the Navy General Staff Kato's meeting with the emperor.¹⁰ In the Manchurian Incident, when the Kanto army was unable to advance its military action freely, right-wingers accused Lord Keeper Makino for acting as an 'evil' advisor to the emperor and opposing the military expansionism. The right-wingers not only harassed Lord Keeper Makino with negative rumors but also tried to murder him.¹¹ Indeed, the emperor's aides' unsupportive attitude toward the Wakatsuki cabinet indirectly collapsed the cabinet. Makino, Saionji and other Imperial Court members initially expected Wakatsuki to check the military. But when they came to judge that Wakatsuki was too weak to control the military, they thought about a so-called cooperation cabinet based on the

⁹ Ibid., p. 217.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 5, p. 171.

Seiyukai and Minseito. They informally talked about it with leaders in the Seiyukai and Minseito. In the cases of the Kanto army's military campaigns in Rehe and Japan's withdrawal of the League of Nations, although the emperor hoped to stop them by organizing the Imperial Liaison Conference, Makino and Genro Saionji advised the emperor that it was better to follow the government decision. They worried that radical officers and right-wingers would attack the emperor if the emperor played larger role in the decision-making process. Although they did not participate in politics directly, the role of the court was significant.

2) The Cabinet

Article 76 recognized that the cabinet was a collective body that consisted of a prime minister and nine departmental ministers. Article 55 further stated that "the respective Ministers of States shall give their advice to the emperor, and be responsible for it. All laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State."¹²

The cabinet members were able to advise the emperor. But the power of the cabinet to administer state affairs as a whole was rather weak for three reasons. First, the cabinet was merely one of the emperor's advisory organs. The military, the Privy Council and the Genro gave advice to the emperor equally. If one of them disagreed with the cabinet, the cabinet was not able to implement policies into practice.

¹² Article 55, in Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, p. 340.

Second, state ministers and the prime minister equally shared executive power. State ministers were not responsible for their actions to the premier. They were directly responsible to the emperor. Although the prime minister appointed state ministers to serve in his government, he had no right to dismiss them. Unanimous approval was required for any cabinet decision, but to reach a consensus on controversial issues was often a difficult task. It implies that any minister could theoretically collapse the cabinet by refusing to agree on a cabinet decision.¹³

Third, the military command was independent from the cabinet. Both the Army and the Navy General Staff had no responsibility to the cabinet. While the emperor receives information on military command by Chiefs of the General Staffs, prime minister and other state ministers were unable to access such information fully. It made difficult for the cabinet to coordinate diplomatic policies with military strategy. It also implies that the military was able to act as “the state within the state.” As early as 1920, Finance Minister Takahashi lamented that: “like the Imperial German General Staff, the Japanese Army General Staff was separated from the cabinet. It did not belong to the Army Minister who was in charge of the military administration. As an independent organization, it maintained autonomous political status. Not only did it conduct military affairs but also involved diplomatic and economic policies. Because of the General Staff,

¹³ The Wakatsuki cabinet stepped down because Adachi refused to cooperate with the cabinet in the middle of the Manchurian Incident. See Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 384-387.

Japan was unable to carry out consistent diplomacy."¹⁴ In fact, as Komoto's assassination of Zhang Zolin, the breakout of the Manchurian Incident, and the Kanto army's military campaign in Rehe all exemplified, without controlling the military, the cabinet often ended up carrying out expansionist policies. Overall, under the Meiji Constitution, the cabinet system was far from perfect. Due to this system, civilian leaders were unable to control the military effectively.

3) The Imperial Diet

The Imperial Diet consisted of two chambers, the House of Peers and the House of Representatives.¹⁵ It influenced policy outcomes by legislating, checking budgets, and monitoring the cabinet activities in the three ways. First of all, the Imperial Diet had legislative power.¹⁶ Because every law required the consent of the Imperial Diet, the cabinet advised by the Privy Council and the Genro had to collaborate with it.¹⁷

¹⁴ Indeed, the army's command manual encouraged field commanders to plan not only military strategy but also political strategy. Josho, *Rikugun Daigakko*, p. 294; Takahashi Korekiyo, "Sanbo Honbu Haishiron." Quotation from Maehara Toru, "Tosuiken Dokuritsu riron no Gunnai deno Hatten keii." *Gunji Shigaku*, vol. 23, no.3, 1988, p. 28.

¹⁵ Chapter III of the Meiji Constitution stated legal function of the Imperial Diet. See, Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics*, pp. 160-200, 338-340.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

¹⁷ Yet, there were large areas of action where the emperor could function without consultation with the Diet. The emperor was able to declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, appoint and dismiss civil and military officials, command the armed forces, proclaim a state of siege and so on. All these matters could be dealt with through imperial orders which required no consent of the Imperial Diet. In addition, in emergencies arising while the Diet was not in session the emperor was

Second, it had the power to check financial resources of the executive.¹⁸

Article 64 states that the expenditure and revenue of the state require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual budget. Approval from the Imperial Diet was required for new taxes or changes in tax rates. Loans and other changes to the national treasury, such as expenditures necessitated under an international treaty, also had to obtain its consent. Article 71 provided that if by the time the next fiscal year began the Diet had not given its consent to a budget, the budget of the current fiscal year should automatically continue in effect for the new fiscal year. It meant that the Diet could refuse an increase in funds to the government.

Third, it was able to bring any governmental activity into its purview as follows. One is that, in the form of a representation, either House could convey to the government or any minister of state requests regarding future actions. Each House was permitted to receive petitions from private persons and could vote to forward these petitions to the government for its consideration. Another is that the government was required to give to the Houses any documents or reports necessary to them in the discharge of their function, providing the material was not secret.¹⁹

The other is, by request of more than thirty members of the Diet, the President of the House had to submit an interpellation on any subject to the government. A minister had either to reply immediately to such a question or fix a date for giving

also empowered to issue ordinances dealing with matters which ordinarily would have required the passage of a law. Ibid., pp. 186-187.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 188-193.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 195-196.

his answer. If he did neither, he had to state explicit reasons for not doing so.²⁰

Finally, it had the right to pass resolutions on a given matter. It was under this heading that a house voted lack of confidence in the government, charged that the government had violated the law, and interpretations of the Constitution.²¹

4) The Privy Council

The Privy Council gave a recommendation to the emperor regarding constitutional amendments, drafts of laws and ordinances supplementary to the Constitutions, emergency provisions, treaties, international agreements, and declaration of martial law.²² Referring to the prime minister's recommendation, the emperor appointed Privy Council members for life. Ministers of state, by virtue of their office, were entitled to sit in the Council. They had the right to vote in plenary sessions, which required the attendance of more than ten members and as a rule were held in the presence of the emperor. The Privy Council's recommendation to the throne was adopted by a majority vote. As the disapproval of emergency imperial financial aids in 1927 exemplified, when serious disagreements between the Privy Council and the cabinet arose, the Privy Council

²⁰ Ibid., p. 196.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 197-198.

²² About the Privy Council, see Ito Takashi, *Showa Shoki Seiji Shi Kenkyu: Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai o Meguru ShoSeiji Shudan no Taiko to Teikei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1969), chapter 7; Awaya Kentaro, *Showano Rekish. vol.6—Showa no Seito* (Tokyo: Shogakkain, 1983), pp. 70-78. (Hereafter *Showa no Seito*): Masuda Tomoko, "Seito Naikaku to Sumitsuin: Meiji Kenpo taisei no Genkai." in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai ed., *Journal of Modern Japanese Studies*, no. 6, (1984), pp. 143-181.

could significantly intervene in the cabinet's policymaking process.²³

5) The Genro²⁴

The Genros were elder statesmen who had distinguished political experience and achievement. The Genro functioned as the emperor's private advisory organ. He advised the emperor on crucial domestic and international problems such as the selection of prime ministers and decisions concerning war and peace. Originally there were several genros such as Ito Hirofumi, Kuroda Kiyotaka, Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, Oyama Iwao, Inoue Kaoru, Katura Taro, and Saionji Kinmochi. Most of them were from the Choshu and Satsuma cliques. They were founding fathers of modern Meiji Japan. Early in the 20th century, they withdrew from active administrative positions. But they maintained their control over the general direction of affairs and particularly over the appointment of ministers.

Unlike the Genro in the Meiji period, the Genro in the Showa period was not politically powerful. Indeed, by 1924 only Saionji remained as the last Genro.²⁵

²³ Awaya, *Showa no Seito*, pp. 71-2, 77-78; Masuda, "Seito Naikaku to Sumitsuin," pp. 146-148.

²⁴ Strictly speaking, the Genro is different from the Imperial Household. While the Genro was in charge of recommending future prime ministers, the Imperial Household is the bureaucracy that deals with affairs and services related to imperial families. However, in this dissertation, the Genro and the imperial court are considered more or less similar.

²⁵ Saionji mildly confronted Yamamoto Gonbei and his supporters in order not to make him the Genro. A Japanese historian points out that Saionji, who was liberal and internationalist, realized that the Genro system would be an obstacle for

Saionji generally confined himself to recommending the prime minister. He did not interfere in the daily conduct of the administration as the earlier Genro had done.²⁶ But every information about politics arrived at Saionji so that he could make a reasonable judgment and make a right recommendation. Therefore, government officials, bureaucrats, party politicians and business leaders all constantly visited him and attempted to gain his attention.²⁷

6) The Military

Military was an advisory body on the matters of military administration and military command. The military administration was considered one of the state affairs. Thus, the Ministries of the Army and the Navy were required to coordinate with the cabinet in policymaking in the fields of military budgets, agreements and treaties on arms control, declaration and termination of war. Indeed, they tended to avoid severe confrontation with the cabinet.

In contrast, military command was exclusively exercised by the General

democracy. Thus, he made effort to be the last Genro in Japanese politics. Komiya Kazuo, "Yamamoto Gonnohyoe Jun Genro Enritsu Undo to Satsuha," in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai ed., *Journal of Modern Japanese Studies*, no. 20, (1998), p. 64.

²⁶ For a brief history of the Genro, see Awaya, *Showa no Seito*, pp. 48-62. While Saionji restrained himself from getting involved in domestic politics as much as possible, Yamagata Aritomo tried to intervene into politics as much as possible. Although Saionji was widely informed about political situations, he was not associated with any groups in political parties, the Privy Council, or House of Peers. Ideologically, he was known as liberal and internationalist. See Ito, *Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu*, pp. 196-197.

²⁷ Genro Saionji's secretary Harada Kumao's diaries illustrate that many politicians constantly visited Genro Saionji. Saionji played a subtle role in the important decision-making processes. See Harada, *Harada Diary* vols. 1-3.

Staffs of the Army and the Navy. It included operational and doctrine planning, the deployment of forces and intelligence activities.²⁸ They were independent from the civilian ministers of state who advised the throne on general affairs of state. Thus, in international crises, they mainly focused on the use of forces without enough coordination with the cabinet. The Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army and the Navy had the right of direct access to the emperor.

In addition, in the army, training and educational programs came under the Inspector-General of Military Education. Like the Army Ministry and the Army General Staff, the Inspector-General of Military Education belonged to the emperor. For crucial decisions in the army such as organizational reforms or personnel appointment, the Army Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Inspector-General of Military Education had to reach consensus. In the navy, education and training program were administrated under the Navy Ministry.²⁹

Under the Meiji Constitution, two problems existed regarding the military command, readiness and civilian control. One was that it was difficult to clarify the domains of operation and organizational issues. The General Staffs often felt that the supreme command covered not only operational issues but also organizational issues while the cabinet considered that organizational issues were in

²⁸ Yet, they were gray areas for military administration and military command. The army treated even the military education was in the field of military command while the navy did not.

²⁹ Takahashi, *Showa no Gunbatsu*, pp. 37-51; Oye Shinobu, *Showa no Rekishi*, vol. 3: *Tenno no Guntai* (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1982), pp. 78-147; Momose, *Jiten Showa no Nihon*, pp. 253-370.

the domain of state affairs. As the London Naval Conference exemplifies, the military often considered that civilian leaders violated the emperor's supreme command by making decisions on military affairs without accepting the General Staffs' opinion.

The other problem is that making a reasonable military strategy was difficult because the army and navy were two independent military services to the emperor. No institution existed that efficiently facilitated communication between the army and the navy.³⁰ In fact, the army and the navy viewed potential enemies very differently. Consequently, Japan's military strategy was unrealistic. The army long believed that Russia was the most dangerous threat. Even after the victory of the Russo-Japanese War, the army always worried if Russia would threaten Japan's rights in Manchuria. Therefore, during the Russian Revolution, the army advocated Siberian Expedition and ambitiously attempted to establish a great self-governing buffer state in Siberian Russia east of Lake Baikal.³¹ The army's active role to defend Japanese rights in Manchuria implicitly included its strategic concern to prevent Soviet Russia from advancing toward the south in the Sino-Japanese War.

³⁰ Scholars of modern Japanese history often point out that the decision-making processes to advance to French colonies in Asia and to attack Pearl Harbor were good examples that the army and navy failed to coordinate military operation and national strategy. See Moriyama Atsushi, *Nihon Kaisen no Seiji Katei* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1998).

³¹ Hosoya Chihiro, *Shiberia Shuppei no Shiteki Kenkyu* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1950); James Morley, *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957).

In contrast, after destroying Russian sea power at the great naval battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War, the navy no longer considered the Russians as a hypothetical enemy. Instead, the United States became the navy's biggest challenge. The United States possessed the largest navy in the Pacific region and the U.S.-Japan relationship turned unfriendly in the 1910s because a movement of anti-Japanese immigration grew in the state of California. A prominent naval strategist such as Sato Tetsutaro also pointed out that the conflict between Japan and the United States over China would be inevitable.³² Therefore, the navy's operational planning and training was based on the assumption that the United States was the most serious enemy for Japan.³³

In short, while respectively designing operational plans, both the army and the navy failed to integrate these plans. Without serious discussion between the two branches of the military, Japan's military strategy named Imperial Defense Principle had been established and revised.³⁴

7) Other Ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance

Regarding diplomatic and national security issues, the Ministry of Foreign

³² Sato Tetsutaro, *Teikoku Kokubo Shiron* (Tokyo: Suikosha, 1908).

³³ Boeicho Boeikenkyujo Senshi Shitsu, *Kaigun Gunsenbi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun sha, 1969), pp. 143-146.

³⁴ Many army officers commented that they never seriously considered the United States as an enemy. Hata's comment in Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu ed. *Daihonei Rikugunhu*, p. 247; Suzuki's comment in Joho Yoshio, *Rikugunsho Gunmukyoku*, p. 247.

Affairs and the Ministry of Finance were the most important civil ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained five bureaus, dealing respectively with Asian affairs, European and American affairs, commerce, treaties, and intelligence. The Ministry was in charge of foreign affairs, the development of commerce, and the protection of citizens abroad. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was usually a career diplomat who was not a member of any political parties, but he coordinated with other cabinet members for foreign/security policy implementation.

The Ministry of Finance is another important ministry because it was in charge of the national finance and budget. Although financial officials were not experts of military affairs, they were familiar with military issues to a large extent and were involved in national security policymaking. In both case studies of the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, finance officials played a significant role in Japan's choice of policy.

II. Japan's Political Development: Party Politics, the Military, and the Imperial Court

1) The Rise of Party Politics and Taisho Democracy

As Japan's Taisho democracy grew in the 1920s, the different political actors came to compete with each other and were actively involved in political debates. To be sure, the Meiji Constitution granted the emperor, the military, the Genro, and the Privy Council veto power to governmental decisions. This political system was a major obstacle for the growth of party politics and democracy. It took more than three decades after the opening of the Imperial Diet for party politics to be institutionalized in the Japanese political arena. As illustrated below, as party

politics and democracy grew, both hard-liners and soft-liners came to compete with each other for their policy preferences.³⁵

From the beginning of the opening of the Imperial Diet in 1890, the leaders of the oligarchy—founding fathers of the Meiji Japan—objected to sharing power with politicians who were elected to the Diet. But they were not all united in fighting against the Diet. Yamagata, a chief of the hard-liner oligarchs, opposed any party demands and urged establishing a political system that would limit the rise of party politics.³⁶ In contrast, Ito, who drafted the Meiji Constitution, supported the growth of party politics.

In 1900, with the help of his fellow Inoue and Prince Saionji, Ito organized the Seiyukai party. Yet, Ito's leadership in the Seiyukai was rather short-lived because of political opposition within his own party. Prince Saionji succeeded the presidency. Hara Takashi greatly contributed to the Seiyukai's dominant position in the Diet. Hara had little support from the oligarchs because he was from neither Choshu nor Satsuma clan, but he became powerful by increasing the Seiyukai's political power. He led the Seiyukai to win a majority in the Diet between 1908 and 1915.³⁷

³⁵ It is important to note that in reality clear cleavage between soft-liners and hard-liners did not exist. In particular, regarding policy toward China, policy preference was slightly different even in their own camps. See Hattori Ryuji, *Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kanryo no Hendo to Nihon Gaiko 1918-1931* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2001), pp. 171, 198.

³⁶ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 436-438.

³⁷ About political party formation, see Mitani Taichiro, *Nihon Seito Seiji no Keisei: Hara Takashi no Seiji Shidou no Tenkai* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1995).

As far as the Japanese electoral system is concerned, until the law of universal male suffrage was established in 1925, the right to vote was restricted by tax-paying qualifications. In order to attract voters who were landlords, prosperous peasant farmers, provincial entrepreneurs, urban property owners, and business leaders, the Seiyukai proclaimed its attachment to a "positive policy" in government spending, promising to divert tax money from military to civilian purposes, especially for local economic development. It began to use its influence to increase appropriations for local railroad construction, new roads and schools, bridges and telegraph lines, local harbor development and expansion of irrigation works. The Seiyukai promised local farmers and business to work for them in return for votes.

As the Seiyukai party expanded during the early 1900s, it aroused hostility from non-Seiyukai parties. Dissatisfied non-Seiyukai politicians found themselves very weak politically. In December 1912, a coalition of journalists, non-Seiyukai politicians and businessmen carried out a nation wide political campaign. Inukai Tsuyoshi and Ozaki Yukio were the main leaders of this movement. Facing nationwide criticism, Prime Minister Katsura Taro formed his own political party named the Rikken Doshikai. The Katsura cabinet lasted only three months because of strong opposition by the Seiyukai majority in the Diet.

Katsura died soon after the formation of the Doshikai, but the party itself survived. Kato Takaaki, an ex-diplomat and a son-in-law of the Iwasaki family—the owner of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, became the leader. Ex-bureaucrats of finance such as Wakatsuki and Hamaguchi joined the party. The new party was renamed as Kenseikai. Later, the name was changed to Rikken Minseitō, and it

soon emerged as a rival to the Seiyukai.³⁸ The Minseito's policy preferences were similar with those of the Seiyukai at first, but it did provide an alternative Diet base for the formation of cabinets. In 1914, Okuma Shigenobu formed a cabinet, relying on the support of the Doshikai. In 1915, when the Okuma government called new elections, the Seiyukai suffered heavy losses.

The era of the Taisho democracy began when Hara became prime minister in 1918. The Hara cabinet lasted until his death by assassination in 1921. The Genros continued to resist the rise of party politics by supporting non-party cabinets—the Kato, Yamamoto, and Kiyoura cabinets. In order to improve this situation, the three heads of major political parties—Kato of the Kenseikai, Takahashi of the Seiyukai, and Inukai of the Kakushin Club—organized a movement for constitutional government based on party politics. Facing pressure by the stronger political movement, Genro Saionji, who was considered liberal, recommended Kato for prime minister of the three coalitions government. From 1924 to 1932, the head of the major political parties—the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai—formed a cabinet. After more than three decades of political struggle, “normal constitutional government” had become institutionalized.³⁹

As party politicians' political power increased relative to the oligarchs, an electoral reform—mainly the abolition of tax qualifications on the right to vote

³⁸ Sakurai Ryuji, *Taisho Seijishi no Shuppatsu: Rikken Doshikai no Seiritsu to Sono Shuhen* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1997), pp. 143-204.

³⁹ Kato Takaaki appealed to the mass that a normal constitutional government should be the core in Japanese politics. See Kato Haku Denki Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Kato Takaaki* (Tokyo: Kato Haku Denki Hensankai, 1929), pp. 239-243.

and the establishment of universal male suffrage—was the key political agenda. From the beginning of 1919 suffragist rallies and demonstrations were staged in Tokyo and other major cities. Yet, not all the political parties agreed to introduce universal male suffrage unconditionally. In fact, the reaction of the political parties to the suffrage movement was mixed. In particular, the Seiyukai majority under the leadership of Hara was afraid that an expanded electorate might have not only weakened its own power but also led to the rise of radicalism. In 1920, a Socialist League was formed and the following year, the Communist Party was organized among anarchists, syndicalists and communists. The veteran politicians considered that the mass political participation would result in political and social instability.⁴⁰

Yet, gradually many political leaders both inside and outside the parties came to realize that an extension of the suffrage would curtail the spread of the left and mollify popular discontent that might otherwise be vulnerable to dangerous ideologies. In late 1923, the short-lived Yamamoto cabinet promised to bring a suffrage bill to the Diet. In 1925, as a result of the efforts of Prime Minister Kato, the law of universal suffrage was established.⁴¹ Responding to this change,

political parties came to demonstrate their own political goals and policy preferences

⁴⁰ Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: the Failure of the First Attempt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 294-346; Masumi Junnosuke, *Nihon Seitoshiron*, vol. 5 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), pp. 385-415.

⁴¹ The most comprehensive study on the law of universal suffrage, see Matsuo Takayoshi, *Futsu Senkyo Seido no Seiritsushi no Kenkyu* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989). Other studies on Taisho Democracy, see Ito Yukio, *Taisho Demokurashi to Seito Seiji* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppankai, 1987); Mitani, *Taisho Demokurashi ron: Yoshino Sakuzo no Jidai*.

in the fields of economics and diplomacy more clearly. By appealing to the mass with political campaigns and propaganda, these two parties attempted to attract new voters.⁴²

2) Civil-Military Relations and Politicization of the Military

The relationship between party politicians and the military became uneasy as the Taisho democracy grew due to two prominent reasons. One reason was that civilians tried to constrain the military's organizational interests. Certainly, the military remained formally independent from the government in military operation affairs. Civilians continued to become ineligible to be military ministers. Despite a large reduction in their size, the level of budget cuts as a whole was rather small in the army and navy for a long time. However, relatively speaking, the party government came to intervene in various military affairs.

In March 1922, political parties demanded civilian military ministers and passed a resolution requesting the appointment of civilians as military ministers in the Lower House in March 1922. At the same time, the Lower House passed a resolution requesting a reduction in the size of the army. The army began to design

⁴² Competition between the two political parties was gradually institutionalized. But political parties were poorly organized. It was one of the major problems for Japan's democracy in the Taisho and Showa era. When a strong leader such as Kato or Hamaguchi existed, party members simply relied on them. But as the Wakatsuki and Inukai cabinets exemplified, in the absence of strong party president and in the presence of strong competing factions within the party, party politics and Japan's democracy was simply undermined due to internal fighting within a party. About internal politics within political parties, see "Seiyukai no Hitobito," *Bungei Shunju*, November, 1929, pp. 56-61; "Seikai Uchimaku Zadankai," November, 1929, pp. 146-159; "Minseitō no Hitobito," *Bungei Shunju*, December, 1929, pp. 106-110; "Seikai Yobanashi," *Bungei Shunju*, December, 1930, pp. 120-123.

plans for reduction. In August 1922, under the Kato Tomosaburo cabinet, the army reduced its force size, discharging about 20 thousand officers and 56 thousand noncommissioned officers and soldiers. The reduction of the army was on the agenda once again under the First Kato Takaaki cabinet. In 1925, it abandoned four divisions, releasing 12 thousand officers and 32 thousand noncommissioned officers.⁴³

As for the navy's arms reduction, under the Washington treaty, fourteen major battleships were destroyed, while construction of six major battleships, which already had begun, was terminated. Arms reduction negotiation further continued in Geneva and London. At the London Naval Conference, the navy was forced to agree on further arms reduction among Japan, Great Britain, and the United States.

The other reason is that in the age of total war, the military perceived that party politicians were not serious enough to build the strong nation and ensure national security. For the military, politicians only sought their narrow self-interests and paid little attention to security affairs. Therefore, while party politicians came to intervene into military affairs more actively, the military became politicized and challenged politicians. In particular, young officers became politically radical. The military became politicized in two ways. First, the radical officers who were dissatisfied with the party politics planned a coup in order to overthrow the government. The radical officers' group known as the Sakurakai.

⁴³ Ohara, *Democratization and Expansionism*, p. 69-110. Ohara argues that antimilitary coalition was formed in this period. The coalition forced the military to decrease the size significantly.

claimed the establishment of the military government. The Sakurakai Prospectus stated that:

Though the causes behind the present state of our nation are many, we must first point out the grave responsibility of the rulers who have been vainly absorbed in political and material self-interest.... When we observe the London Treaty issue, it is evident that the poisonous sword of the demoralized and covetous party politicians is about to be turned toward the military. The military authorities...who have been numbed by terrible social conditions lack the courage and the decision to rise even against corrupt politics...Therefore, those of us who consist the rank and file of the army must thoroughly strengthen unity ...and not only prevent the repetition of the navy's failure, but also with a strong patriotic fervor must be ready to wash out the bowels of the corrupt and covetous rulers.⁴⁴

To a considerable extent, the Sakurakai reform program influenced official army policy. Many of the members of the Sakurakai occupied important position. At a higher level, important officers of the Army Ministry and the Army General Staff were sympathetic with the reformist. Major General Koiso Kuniaki, director of the military affairs department of the Army Ministry, Vice Chief of the General Staff Ninomiya Harushige, and the director of the second department of the General Staff Takckawa Yoshitsugu were especially regarded as patrons of the Sakurakai and supporters of their program. In March 1931, these leading army officials conferred with Hashimoto Kingoro and Nemoto Hiroshi of the Sakurakai in order to execute a coup plan. They prepared to move troops to the Diet, demand resignation of the cabinet, and bring about the formation of the military government. The March coup attempt was suppressed before its execution. But no officer was punished despite the political activities.

⁴⁴ Nakano Masao, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1963), pp. 29-31.

Second, the hard-line military officers executed military campaigns without coordinating with the government's foreign policy principle. As early as 1928, the Kanto army's Colonel Komoto and his fellows crafted a conspiracy and assassinated Zhang Zuolin on his way back to Manchuria. Komoto expected that confusion would follow in Manchuria and the Kanto army would occupy Manchuria.⁴⁵ In September 1931, facing an anti-Japanese movement around Manchuria, the Kanto army hard-liners led by Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishiro planned to take military action and occupy Manchuria once again. Ignoring the government's non-enlargement principle, the Kanto and Korea armies mobilized their troops and launched military campaigns around Manchuria.

The above examples prove that the military officers and party politicians became uneasy. Indeed, the radical officers were determined to challenge party politicians. However, it is inaccurate to suggest that the military and party politicians always confronted each other. Rather, hard-line politicians shared their policy preferences with hard-line military officers. Together, they set a political agenda and implement hard-line policies. Naturally by the same token, soft-line politicians and soft-line military officers cooperated with each other.

3) Politicization of the Imperial Court

In addition to politicization of the military, the emperor and the staffs of the

⁴⁵ However, they failed because Emperor Hirohito demanded Prime Minister Tanaka to investigate the incident fairly. The emperor also requested Tanaka to punish the conspirators in the army. To make matters worse, after Zhang Zuolin's death, Zhang Xueliang, a son of Zhang Zuolin, decided to work with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan. With the reunion of Manchuria with China, the anti-Japanese nationalist movement spread to Manchuria. See Usui, *Nihon to Chugoku*.

Imperial Court became politicized late in the 1920s. Unlike the Taisho emperor who was chronically ill, Emperor Hirohito was young and energetic in the throne when Japan became one of the Great Power in Asia.⁴⁶ He seriously considered that Japan would maintain its security and peace in East Asia within the framework of the Great Power cooperation. He also paid sufficient attention to social transformation in the society and worried about the growth of radical ideology.

Before becoming the emperor, Hirohito traveled to Europe. In Great Britain, in addition to official ceremonies, Hirohito informally visited industrial facilities. He was eager to learn economic and labor situations in Scotland. In France, he visited old battlefields such as Somme. Through this trip, he was able to observe international situations with his own eyes.⁴⁷ Back in Japan, Hirohito paid attention to domestic change. He fully acknowledged social change in urban and rural areas as Japanese economy and industries had grown. On his way to observe the drill and practice of military performance in Awaji Island, he had a conversation with local bureaucrats and factory owners about employee's wages. In 1923, just after the Kanto Great Earthquake, he proposed to offer some spaces in the Imperial

⁴⁶ Recent works on the emperor, see Iyenaga Saburo, *Senso Sekinin*; Fujiwawa Akira ed., *Tettei Kensho: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*; Nakamura Masanori, *Sengo to Shocho Tenno*; Yoshida Hiroshi, *Showa Tenno no Shusenshi*; Sakamoto, "Atarashii Koshitsuzo wo Motomete."; Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan: Nara, Nara Diary*.

⁴⁷ About the emperor's trip to Europe, see Hatano Masaru, *Hirohito Kotaishi Yoroppa Gaiyuki* (Tokyo: Soshi sha, 1997); Sakamoto Kazuki, "Atarashii Koshitsuzo wo Motomete: Taisho Koki no Shinno to Kyuchu." *Journal of Modern Japanese Studies*, no. 20, (1998), p. 29. See also, Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 4, pp. 120-126.

Palace for disaster refugees and provided special funds for quick recovery.⁴⁸

Although the emperor hardly participated in daily policy-making process, his opinion and suggestion on both domestic and international affairs influence the government's policy choice. Indeed, the emperor and the Imperial Court members occasionally acted very politically. The emperor himself recalled that his harsh criticism toward Prime Minister Tanaka who failed to punish Colonel Komoto properly for the assassination of Zhang Zuolin caused the collapse of the Tanaka cabinet. Hard-liners in both the Seiyukai and the Army and right-wingers accused the emperor's advisers for the collapse of the Tanaka cabinet as the court's conspiracy.⁴⁹

During the London Naval Conference, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki supported Hamaguchi and arranged to delay Chief of the Navy General Staff Kato's meeting with the emperor. Suzuki also suggested Prince Fushimi to be careful not to support Navy hard-liners, since the emperor hoped to achieve the naval arms reduction agreement. Although the emperor's military aide General Nara noticed that Suzuki unfairly delayed Kato's meeting, he also did not criticize Suzuki publicly.⁵⁰

When the Manchurian Incident broke out, the emperor supported the

⁴⁸ Makino, *Makino Diary*, pp. 86-96; Sakamoto, "Atarashii Koshitsuzo wo Motomete: Taisho Koki no Shinno to Kyuchu," p. 29.

⁴⁹ Terasaki and Terasaki Miller, *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 22-23. The emperor was apologetic about his suggestion to Tanaka to resign. Hirohito mentioned that he suggested it strictly but did not force Tanaka to resign.

⁵⁰ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 217.

non-enlargement policy principle. Disappointed and angered with the fact that the government and the emperor supported military escalation in Manchuria, right-wingers spread negative rumors about the emperor and his aides. They tried to offend the court members, believing that the emperor's aides were obstacles for Japan's expansionism.⁵¹ Later, just after the death of Prime Minister Inukai, hard-line army officers approached Kido and Konoye who were sympathetic with views of hard-liners. In fact, by conveying the army's dissatisfaction toward party politics to Konoye and Kido, the army was able to establish a non-party cabinet after the May 15 Incident. These examples demonstrate that political coalition-making among party politicians, the military, and the court were crucial to shape the domestic balance of power between hard-liners and soft-liners and Japan's diplomatic direction.

III. Two Views of Japanese Diplomacy and Security

Party politicians were closely associated with bureaucrats, military officials, and members of the Privy Council and the Imperial Court.⁵² Because the Japanese political system was de-centralized, politicians needed to form a coalition with other actors and empower themselves in order to implement policies effectively. Both the Seiyukai and Minseito sought to increase their power and promote national

⁵¹ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 88, 101, 112.

⁵² Neither the Genro, the emperor, nor the court circle was associated with particular political parties. They were rather considered mediators. Genro Saionji, former head of the Seiyukai party, was often considered pro-Seiyukai. But he supported the Hamaguchi cabinet to complete naval arms reduction with the Great Powers. See Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 306-308.

interests by making a coalition with the members of the military, the court and the Privy Council.⁵³ Consequently, policy outcome is a result of a domestic internal balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners in these political institutions.

1) Historical Background of the Two Views of Japanese Diplomacy and Security

Since the Meiji restoration, Japan's primary concern had been the maintenance of national security. Yet, Japan did not seek territorial expansion in Asia aggressively all the time. To the contrary, while hard-liners constantly advocated territorial expansion, those who tried to maintain national security with limited aims fairly checked Japan's foreign policy direction until the Manchuria Incident. These soft-liners considered that reckless territorial expansion would only endanger Japan's security. Rather, Japan would be able to maintain its national security through cooperation with the Great Powers and China.

For example, the majority of the Meiji leadership decided not to conduct expedition to Korea. They rightly judged that domestic political reforms were more urgent issues than the expedition. They were also afraid that it would only provoke the hostility of the Great Powers. Similarly, after victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan reluctantly accepted demands from Russia, France, and

⁵³ Of course, this typology is much simpler picture than the reality. Some Seiyukai members such as Inukai and Takahashi were liberal who opposed Japan's occupation of Manchuria. In contrast, some Minseito members such as Nakano Seigo were pro-fascist and advocated Japan's dominance in Manchuria. For a nice summary about policy preferences in the two parties, see Banba Nobuya, *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924-1929* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1972); Masumi, *Nihon Seitoshiron*, vol. 5, pp. 235-274; Awaya, *Showa no Seito*, pp. 88-112, 148-238.

Germany to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. Even in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan cautiously avoided any prolonged fight with Russia. Soon after Japan defeated Russia in Sea of Japan, with the help of the United States, Japan and Russia signed the peace treaty at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1905. In the treaty, it was assured that Japan would control the Korean Peninsula, the Liaodong Peninsula, the South Manchurian Railway, and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. In 1907, Japan and Russia secretly stipulated the division of South and North Manchuria respectively as Japanese and Russian spheres of influence.

As far as Manchuria is concerned, due to its geographical position, the Kanto army and the South Manchurian Railway Company administrated business and public affairs there.⁵⁴ All of them had strong desire and interests in controlling Manchuria because of their commitment in this region. Yet, Japan hardly tried to control Manchuria unilaterally until the Manchuria Incident. Rather, at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, Japan agreed on the principles of the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity for trade and industry for all nations in China.

Regarding the Sino-Japanese relationship, in the middle of 1920s, under the Kato cabinet, Foreign Minister Shidehara made it clear that Japan would respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and avoid any interference in China's domestic strife. Shidehara believed that Japan's non-intervention principles would help establish a good relationship with China. He aimed to promote Japan's trade activities there. At the same time, the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, which was the main

⁵⁴ A general view of the Kanto army, see Shimada Toshihiko, *Kantogun* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1965).

financial supporter for the Kato cabinet, also gained benefits through such economic activities. Indeed, Shidehara foresaw that Japan would grow as a trading state in the future so that China's market was extremely important from the viewpoint of size, low transportation costs and low wages. Based on this vision, he considered it the task of diplomacy to promote this economic advancement through the conclusion of commercial treaties and assistance to private enterprises overseas.⁵⁵

However, the non-intervention principle did not last long as China's unification and nationalism advanced in the middle of the 1920s. During the Northern Expedition of 1926, radical anti-foreign outbursts damaged Japanese interests in Nanjing and Hangzhou. Responding to China's assaults, hard-liners both in politics and the military proposed that Japan should stand firm against China with the use of forces. In fact, Japan sent troops to Shangdong twice to protect Japanese there, known as Japan's Shangdong Expedition of 1927 and 1928.

The Sino-Japanese relationship was decisively deteriorated after the death of Zhang Zuolin. In June, 1928, as it turned out that Zhang Zuolin was not cooperative with Japan, the Kanto army officers murdered him on the assumption that political chaos after the death of Zhang Zuolin would give the army an excellent opportunity to mobilize forces and control Manchuria. The Kanto army failed to control Manchuria at this time. But since this incident, countless local disputes between Chinese and Japanese had occurred in Manchuria. It was around this period that major officers in the Issekikai, the army's informal study group, reached

⁵⁵ Hattori Ryuji, *Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kankyo no Hendo to Nihon Gaiko, 1918-1931*, pp. 163-167, 264-274.

a conclusion that Japan's occupation of Manchuria would be the ultimate solution for the Manchurian problem.⁵⁶

Besides the Kanto army, Japanese organizations in Manchuria, such as Manchuria Youth League, staffs at South Manchurian Railway Company, and hard-liners in the Seiyukai agreed that Japan had to control Manchuria and protect their interests. In fact, it was at the First Manchuria Youth Congress that the state-building of a Manchuria-Mongolia Autonomous State based on the principle of racial harmony was proposed. Japanese in Manchuria had been dissatisfied with the government's weak policy toward Manchuria. Thus, they concluded that they would give up their citizenship and would join the new Manchurian State as full citizens.⁵⁷ The Mitsui zaibatsu, the main financial supporter for the Seiyukai party, had certain economic interests in resources, development and investment in Manchuria as well.

Regarding Japan's relations with Great Powers, especially the United States, diplomatic relationship between them was not seriously damaged until the Manchurian incident. To be sure, the US-Japan relationship had been gradually deteriorated since the 1910s. On the one hand, the United States worried about Japan's increasing influence in China and Manchuria as Japan became one of the great powers in Asia. Japan established the South Manchurian Railroad Company in Manchuria in 1906 and annexed Korea in 1910. After the eruption of World War

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 169-178, 200-218.

⁵⁷ Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, pp. 38-40.

I in Europe. Japan sent troops to German bases in China and the Pacific Islands. The United States viewed that, taking advantage of "equal opportunities," Japan steadily advanced its influence in Asia and block American business opportunities and interests.

On the other hand, Japan perceived that it had to continue to grow for its own survival. Although Japan became stronger in East Asia, it was still a country of late industrialization that possessed few colonial territories. Japan badly needed new territories and new markets because of a rapid increase in its population and accelerating industrialization.

Japan viewed that the United States would threaten Japan's interests. The United States' discriminatory restrictions against Japanese immigration increased anti-American feeling among Japanese. At the Washington Conference, Japan felt that the United States tried to block Japan's advancement in the Asia Pacific for its own sake. Some considered that a Japan-American War would inevitably occur in the future.⁵⁸

In 1912, responding to anti-Japanese immigration problems on the West Coast at that time, Sato observed in *On the Study of National Defense* that "the United States had intended to actively daunt and intimidate Japan." In addition to immigration problems, Sato believed that American dollar diplomacy and American imperialism in Asia would induce competition between Japan and the United States over China. For the United States, commercial expansion and development of the

⁵⁸ Sato, *Teikoku Kokuboshiron*, pp. 815-816.

market were absolutely necessary. The United States would try to monopolize its commercial interests in China. Under such a condition, it would be unavoidable that Japan and the United States would fight for control of the Pacific. Although the army hardly thought Russia was the main threat, later, Ishiwara followed Sato's view and wrote an article that Japan and the United States had destiny to clash.⁵⁹

In contrast, others believed that Japan should maintain a good relationship with the United States through international agreements. Suzuki of the navy held that any conflicts with the United States would bring no benefits for Japan or the United States. He made this point very clear when he gave a speech at a welcome party organized by the mayor of San Francisco in 1918. In his words, "people talk about a possibility of a U.S.-Japan war. However, both countries must not fight with each other....even if both countries fight, both will waste lives and materials. Only the third countries would get benefits from the war. Hence, the concept of a U.S.-Japan war is quite foolish. The Pacific Ocean must be as peaceful as its name indicates. It must be the ocean of peace. God gives us this sea for trade, not for transport of armed forces. If the sea is used for the latter, both Japan and the United States will be seriously punished."⁶⁰

2) Hard-liners' Ideas of Japanese Diplomacy and Security

The Seiyukai Party members were often described as hard-liners in diplomacy and national security. They shared their views with hard-liners in the

⁵⁹ Ishiwara Kanji, Tsunoda Jun ed., *Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), pp. 48-49.

⁶⁰ Suzuki Hajime ed., *Suzuki Kanatro Jiden*, (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1968), pp. 198-199.

military such as Araki Sadao, Kato Hiroharu and Suetsugu Nobumasa. They built relationships with members in conservative circles such as the Kokusuisha led by Hiranuma Kiichiro and with right-wing activists such as Nishida Zen and Okawa Shumei.⁶¹ They considered Japan's national security in the following ways.

First of all, they saw the state as the basic unit. At the level of international politics, Japan's prestige was the most important. Hence, they were eager to seek wealth and power. They also reacted excessively to any trivial incidents that would hurt Japan's reputation. At the level of domestic politics, although they were party politicians, hard-liners of the Seiyukai were skeptical about the development of democracy.⁶² According to them, parliamentarism was unfit for Japanese politics because it originated in Western democratic thought. It would be incompatible with the spirit of the Imperial Constitution which declared that Japanese sovereignty belongs to the emperor. Suzuki Kisaburo of the Seiyukai publicly stated:

From its inception, the Seiyukai has been obedient to the principle of government centered on the emperor.... The governance of imperial Japan is completely subject to the control of the emperor. It is very clearly politics centered on the emperor. Concepts like parliament-centered politics are Anglo-American notions flowing from the current democracy.

⁶¹ A distinguished historian Ito Takashi nicely summarized the nature of the Seiyukai. See Ito, *Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu*, pp. 222-230. Ogawa Heikichi and Mori Kaku were closely connected with right wing activists. Hiranuma Kiichiro Kaikoroku Hensankai, *Hiranuma Kiichiro Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Gakuyo shobo, 1950), pp. 11, 78-79, 88-89, 93.

⁶² For instance, Mori, a leading hard-liner of the Seiyukai, eventually considered that fascist style whole national unity based on a coalition between the military and political parties is the best way to pursue expansionism. Yamamura, *Mori Kaku*, p. 30.

and are inconsistent with our nation's polity. They obscure the great principle that sovereignty lies entirely with the emperor. They violate the great spirit of the Imperial Constitution. They are absolutely intolerable. I call upon the people to assess the situation coolly, and to permit the fullest operation of the Constitution, faithfully giving body to its great spirit.⁶³

Second, they perceived that world politics was a Hobbesian anarchic world. Western individualism and materialism led to endless wars in international politics. Peace was only temporary and war was constant. International laws and agreements set by the Washington Conference were only useful instruments for the Western Great Powers to maintain status quo and dominate its influence in Asia. Therefore, they hardly respected international laws, agreements and norms. Rather, they believed that military strength was the only fundamental resource for national security.⁶⁴

The Seiyukai Party formed a political alliance with the hard-liners of the navy such as Kato, Suetsugu, and Togo. They opposed the arms reduction agreement that the Minseito government strongly supported. According to them, an international negotiation was a different kind of battle. Making concessions meant losing a battle. The United States and Great Britain attempted to restrict Japan's freedom of action by imposing the treaty. Because the ultimate means to survive in world politics was to use military power, they objected to any arms

⁶³ Suzuki's infamous statement about Japanese democracy, see *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, February 20, 1929.

⁶⁴ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, p. 19. Mori argues that Japan was unable to expand freely because the Great Powers restricted Japan under the Nine Powers Treaty and the Kellogg-Braind Pact. He also believed that diplomacy was an international war during the peace times and that national power determined results of diplomacy.

reduction.⁶⁵

Third, hard-liners such as Mori, Ogawa Heikichi, and Matsuoka of the Seiyukai strongly advocated the “Manchuria First” policy.⁶⁶ Hard-liners of the army also stressed that Manchuria would be crucial for the existence of the Japanese Empire. They believed that Manchuria was a separate area from China and that Japan had special privileges and interests there: namely, Japan was responsible to maintain peace and order in this region.⁶⁷

As early as 1927, the resolution of the Far Eastern Conference of 1927 declared that:

In view of Japan’s special position in the Far East, the means to achieve these goals in China proper naturally ought to be different from those toward Manchuria and Mongolia.... Manchuria and Mongolia, especially the Three Eastern Provinces, have vital relations with Japan from the viewpoints of our national defense and national existence. Our country not only must be especially concerned with the area but also has a duty and responsibility, as a neighboring country, to make the area a happy tranquil land for natives and foreigners alike by maintaining peace and developing the economy.... If it is anticipated that the upheaval will spread to

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 1027.

⁶⁶ Ito, *Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu*, pp. 229-230. Yamamoto Jotaro Denki Hensankai, *Yamamoto Jotaro*, pp. 649-657. It is important to note that not all the Seiyukai shared an identical policy preference. In fact, unlike Mori, Takahashi Korekiyo and Inukai Tsuyoshi disagreed on Japan’s intervention into China’s civil war.

⁶⁷ Rikken Seiyukaishi Hensankyoku, *Rikken Seiyukai Shi: Tanaka Sosai*, vol. 6, p. 47; Matsuoka, *Ugoku Manmo*, pp. 27, 40-47, 275-282; Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 694-710. Indeed, in “Manchurian First” policy, different policy options existed in the army in a strict sense. In the middle of the 1920s, senior army leaders such as Ugaki Kazunari, Shirakawa Yoshinori and Honjo Shigeru considered that the army had to back up Zhang Zolin in Manchuria to defend Japan’s interests. In contrast, middle ranking officers such as Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishiro who were in Manchuria believed that the army had to control Manchuria directly.

Manchuria and Mongolia, public peace and order will be disturbed, and our special position as well as our rights and interests will be violated, we must prepare to take immediate and appropriate means to protect the area and to maintain it as a peaceful land for development by both natives and foreigners.⁶⁸

These hard-line politicians and the army hard-liners believed that Japan had to control Manchuria. Indeed, when Inukai cabinet took the office, these hard line politicians and the military officers worked together for their policy goal.⁶⁹

3) Soft-liners' Idea of Japan's Diplomacy and Security

In contrast to the hard-liners, the Minseito party leaders perceived Japan's security differently.⁷⁰ First of all, they considered civil society as the basic unit in politics. The goal of politics was to enrich citizens' lives so that politicians were responsible to carry out the best policies for the citizens.⁷¹

⁶⁸ On the Far Eastern Conference. See, Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 581-587. Tanaka Giichi Denki Kanko Kai, *Tanaka Giichi Den*, vol.2 (Tokyo: Tanaka Giichi Denki Kankokai, 1960), pp. 644-664.

⁶⁹ In addition to the army, the Foreign Ministry later cooperated with the hard-line coalition to implement expansionist policy. In fact, within the Foreign Ministry, those who worked in China proper and Manchuria had a slightly different view from those in Tokyo. In the middle of 1920s, facing Chinese Nationalist Party's northern expedition, those who worked in Manchuria such as Yoshida Shigeru and Yoshizawa Kenkichi considered that the army's certain intervention in Manchuria would be inevitable. In particular, once the Manchurian Incident took place, Consul General Hayashi considered that the Wakatsuki cabinet's non-enlargement principle would be unrealistic given the fact that Kanto army continued to fight against Zhang's army. Also, in the Inukai administration, hard-liners such as Shiratori Toshio worked with Mori to build the state of Manchukuo.

⁷⁰ Like Seiyukai members, not all the Minseito politicians were soft-liners. In the middle of the Manchurian Incident, Nagai Ryutaro and Nakano Seigo supported the national unity and advocated effective colonial policy.

⁷¹ Hamaguchi, *Zuikan Roku*, pp. 41-49.

Second, they viewed world politics in an optimistic way. They believed that the use of force was obsolete after World War I. Rather, international institutions, laws and agreements were important tools for maintaining peace. The League of Nations, the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact all demonstrated that the world had entered into a new era of stability and peace. Therefore, the Minseito supported the agreement of naval arms reduction at the London Naval Conference. The agreement would terminate unnecessary arms races among the Great Powers, lighten the financial burden of the nation, and promote international peace.

At the Washington Conference, Admiral Kato recognized that both military power and international agreements were necessary for Japan's defense. He agreed on naval arms control in exchange of a non-fortification agreement in the Pacific. Following Kato's line, Admirals Okada, Takarabe, and Saito also supported international agreements on arms reduction at the Geneva and the London Naval Conferences.⁷² Prior to the Geneva Conference, Admiral Saito pointed out that:

Japan must consider how to develop its national power and increase its national interests and welfare while maintaining peace with other powers. It is disadvantageous for Japan to specify the ratio of naval power to Great Britain and the United States at the very beginning of the Conference... We have to consider what is the best thing to do from the viewpoint of our actual present national power, from the viewpoint of the national interest and the Japanese citizen's welfare, from the viewpoint of the armament

⁷² Internationalists in the navy and Minseito politicians were not naïve idealists. Rather, they were defensive realists who judged that international cooperation would enhance Japan's national power. Okada Keisuke, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun sha, 1950), pp. 42-43. However, no strong soft line coalition existed between the navy and politicians, although internationalists in the navy supported the agreement.

necessary for our future expansion, and from the viewpoint of continuing to be ranked among the nations supporting peace....In the future, the only way to attain both safety and expansion is to stick to our present position.⁷³

Third, the Minseito held a non-interventionist policy in China's civil war.

Unlike Seiyukai members, the Minseito leaders hardly emphasized Japan's dominant position in Manchuria. They perceived that Manchuria was economically underdeveloped while China proper had enormous commercial value. Therefore, the Minseito made a lot of effort to maintain a good relationship with China and avoid any intervention in Manchuria. By so doing, the Minseito promoted economic trade with China. Even when China's anti-foreign and anti-Japanese movement escalated, the Minseito maintained that Japan should patiently negotiate with China through diplomatic means.⁷⁴ At the same time, the Minseito promoted

⁷³ Saito Shishaku Kinen kai, *Saito Makoto Den*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Saito Shishakku Kinenkai, 1941), pp. 72-73.

⁷⁴ The Minseito's policy preference, see, Ito, *Showashoki Seijishi Kenyu*, pp. 34-68; Banno Junji, *Kindai Nihon no Gaiko to Seiji* (Tokyo: Kenbunshuppan, 1985), p. 154, 159, 175; Sakurada Kai, ed., *Soshi Rikken Minseito: Shiryo hen* (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1989), pp. 46-76. Indeed, after the Nanjing Incident, Chinese nationalists brutally attacked Japanese Consulate in Nanjing, Sasaki Teiichi criticized Shidehara's non-interventionism, saying that Shidehara tried to protect his father-in-law's business—the Mitsubishi zaibatsu at the expense of Japanese national security. According to Sasaki, "Chinese nationalist soldiers invaded into Japanese Consulate in Nanjing. The consulate's wife was raped by twenty seven soldiers in front of her husband, Consul Morioka Shohei. About thirty women, including girls, were also raped. Nemoto Hiroshi and the police chief were seriously wounded. Yet, the official statement by the Foreign Ministry was that there were no victims...Japanese who lived in Nanjing were victims for Shidehara Diplomacy which aimed to promote trade with China for the Mitsubishi zaibatsu." Sasaki Toitsu, *Aru Gunjin no Jiten* (Tokyo: Sokei Shobo, 1963), pp. 138-141. The majority of the army viewed that the use of force would be necessary to solve the Sino-Japanese problem. Regarding the Manchurian problem, no soft liner coalition

an active economic relationship with China. Foreign Minister Shidehara was enthusiastic about participating in the Special Tariff Conference in October 1925. There, the Japanese delegate declared granting recognition to the Chinese demand for tariff autonomy.⁷⁵

In addition, the Minseito claimed that the maintenance of peace and order in the Three Eastern Provinces—Manchuria—was strictly China's responsibility. It understood that Japan has no rights to claim whatsoever in these areas except to the South Manchurian Railway and Japanese people in Manchuria. In Shidehara's words, "we must make allowance for this situation and pray for the success of the Chinese people with sympathy, patience, and hope. We must offer our friendly cooperation to China as much as possible, if she seeks it. At the same time, however, we should never interfere in her domestic affairs. We aim to establish a close economic relationship between Japan and China under the principle of equal opportunities. In order to accomplish this, we shall take such methods as will bring equal benefits to both Japan and China. Chinese people will surely recognize our fair policy."⁷⁶

was existent, although Chief of Army General Staff Kanaya and the Army Minister Minami cooperated with the Wakatsuki cabinet.

⁷⁵ Usui Katsumi, *Nihon to Chugoku: Taisho Jidai* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1972), pp. 235-254; Banba Nobuya, "Pekin Kanzei Tokubetsu Kaigi ni Nozomu Nihon no Seisaku Kettei Katei," in Hosoya Chihiro and Wakanuki Joji ed., *Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei no Nichibeiki Hikaku* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977); Hattori Ryuji, "Chugoku Gaiseki Seiri Kosho ni Okeru Shidehara Gaisho to Shigemitsu Chuka Rinji Dairi Koshi: Washinton Taisei ka no Futaaatsu no Taigai Rosen to Manshu Jihen: 1929-1931," *Kokusai Seiji*, vol. 113 (December 1996), pp. 167-180.

⁷⁶ *Records of the Imperial Diet*, vol. 4, no. 9 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunkasha, 1976), pp.

	Hard-liners' View	Soft-liners' View
Major Political Actors	The Seiyukai, the Sakurakai, the Kanto army	The Minseito, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance
Diplomatic Principle	Imperialism, Nationalism	International Cooperation with the Great Powers in Asia
Attitude toward the Great Powers	Competitive	Cooperative
Attitude toward China	"Manchuria First" Policy, intervention in Manchuria	Economic Cooperation, non-intervention principle in China's civil war
Economic Policy preference	Control Manchuria and develop resources for industrialization	Economic interdependence and promotion of trade with China

Table 2.1 Two Views of Japanese Diplomacy and Security

4) Hypotheses

In conclusion, this study will build the following hypotheses. They are:

Hypothesis 1: Japan's security policy outcome is the result of domestic political balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners.

Hypothesis 2: Japanese political leaders have a greater impact on policy outcome when the emperor, the court members, and the military support politicians' policy principle. In contrast, without their support, Japanese political leaders' influence is rather weak.

Hypothesis 3: Not all the military officers share identical views of national security. Rather, soft-liners and hard-liners exist within the Japanese navy and army respectively.

Hypothesis 4: Civilian and military leaders are interdependent. Civilian leaders try to maximize their influence in the policymaking process by getting support from military leaders. At the same time, the military leaders work with them closely in order to implement policy as they hope.

Hypothesis 5: Japanese political leaders are able to carry out security policy effectively when they have constitutional authority on the issue. The higher authority they have, the more successfully they execute their policy principle.

Hypothesis 6: Under the Meiji Constitution, Japanese military is able to influence issues of military affairs to a great extent because of its institutional autonomy and its professional expertise.

These hypotheses will be tested by the following case studies chapters.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates that characteristics of the Japanese political system and views of Japan's national security. First of all, the prominent nature of the Japanese political system is decentralization. No single political actor had dominant power in the political system. The emperor's authority was delegated to the ministers of state, the military, the Privy Council and the Genro. Additionally, both the state ministers and a prime minister equally shared executive power. State ministers were responsible for their actions not to the premier but to the emperor. Although the prime minister, as the main authority of the cabinet, appointed state ministers to serve in his government, he had no right to impose policies to other ministers. Unanimous approval was always required for any cabinet policy submitted for imperial ratification.

Second, the Japanese political system was undemocratic by nature. In the Japanese political system of pre-World War II, the Privy Council, the Genro, and the General Staffs held veto power to the government's decision. Unlike the cabinet members, these political actors were not elected by citizens. But this held significant influence in politics. The Privy Council had veto power to cabinet

decisions if the majority of the Privy Council members disagreed to recommend the cabinet decision to the emperor. The Genro and the Imperial Court aides advised the emperor and influenced the decision-making process behind the scene. The General Staffs in the navy and the army were independent from the cabinet. It was the emperor that held the sole supreme command of the army and the navy. Hence, the cabinet was unable to implement security policy effectively without coordination with these actors.

Third, the military became politicized as Japanese democracy grew. Although the military enjoyed high institutional autonomy in the government, party politicians came to intervene into military affairs. As the party government increasingly demanded both the army and the navy to reduce the size of the military, young military officers who were dissatisfied with these party politicians planned a coup. In addition, the Kanto army officers who were dissatisfied with the government's Manchurian policy were also determined to execute military campaigns without any orders from the above.

Fourth, the court members, including the emperor, also gradually became politicized late in the 1920s. It was well known that Prime Minister Tanaka decided to resign because the emperor was unsatisfied that Tanaka hesitated to publicly state that Colonel Komoto murdered Zhang Zuolin. In the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, hard-liners criticized that the emperor's 'evil' advisers at the Imperial Palace always gave improper advise to the emperor. In particular, right-wingers harassed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki. Later, they became targets of assassination.

Finally, two different views of national security had existed since the birth of modern Japan. One was the realist view. The group sees the world as a zero-sum competition among the nation-state. War was constant and international laws and agreements were only useful instruments for the Western Great Powers to maintain the status quo and dominate its influence in Asia. Additionally, in their opinion, because the only resource for Japan's national security was the military strengths, Japan had to promote industrialization and build up strong military power. The other was the liberal view. In this view, states can cooperate and share economic prosperity with each other. Thus, it is wise to abolish unnecessary competition and maintain peace through international agreements. Furthermore, Japan would be able to enrich the national economy, develop industry, and mature civil society by promotion of trade. It discouraged unnecessary expeditions to China and excessive military commitment to Manchuria. The balance of power between these two views reflected the direction of Japan's foreign policy. The next chapters will examine in detail the national security policymaking processes among major political actors in the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident.

Chapter 3

The Hamaguchi Cabinet and the London Naval Conference

Although I may lose the prime ministership, although I may lose the Minseito, although I may lose my life itself, my determination to bring the conference to a successful conclusion is unshakable.¹

Hamaguchi Osachi

My object was to ease everyone into an acceptable solution and as far as possible to avoid a violent confrontation. In dealing with opponents of the treaty, I sometimes carried things off by silently nodding in agreement as if I supported opposing ideas. With pro-treaty people, I did things like expressing opinions that smacked of the hard-line.²

Admiral Okada Keisuke

Introduction

The Japanese navy made a large concession to the United States in the Washington Conference of 1922-23. At the Conference, Japan signed the Naval Limitation Treaty known as the Five Power Treaty. The treaty established the maximum capital ship tonnage at the ratio of 5. 5. 3. 1.75, and 1.75, respectively for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. The navy experts opposed this treaty because it had to accept an inferior military status with the naval ratio lower than that of the United States and Great Britain. However, Admiral

¹ Quotation from Kobayashi Tatsuo, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Senso Genin Kenkyūbu ed, *Taiheiyō Senso heno Michi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Asahi shimbun sha, 1963), p. 75.

² Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaiko Roku*, pp. 52-53.

Kato, the head of the Japanese delegation at the conference, believed that naval arms reduction would still guarantee Japan's security. The navy experts hardly opposed Admiral Kato because Kato was the strongest leader. Therefore, Japan responded to the U.S. demands and accepted this treaty. At the Washington Conference, civilian leaders played a minor role. The navy leader was the head of the delegation and led the whole negotiation process.

In contrast, at the London Naval Conference in 1930, civilian leaders such as Prime Minister Hamaguchi and the chief delegate Wakatsuki led the negotiations, made concessions to the United States and Great Britain, and reached an agreement despite strong opposition by naval operational experts. What determined Japan's choice for arms reduction? Was it the international pressure? Or was it the result of domestic politics? Who were the main actors in this policymaking process? Why were civilian leaders able to persuade the navy to make a compromise? Did they make a coalition with some members in the navy? Did Emperor Hirohito and his aides support Hamaguchi?

The main focus of this chapter is to examine coalition politics among politicians, the navy, and the Imperial Court in Japan's decision and policymaking process on the issue of arms reduction agreement with the United States and Great Britain. In particular, exploring new sources, this chapter will make it clear that Grand Chamberlain Suzuki played an important role in the decision making process. Hamaguchi was able to avoid severe confrontation with the Chief of the Navy General Staff Kato because Grand Chamberlain Suzuki deliberately delayed Kato's meeting with the emperor. Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara also accepted Suzuki's

request to arrange the delayed meeting. The court members rarely involved in the government's decision-making process. But, they influenced politics indirectly because they functioned as a mediator between the emperor and policymakers.

The main hypotheses are that: 1) either international cooperation or international conflict is the result of internal politics within the state; 2) Japanese political leaders are able to maximize their influence when they have constitutional authority on the issues of national security; and that 3) they are able to empower themselves if they share ideas about national security and make a coalition with the military. In addition to coalition with the military, civilian leaders are able to increase their influence when the emperor and the court support them. These hypotheses are to be examined by process-tracing the London Naval Conference.

This chapter has eight sections. The first section briefly describes the historical background. The second section illustrates the Hamaguchi cabinet's constitutional authority on the issues of arms reduction. It argues that the Hamaguchi cabinet perceived that arms reduction was an important issue of state affairs. He strongly supported naval arms reduction because budget cuts to the navy would reduce the citizens' financial burden. Instead of building strong arms, he considered that achieving economic prosperity and enriching the national welfare were the core of national interests. The third part depicts the process that the three chief delegates—Wakatsuki, Stimson, and MacDonald—made a reasonable compromise and reached a naval agreement. The fourth section draws on the confrontation between Hamaguchi and the Navy General Staff. As military professionals, the members of the Navy General Staff considered national security

from a narrow operational point of view. Hence, they objected to any concession out of concern it might endanger national security. When Hamaguchi and the Navy General Staff disagreed on the arms reduction, Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki delayed the Chief of Navy General Staff Kato's meeting with the emperor. By so doing, they gave Hamaguchi an opportunity to discuss with Emperor Hirohito frankly on the issue of the arms reduction agreement.

The fifth section focuses on the debate of military command and the Supreme War Council's report on the treaty to the emperor. In both cases, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to reject any strong opposition by the Navy General Staff because some leaders in the Navy Ministry supported the naval agreement. The sixth section also demonstrates that thanks to the navy soft-liners' support, the Hamaguchi cabinet had the Privy Council approve the treaty for ratification successfully. But Hamaguchi's triumph was short-lived. The military radical officers became politicized and a right-winger attacked Hamaguchi.

The final section explores six five implications of this case study. First of all, Japan's policy outcome is the result of domestic politics between soft-liners and hard-liners. Despite opposition from the Navy General Staff and hard-liners from the Privy Council and the Seiyukai, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to ratify the treaty because the cabinet was able to gain supports from the emperor, the navy and the Imperial Court. Second, this case study shows that the higher constitutional authority civilian leaders have, the more influence they have on policy outcome. Third, civilian leaders are able to influence policy outcomes when the military and civilians share policy preferences. Admirals Okada, Takarabe, and

Vice Admiral Yamanashi all agreed that the treaty would be beneficial to Japan so that Hamaguchi was able to make the treaty despite strong opposition from the Navy General Staff. Fourth, the Imperial Court members' political role should not be underestimated. The emperor and the Imperial Court also backed up Hamaguchi indirectly by delaying the Chief of the Navy General Staff's meeting with the emperor. Although the court hardly participated in the government's decision-making process on this issue, they helped the cabinet by manipulating the emperor's meeting schedule with the Chief of the Navy General Staff. Thanks to them, Hamaguchi was able to talk with the emperor directly in advance. Fifth, it is counterproductive for civilians to confront with the military and force it to agree to their wishes. This case study demonstrates that those who contributed to this treaty were forced to retire and that hard-liners gradually increased their influence in the navy. To make matters worse, fearing civilian supremacy over the military, young military officers formed a secret group and challenged party politics. Sixth, lack of communication only increases misunderstanding and hostility between the military and politicians. Surely, the Hamaguchi cabinet compelled the navy to accept the compromise plan. But the navy and right-wingers felt that politicians were too arrogant. Simply confronting the military would be counterproductive for civilian leaders in implementing policies.

I. Historical Background of the London Naval Conference

The London Naval Conference was held two years after the Geneva Conference. The lesson that the United States learned from the deadlocked Geneva Conference was to approach the Great Powers and get some positive feedback

before starting official negotiations. Therefore, President Herbert C. Hoover sent former Vice President Charles G. Dawes as ambassador to Britain. He initiated informal discussions on arms reduction in the spring of 1929 in order to facilitate a favorable environment. While establishing a bilateral diplomatic channel, the United States demonstrated its commitment on disarmament at the League of Nations. At the sixth session of the League of Nations Disarmament Preparatory Commission, following President Hoover's instruction, Hugh S. Gibson stated that the United States recognized that the Great Powers should press on positively toward substantial reductions in armaments.³

Great Britain, like the United States, supported arms reduction. In particular, after the Labor Party's victory at a general election, new Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald conferred with Ambassador Dawes and started discussing a future naval conference.⁴ Later, Dawes also discussed with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, Matsudaira Tsuneo. In response, Ambassador Matsudaira requested the Tokyo government issue official principles for the coming conference. On June 28, just before its resignation, the Tanaka cabinet reached a consensus in naval armaments. The cabinet maintained that "Japan would assert the necessity of an auxiliary vessel strength equivalent to at least 70 percent of that

³ Robert Gordon Kaufman, *Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: the United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 113-117.

⁴ Kaufman, *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era*, pp. 118-124.

of the world's largest navy."⁵ In addition, the cabinet agreed that "with regard to specific distribution within categories, this ratio should be emphasized for large vessels such as 20-cm.-gun cruisers and above, but in the case of submarines and small vessels such as light cruisers and below the principal consideration ought to be the strength each nation itself feels to be necessary."⁶

II. The Hamaguchi Cabinet and Constitutional Authority on the Issue of Naval Arms Reduction

On July 2, 1929, following Prime Minister Tanaka's resignation, Hamaguchi formed a new cabinet. He appointed Shidehara as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inoue Junnosuke as the Finance Minister, and Takarabe as the Navy Minister.⁷ As the Hamaguchi cabinet's ten-point program demonstrated, the Hamaguchi cabinet had strongly desired international disarmament.⁸ Hamaguchi

⁵ Gaimusho, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: the London Naval Conference of 1930*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gaimusho, 1983), pp. 107-108.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ When Hamaguchi formed a cabinet, the Minseitō party was loosely divided into two factions: Adachi and Egi factions. The members of the Adachi faction were local politicians who were very skillful in election campaigns. Those of the Egi faction were former bureaucrats who were good at policy planning. Under Hamaguchi's leadership, competition between the two was rather marginal. *Bungei Shunju*, December, 1929, p. 107.

⁸ The Hamaguchi cabinet's ten-point program consisted of: 1) a non-corrupt and clean government, 2) enhancement of the national spirit, 3) enforcement of official discipline, 4) re-orientation of foreign policy toward China, 5) encouragement of arms reduction, 6) adjustment and retrenchment in finance, 7) a no-loan policy and reduction of the national debt, 8) lifting of the gold embargo, 9) establishment of a new social policy, and 10) reform of education. An adjustment of finance was particularly crucial for the Hamaguchi cabinet because the Minseitō tried to gain public support, and become dominant in the Diet by improving economic conditions.

also understood that arms reduction was in the sphere of his competence, since it was a broad state affair. The announcement of the ten-point program elaborated that Japan had to cooperate with other powers and establish an international agreement on arms limitation and arms reduction.

For Hamaguchi, arms reduction was not only a defense issue but also an economic one. At that time, the national treasury was in extremely poor condition as a consequence of the financial depression. The cabinet decided to postpone expenditures for all new programs. In the revised working budget for fiscal 1929 there were reductions or postponements in expenditure totaling 90.47 million yen in the general account and 57.15 million yen in the special accounts. Arms reduction was an indispensable prerequisite to improving government finances and to lifting the gold embargo. Hence, the cabinet was eager to make a naval arms reduction agreement and reduce defense budget. Indeed, Hamaguchi believed that arms reduction will contribute to strengthening the national economy which was the foundation for national welfare and national power. According to Hamaguchi,

The goal of politics must be to enrich citizen's lives materially and spiritually...First of all, once political development was more or less achieved internally and Japan's international position was accepted externally, politicians who were in both the majority and the opposition parties came to pay sufficient attention to the substance of citizens' life. Second, economic and social conditions were so serious that people came to worry about their lives. Third, most new voters under universal male suffrage belonged to the class who were most dissatisfied with their material existence. Hence, politicians had to pay attention to their voices.

A good summary for the Hamaguchi cabinet's policy principle, see Hamaguchi Naikaku Hensansho, *Hamaguchi Naikaku* (Tokyo: Hamaguchi Naikaku Hensansho, 1929); Ito, *Showashoki Seijishi Kenkyu*, pp. 34-68; Sakurada kai ed., *Soshi Rikken Minseito: Shiryohen*, pp. 46-76.

Politicians had to improve citizens' life both materialistically and spiritually. There are those who have a great impact on citizens' life. Political parties and politicians must understand it and carry out politics. At the same time, citizens must supervise the government and judge its performance by elections.⁹

As the Hamaguchi cabinet indicated its active commitment for the naval disarmament, both the United States and Great Britain advanced negotiations at the highest official level. Early in October, 1929, during his visit to the United States, Prime Minister MacDonald discussed with President Hoover a future conference in London. Then, the British government issued an official invitation to Japan, the United States, France, and Italy to attend a third naval conference at London starting January 1930.

Understanding that the cabinet was to be responsible for achieving an arms reduction treaty, Hamaguchi structured this agenda in the following ways. First, soon after the Hamaguchi cabinet received the invitation from Great Britain, Hamaguchi chose former Prime Minister Wakatsuki as the head of the Japanese delegation.¹⁰ As a financial expert, Wakatsuki had spent most of his career in the Ministry of Finance: he had worked as Finance Minister and Prime Minister in the

⁹ Hamaguchi, *Zuikanroku*, p. 42.

¹⁰ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 334-335; Ike, Hatano and Kurosawa ed., *Hamaguchi Diary*, pp. 240-241. Additionally, Kaya Okinori of the Ministry of Finance, a keen finance bureaucrat, assisted Wakatsuki from the viewpoint of finance. Prior to the conference, he had studied the great powers' financial conditions and naval armaments in detail in order to argue with naval experts. Indeed, he was considered to be as well-informed as naval experts on naval affairs. See Uchida Nobuya, *Fusetsu Gojunen* (Tokyo: Jitsugyono Nihonsha, 1951), pp. 96-98.

past.

Without doubt, Wakatsuki and Hamaguchi shared a common idea of national defense. They both understood that the London Naval Conference would have a significant impact on Japan's economy as well as on world peace. In his message before departure, Wakatsuki asserted that:

In order to establish world peace and reduce the national burden, the Imperial government expects to conduct naval arms reduction. This is Japan's traditional policy principle...It goes without saying that it is crucial to eliminate any misunderstanding and suspicions among the nations in order to reach a naval arms reduction agreement.... The Imperial government has never prepared offensive wars against any countries. What Japan needs is to arm itself enough to defend Japan from any offensive attack by foreign countries. In this sense, Japan is willing to reach an agreement as long as the agreement ensures Japan's minimum armament for national defense. This demand is very fair and reasonable. If other countries accept Japan's demand in the London Conference, these countries would help promote world peace and the reduction of national burdens.¹¹

Second, the Navy Minister Takarabe appointed himself as a member of the delegation. Takarabe was an adequate leader in the navy, who could listen to others' opinions and make a compromise if necessary. His position was ambiguous, though. As a minister of state, he hoped to contribute to reach an international agreement. But, as a leader of the navy, he understood that the majority in the navy opposed any concession.¹² In fact, leaders at the Navy General Staff were skeptical

¹¹ Gaimusho, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: the London Naval Conference of 1930*, vol. 1, Doc. 232, p. 317.

¹² As a son-in-law of Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Gonbei, Takarabe developed successful career. Served as the Navy Minister in the Kato and Wakatsuki cabinets in 1924-26, Takarabe cooperated with the Minseito politicians. Yet, some navy officers were rightly afraid if Takarabe would make concession against party politicians at the expense of the navy's organization interests. *Tokyo Asahi*

about Takarabe's leadership. They chose Admiral Abo Kiyokazu as a naval adviser and made him accompany these delegates to London. By doing so, the Navy General Staff attempted to prevent the Japanese delegates from making concessions easily.¹³

Finally, the Hamaguchi cabinet established Japan's basic demands in a flexible way. On the one hand, the cabinet accepted three basic principles that the navy had claimed. The first principle was that the standard for Japanese auxiliary vessel strength should be the actual amount Japan would possess at the end of fiscal 1931, and the ratio of Japanese forces to those of the United States should be overall at least 70 percent. The second one was that Japan should have a 70 percent ratio vis-à-vis the United States, particularly in the category of 20-cm.-gun heavy cruisers. The third one was that submarine tonnage should be the actual amount Japan would possess at the end of fiscal year 1931. The actual strength Japan would have at the end of fiscal year 1931 was: 108,400 tons in heavy cruisers (12 ships); 98,400 tons in light cruisers; 132,495 tons in destroyers; and 78,497 tons in submarines. By emphasizing these three basic principles, the navy aimed to maintain the minimum strength necessary and preserve the safety of Japan's national territory.¹⁴

Shimbun, July 3, 1929. In fact, he declared that he would participate in the conference as a politician, not as an admiral. *Bungei Shunju*, January, 1930, p. 162.

¹³ Ito Takashi ed., *Zoku Gendaishi Shiryo vol. 5: Kato Hiroharu Nikki* (Tokyo: Mizuho Shobo, 1994), pp. 466-468 (Hereafter, *Kato Diary*); Asada Sadao, *Ryotaisenkanki no Nichibei Kankei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993), p. 181.

¹⁴ Asada, *Ryotaisenkanki no Nichibei Kankei*, pp. 42-44; Ikei, Hatano, and Kurosawa ed., *Hamaguchi Diary*, p. 260.

On the other hand, the cabinet insisted that Japan had to make every effort to finish the coming conference successfully. The instructions noted that "in this upcoming conference, the Imperial government attempted to ensure national defense and reduce the national burden. It also aimed to reach a naval agreement among the great powers in order to promote cooperation and peace."¹⁵

III. The London Naval Conference: January-March, 1930

There were four crucial stages from the official negotiations in London to the ratification of the treaty in Tokyo.¹⁶ The first stage was official negotiations in London from January to March, 1930. Hamaguchi considered that arms reduction was an important issue of state affairs which was related to both national security and economic/finance issues. He understood that it was proper that the cabinet, not the navy, was the main organ for policy choice. Therefore, he appointed Wakatsuki as the head of the delegation and let him lead the negotiation. Indeed, during the conference, the navy experts had little impact on the international outcome.

On January 21, 1930, the opening ceremony of the London Naval Conference was held in the presence of King George V in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. Since the United States and Britain had already discussed their views in detail prior to the conference, the main dispute at the conference was

¹⁵ Gaimusho, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: The London Naval Conference of 1930*, vol. 1, Doc. 223, p. 306.

¹⁶ About the London Naval Conference, see: Ito, *Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu: Okada Keisuke Taisho Kiroku Hensankai. Okada Keisuke* (Tokyo: Okada Taisho Kiroku Hensankai, 1956), pp. 30-180; Kobayashi Tatsuo, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," pp. 11-162.

between Japan and the United States over the issue of the 70 percent ratio. Based on the three principles, Japan claimed that it had to possess the 70 percent naval strength of the United States while the United States maintained that the 60 percent ratio, not the 70 percent, would be appropriate.

Wakatsuki dominated the negotiation with the United States and minimized naval experts' demands because official negotiations proceeded through informal conversation among chief delegates. While naval experts failed to have any substantial input into the negotiations, Saito Hiroshi and Matsudaira of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assisted Wakatsuki. Following MacDonald's suggestion, these Japanese representatives carried on free bilateral conversations with American and British representatives. Ambassador Matsudaira and Senator David Reed acted as representatives of Japan and the United States. Saito, Chief of the Public Information Division of the Foreign Minister and Sir Robert L. Craigie, the head of the American Division of the Foreign Office, spoke as representatives of Japan and Great Britain.¹⁷

Indeed, during this interval, Saito presented a brilliant compromise plan so that the Japanese-American impasse could be resolved. Accordingly, Japan would accept a quota of 18 cruisers for the United States, if the American government would defer construction of the last three cruisers until 1935. This idea would satisfy the United States because it would maintain the 10:6 ratio. At the same time, it would also assure Japan's wish for a de facto 10:7 ratio until 1936.

¹⁷ About negotiations in London, see Wakatsuki Reijiro, *Oshu ni Shishite* (Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihon Sha, 1931), and Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 348-351.

at which time the two nations could reconsider their positions at the next conference on naval limitation.¹⁸

On March 8, the American delegation followed the compromise outlined by Japan. If Japan would sanction a quota of 18 cruisers for the United States, Senator Reed conceded that the United States would defer construction of the last three cruisers until 1934, 1935, and 1936 respectively. This plan would give the American government a stronger bargaining position in 1936 than contained in Japan's plan. Thus, Ambassador Matsudaira maintained that he would accept the latest American proposal if Japan were permitted to spread an additional 20,000 tons of naval construction over other categories of warships. This concession, noted Matsudaira, would furnish Japan with a combined fleet tonnage slightly in excess of 70 percent during the life of the treaty. Although Senator Reed responded favorably to Matsudaira's suggestion, the American naval advisors vigorously opposed it.¹⁹

Following Stimson's request, the heads of the three delegations—Stimson, MacDonald, and Wakatsuki—led the final negotiations on March 12. Forgoing the usual amenities, Stimson directly informed Wakatsuki that Senator Reed's proposal of March 8 represented the maximum concession the United States could make. He warned that any further demands on this subject would completely rupture the negotiations. In addition, he implied that Great Britain and the United States were

¹⁸ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 351-355.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

fully prepared to negotiate a bilateral agreement if necessary.²⁰

Under this condition, Wakatsuki and Stimson worked out the Japanese-American compromise plan. Namely, the United States promised not to lay down its sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth heavy cruisers until 1933, 1934, and 1935 respectively. It also promised not to complete them before 1936, 1937, and 1938. Consequently, the Japanese heavy cruiser ratio would be 72.26 percent in 1935, 67.8 percent in 1936, 63.8 percent in 1937, and 60.2 percent in 1938. Japan, the United States, and Great Britain were to have parity in submarine tonnage, which was set at 52,700 tons and by not constructing replacements for scrapped submarines, for which tonnage was reduced to the proper amount by 1936, the year the treaty reached full term. Under this plan, the overall Japanese ratio was 69.75 percent vis-à-vis the United States. On March 14, the Japanese delegates agreed on the compromise plan.²¹

Admiral Abo had little opportunity to join the discussions among the top delegates. He had little influence on the agreement at the conference. In fact, it was after all the delegates had reached the agreement that he was informed of the terms. After slightly changing the technical terms of the plan according to Abo's request, the delegates sent the plan to Tokyo with their overall signature and waited for further instructions.²²

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 348-351.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 352-365.

²² Sato Naotake, *Gaiko Hachiju nen* (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin sha, 1963), pp. 247-259.

The delegates' telegram implicitly asked the Hamaguchi cabinet to agree on the compromise plan. For the Japanese delegates who firmly negotiated with both American and British delegates, any concessions beyond the compromise plan would be highly unlikely. It said:

The Americans have already accepted the principle of a de facto overall 70 percent ratio. Although it is true that the ratio falls short by two hundredths of a percent, this shows that great pains have been taken to meet Japan's desires, while at the same time the Americans avoid the criticism of having accepted completely our demands. Our demand with regard to heavy cruisers has not been met, but it can be seen that until the next conference we will in fact have the strength in excess of 70 percent. Though it is regrettable that our submarine tonnage is less than we asked for, it can be regarded as a concession that they have reduced their submarine strength and suggested parity with us. As we see the situation, short of new circumstances developing, it will be difficult to force any further concessions from the Americans.²³

Japan made a slight concession over the ratio problem. But the civilian delegates led the whole negotiation and reached a reasonable compromise plan with the United States and Great Britain at the first stage of the London Naval Conference.

IV. Negotiation between the Hamaguchi Cabinet and the Navy in Tokyo

At the second stage, the Hamaguchi cabinet had to have the navy accept the compromise plan. The arrival of the telegram was the beginning of a confrontation between the Hamaguchi cabinet and the navy. Hamaguchi was determined to end this conference successfully even at the expense of the 70 percent ratio. In contrast, the Navy General Staff members opposed any concessions.

²³ Kobayashi. "Rondon Kaigun Joyaku." pp. 11-13.

They viewed national defense from a military operational point of view so that any concessions meant the endangerment of Japan's national defense.

In the negotiation process between the cabinet and the navy, leaders at the Navy Ministry played an important role as mediators between the cabinet and the Navy General Staff. In fact, despite strong opposition of the Navy General Staff, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to accept the compromise plan because the Navy Ministry agreed on the compromise plan. On the one hand, as naval professionals, leaders of the Navy Ministry such as Takarabe, Okada and Yamashita Katsunoshin all understood what the Naval General Staff claimed. On the other hand, as military administrators, they were in a position to cooperate with Prime Minister Hamaguchi. Although no close coalition existed between the Minseito and the navy, top leaders at the navy were cooperative. In addition, the emperor and the Imperial Court helped the cabinet to complete the agreement. Thanks to their support, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to weakened hard-liners' opposition and sign the treaty. The below of this section depicts how the Navy General Staff, the navy, and the Imperial Court reacted.

1) The Navy General Staff's Opposition

Obviously, the members of the Navy General Staff disagreed on the compromise plan. For specialists in naval operations, 70 percent was the absolutely lowest ratio. It was a matter of life and death for them.²⁴ Imperial Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, a member of the Supreme War Council, and Fleet Admiral

²⁴ Ito ed., *Kato Diary*, pp. 466-467; Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 70.

Togo Heihachiro also supported the Navy General Staff. On March 16, soon after the arrival of the telegram, the Chief of Naval General Staff Kato visited Togo. He explained the compromised plan. After listening to Kato's explanation, Togo responded.

We have already yielded 30 percent. If they do not make concessions to us in this very important matter of the heavy cruisers, all we can do is to give up the hopeless conference and return home. Even if we fail to reach an agreement, there will be no big naval expansion. Therefore there is nothing to worry about fiscally. We have adopted the position that without 70 percent of the naval strength of the United States, we do not feel secure in our national defense. Consequently, petty bargaining over one or two percentage points is useless. If they will not accommodate our demands, we must withdraw from the conference.²⁵

The Navy General Staff criticized the government position in two ways.

First, Vice Chief of the Navy General Staff Suetsugu leaked information and tried to appeal to the public.²⁶ He gave the full text of an official statement of the navy to newspaper reporters. He condemned American pressure as well as the Hamaguchi cabinet. The statement declared that the navy could not possibly accept that kind

²⁵ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 30.

²⁶ Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku*, p. 53; Okada Keisuke Taisho Kiroku Hensankai, *Okada Keisuke* (Tokyo: Okada Taisho Kiroku Hensankai, 1956), pp. 82-91. Vice Chief of the Navy General Staff Suetsugu was the leader of the hard-liners in the navy. As Vice Chief of the Navy General Staff, Suetsugu was in charge of making operational plans against the United States. According to Okada, "Kato was a simple-hearted, rather nice fellow. Compared to him, the real sly fox was his scheming subordinate Suetsugu. In view of this, the only thing I could do was to take on Suetsugu as my opponent." The emperor also commented that Chief of General Staff Kato agreed with the soft-liners in the navy, while Suetsugu lectured the emperor that soft liners' opinion would endanger national security. Mizuno Hiroto, "Kaigun Oiyē Sodo no Sokessan" *Chuo Koron*, September, 1930, p. 311. Recent historical document demonstrated that Kato was not a hard-liner like Suetsugu. Terasaki ed., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 26-27.

of proposal. The Navy General Staff intended to appeal to the public and object the government's position.²⁷

Second, the Navy General Staff sent an official report to the Navy Minister. It requested some changes in Japan's position. The document entitled "Policy Towards the Delegates' Request for Instructions" expressed that:

The American plan sought to impose the original American demands even though the proposal was cleverly disguised as a concession. The General Staff therefore requested the following changes:

1. The transfer to the 20-cm.-gun cruiser category of 17,600 tons from the overall 205,850 tons in light cruisers and destroyers allowed Japan under the American plan.
2. When the United States lays down its sixteenth 20-cm.-gun cruiser, Japan would lay down its thirteenth heavy cruiser out of the transferred tonnage provided for in point 1. When the United States completes its eighteenth cruiser, Japan would complete its fourteenth cruiser.
3. Japan's submarine tonnage should be 65,500 tons: 12,350 tons will be transferred from the overall light cruiser and destroyer tonnage.
4. If the transfer of tonnage to submarines was not accepted, then this should be conditioned on the exclusion of submarines under 8,700 tons from the limitation placed on submarine tonnage, and our submarine tonnage should be reduced to 72,000 tons.²⁸

By using power of the authority of naval operation and leaking information to the public, the Navy General Staff stubbornly kept pressure on the Navy Ministry and the cabinet to reject the compromise plan.

2) The Navy Ministry

²⁷ Kobayashi. "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 79.

²⁸ Kobayashi. "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 80; Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu, ed. "Showa Gojunen Shigatsu Ichinichi Kaigun ni kansuru Keii." *Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi: Kaisen Gaikoshi Bekkan Shiryo Shu* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1963), pp. 22-24

Like members of the Navy General Staff, leaders in the Navy Ministry were unsatisfied with the fact that the delegation had failed to meet the demands of the three principles. According to Takagi Sokichi, who was known as a pro-treaty officer,

in either the Navy Ministry or the General Staff, those who wear naval uniforms are technicians. They demand the navy have enough naval strength to counter the United States sea power for Japan's national defense. The United States is absolutely superior to Japan in the Western Pacific....American national power is so overwhelming that there is no need to reject Japan's demands of the 70 percent. If the United States insists that Japan must have only 60 percent of its naval strength and abandon submarines, we would become suspicious that the United States may intend to invade Asia.... All the naval officers who had a military education more or less think this way. In contrast, politicians think of national defense from a broad point of view.²⁹

In this sense, even navy soft-liners did not share the same idea of arms reduction and national security with Hamaguchi completely. However, unlike members of the Navy General Staff, Yamanashi and Okada considered that Japan had to reach a naval arms reduction agreement for two reasons. First, they thought that useless arms races would only weaken Japan's international position. Okada, for instance, thought that it was impossible for Japan to compete with the Great Powers and maintain a superior position due to the poor economy. He suggested that it would be wise to make an arms reduction agreement, since Japan was too weak to engage in international competition.³⁰

²⁹ Takagi's comment in Ando Yoshio, *Showa Seiji Keisaishi heno Shogen*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1966), p. 264.

³⁰ Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku*, p. 43.

Second, these top leaders of the Navy Ministry feared that the Minseito politicians would blame the navy for all the responsibilities if the conference collapsed. As party politics had developed, the navy leaders felt that they had to avoid developing uneasy relationships with party politicians.³¹ As early as March 17, when Yamanashi asked what would be the best way to handle the delegates' request, Okada replied: "If unavoidable, we will in the end have to swallow the proposal just as it stands. With the strength allowed under the agreement we can have an effective national defense. We must not be responsible for breaking up the conference but we should still try once or twice more to get what we want."³²

Therefore, the Navy Ministry mediated between the Hamaguchi cabinet and the Navy General Staff. It eventually assisted the Hamaguchi cabinet. At the same time, the Navy Ministry prepared a memorandum for the cabinet meeting to clarify the navy's position.

This memorandum was based on the premise that the navy was going to accept the government's draft of the return instructions. The memorandum stated that while the Americans' plan fulfilled the condition of giving Japan an overall ratio of 70 percent in auxiliary vessels, it fell short of the navy's demand with respect to heavy cruisers and submarines. The navy hoped that in the formulation of the return instructions, sufficient consideration would be given to these shortcomings.

³¹ Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku*, p. 50; Ito, *Showa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu*, p. 135, 140-141; Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 87.

³² Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku*, p. 51; Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," pp. 78-89.

If it were decided to send return instructions that exactly followed the delegates' proposal, the navy requested the following points in the future naval defense: the maintenance and improvement of the capabilities of existing vessels; full provision for air power; the promotion and development of experimental research installations; the improvement of defense facilities; the full provision of special types of surface vessels; the maintenance of construction skills and productive capacity; the adoption of suitable measures to prevent unemployment in the shipbuilding and related industries.³³ While accepting the compromise plan, the navy made efforts, as much as possible, to put its requests into the return instruction.

Having an informal conversation with Hamaguchi before the cabinet meeting on April 1, Okada asked Hamaguchi to accept the navy's amendments.

These amendments that the navy requested were:

1. With respect to 20-cm.-gun cruisers there is a reservation freeing Japan from treaty restraints after 1936. This reservation must without question apply to submarines, and it is necessary that it also be extended to all auxiliary vessels.
2. Although it is anticipated that there will be an increase in submarine tonnage as a result of the French and Italian positions on the question, it is equally necessary to consider a situation in which Britain and the United States increase submarine tonnage for other reasons.
3. From the viewpoint of maintaining naval construction skills and industrial capacity, it is necessary that exceptions to the agreed replacement age limits be acknowledge in every category, but especially in the submarine category.³⁴

While accepting the compromised plan, the navy made efforts as much as

³³ Kobayashi. "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 85.

³⁴ Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko. "Okada Keisuke Nikki." in *Gendaishi Shiryo* vol. 7 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1964), pp. 7-8 (Hereafter, *Okada Diary*).

possible to put its requests into the returned instruction.

3) The Emperor and the Imperial Court

In addition to the Navy Ministry, Emperor Hirohito and the Imperial Court supported the cabinet in order to complete the agreement in London. Emperor Hirohito, Genro Saionji and staffs at the Imperial Household helped the cabinet in the following ways. First, on March 27, when Hamaguchi met Emperor Hirohito, the emperor encouraged him to make efforts to complete the agreement and promote world peace as much as possible.³⁵ Thanks to the emperor's encouragement, Hamaguchi was confident in completing the arms reduction agreement. He was truly determined to stand firm against the Navy General Staff.

Second, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki actively worked for the Hamaguchi cabinet in order to weaken hard-liners' influence in two ways. One is that he advised Prince Fushimi not to oppose the cabinet decision too strongly. On March 26 and 28, Suzuki repeatedly told Prince Fushimi that the emperor sincerely hoped to make the naval reduction agreement. He suggested Prince Fushimi not to support the Navy General Staff and behave cautiously. The other is that he skillfully delayed Kato's meeting with the emperor. As a close aide of the emperor, Suzuki hoped that the naval agreement would be reached as the emperor wished. Therefore, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki once criticized the Chief of the Navy General Staff Kato, saying that "only the mediocre general could claim for 70 percent or

³⁵ Jonan Inshi, "Seikai Yobanashi," *Bungei Shunju*, 1930, November, p. 116; Ikei, Hatano, and Kurosawa eds., *Hamaguchi Diary*, p. 317; Hatano Masaru, *Hamaguchi Osachi: Seito Seiji no Shiken Jidai* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1993), pp. 164-169; Kato Yoko, "Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai no Ronri," pp. 154-160.

nothing. Chief of the Navy General Staff must be able to utilize whatever strength is allotted to him; whether it be 60 or even 50 percent that may be decided upon."³⁶ Furthermore, when Kato requested Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara to arrange the schedule to meet the emperor late in March, Suzuki strongly asked Nara to delay the meeting schedule so that Hamaguchi would be able to discuss frankly with the emperor the issue. Although Nara thought that Suzuki's request was unfair, Nara responded to Suzuki's request. He indirectly supported Hamaguchi.³⁷

Thanks to the leaders of the Navy Ministry and the court staffs, the cabinet was able to counter the Navy General Staff. On April 1, Hamaguchi sent the return instructions that approved the agreement among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. After receiving the government's return instruction, the delegates prepared to sign the treaty. The next day, in front of the heads of the delegations at St. James' Palace, Wakatsuki announced that with only one or two reservations Japan accepted the Matsudaira-Reed compromise.

On April 3, the delegates discussed the Japanese reservations. The main reservations were: 1) the present treaty should in no way limit Japan's freedom of action at the next conference; 2) the replacement age for submarines, destroyers, and light cruisers should be lowered so as to maintain construction skills and capacity; 3) submarine parity should be maintained with the United States and Great Britain. After the discussion, the second stage of the London Naval Conference was

³⁶ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 32-33.

³⁷ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 217.

completed with a major success.³⁸

On April 13, at reception dinner for Prince Takamatsu's visit to Europe, the emperor told the British ambassador that he was truly pleased with the agreement at the London Naval Conference. With approval from Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and Imperial Household Minister Ichiki, Foreign Minister Shidehara sent a secret telegram to London to convey the emperor's endorsement.³⁹ Thanks to cooperation from the navy experts, the emperor, and the Imperial Court, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to stand firm against the Navy General Staff and reached the agreement.

V. Confrontation Continued: April-July, 1930

Even after the London Naval Conference, the Navy General Staff, the Navy Ministry, and the Hamaguchi cabinet continued to confront each other. At the third stage, the Hamaguchi cabinet had to handle the controversy of the right of military command. It arose suddenly after the 58th Diet session was opened on April 21.⁴⁰ It originated in an interpretation of Articles 11 and 12 of the Meiji Constitution. Article 11 placed the command of the army and navy outside the area in which ministers of state were to advise the emperor. It allowed both the army and navy to conduct military operations without the cabinet's intervention. In contrast, Article 12 assigned an imperial prerogative on the determination of the organization and

³⁸ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, p. 358.

³⁹ Hatano, *Hamaguchi Osachi*, p. 171.

⁴⁰ Ito, *Showashoki Seijishi Kenkyu*, p. 111.

peacetime standing of the military forces. This was considered to be an item of state affairs.⁴¹ Because naval arms reduction was related in numerous ways to both state affairs and military command, the Navy General Staff and the Seiyukai Party criticized the Hamaguchi cabinet for intervening in the issue of military command.

The Seiyukai politician Mori addressed that: "properly speaking, national defense must not be looked upon as an ordinary affair of state. Within the navy, the Navy General Staff is responsible for directly advising the emperor with regard to national defense...everybody acknowledges this. Yet, the current situation is that ministers of state who have no direct responsibility have imprudently decided on an important national defense matter while knowingly disregarding the strong opposition of the Navy General Staff."⁴²

Responding to Mori's address, Shidehara stated:

Because of this treaty we will be able to economize on our military expenditures, and yet for at least the life of the treaty the security of our national defense is, I believe, completely secured. The government considered fully the opinions of the naval technical experts and with firm faith took the resolve to join in the present treaty.... We studied the comparative advantages and disadvantages of this treaty not only from the viewpoint of diplomacy but also from the viewpoint of military power, of economic and financial capacity, and of all the other national strengths upon which the national defense must rest. As a result of our study we were decisively persuaded that on this occasion the best policy for Japan was to participate in this treaty.⁴³

⁴¹ A superb comment on this issue. See Minobe Tatsukichi, "Rondon Kaigun Joyaku to Kenpo Mondai." in Minobe Tatsukichi, *Gikai Seiji no Kento* (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha, 1934), pp. 104-115.

⁴² Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 109.

⁴³ Ibid.

Responding to Shidehara's speech, the Seiyukai party leaders pointed out that the cabinet hardly accepted the opinions of the Naval General Staff.⁴⁴ Yet, Prime Minister Hamaguchi replied that the government was responsible for national defense insofar as the Diet is concerned.⁴⁵ He contended that Japan's national defense was very secure with the naval strength allotted under the present treaty. Hamaguchi also claimed that the technical opinions of the military were fully considered.⁴⁶

The speeches by Shidehara and Hamaguchi infuriated the Navy General Staff members.⁴⁷ In the Navy General Staff's understanding, it was the Navy General Staff that determined naval strength. To make matters worse, they viewed Hamaguchi as ignoring the Navy General Staff's opinions.

1) The Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff

Despite criticism from the Seiyukai and the Navy General Staff, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to defend his position because leaders of the Navy Ministry supported him. To be sure, in the beginning of the London Naval Conference, the navy soft-liners did not fully share the view about arms reduction with Hamaguchi and Shidehara. Yet, as the emperor and the other Imperial

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 110-112.

⁴⁵ Kato, "Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai no Ronri." pp. 168-172.

⁴⁶ Shakai Mondai Shiryo Kenkyukai. *Teikoku Gikaishi*, vol. 7, p. 85; Ito ed., *Kato Diary*, pp. 586-587.

⁴⁷ Kobayashi. "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." pp. 112-113; Ito ed., *Kato Diary*, pp. 97-99.

Household members supported the arms reduction agreement, the navy soft-liners came to strongly cooperate with Hamaguchi.

They understood that it was appropriate that the government deal with the matter of naval strength. The officials at the navy had incorporated the opinions of the Naval General Staff into their negotiations with the government. Through consultations with the Navy General Staff, the government had decided on the return instructions. Although Kato might not have fully agreed with Hamaguchi and the officials of the Navy Ministry, he had not raised explicit objections to them. This was how that the Navy Ministry believed the government did not violate the right of military command. Hence, the Navy Minister Takarabe commented that:

In view of the overall situation the decision was made that to sign this treaty was the right thing to do: I was happy to affix my signature. National defense is, of course, important, but state affairs are not limited simply to national defense. They include finance, economics, foreign policy, and other matters. We responded to the general trend toward world peace and signed this treaty in a spirit of international cooperation. From the wider national point of view I do not think it was detrimental for us to have done so. On the contrary, I firmly believe that there are many ways in which the treaty will contribute to our national progress. We did not achieve all our demands, so there is bound to be some dissatisfaction with the terms of the treaty. However, since the terms will not be fully implemented until 1936, I think that gives us time to study the matter thoroughly and prepare for the conference.⁴⁸

Similarly, Admiral Saito stated:

I do not think it in any way infringed on the right of military command for our country to have participated in the disarmament conference and to give approval to the London Treaty on the grounds that it was necessary from the viewpoints of international relations. I think it is exceedingly disagreeable that this kind of problem was used as a political weapon...I do

⁴⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 22, 1930; Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 124.

not consider this agreement to have created any deficiencies in the national defense before 1936. There are no limits to national defense, but even an amateur can tell by one glance at the figures that the agreement creates no deficiencies in our national defense.⁴⁹

These navy leaders supported the cabinet's interpretation about arms reduction issue. Backing from them was vital for the Hamaguchi cabinet.

In addition, both the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff agreed on drafting a memorandum to avoid any conflicts and misunderstanding within the navy. In a meeting on May 28, Kato presented a memorandum and sought Takarabe's approval for it. It said that military strength and organization, which were subsumed under the imperial prerogative embodied in Article 12, were matters for joint advice by the Navy Minister and by the Navy Chief of Staff. Neither could decide such matters unilaterally. On May 28, a memorandum was drafted as a response to Kato. It stated that there should be an agreement between the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff whenever the Minister makes a decision about a naval armament matter that involves a change in naval strength.⁵⁰

Furthermore, the emperor and the court worked hard to ease hard-line navy officers' attitude and let them accept the treaty. The emperor, for instance, made sure that after Kato's resignation, the navy leaders would choose a non-hard-line admiral as the new Chief of General Staff at the navy. The emperor sent Nara to Fleet Admiral Togo to check if he was satisfied with the treaty. The emperor tried

⁴⁹ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," pp. 124-125.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 127-128.

to have him accept that Tani would be the next Chief of the General Staff at the navy.⁵¹ In addition, when the delegation returned from London, the emperor invited them for lunch and gave them special gifts for their contribution to the treaty.⁵² While trying to check the navy hard-liners, the emperor showed that he was very pleased with the arms reduction agreement.

2) The Supreme War Council and the Report to the Emperor

After both the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff reached a consensus on the issue of military command, the navy had to prepare for an official report to the emperor. This report was to assess the treaty from the point of the navy.⁵³ The Supreme Navy Council had to approve the report. The new Chief of Navy General Staff Taniguchi Makoto, Okada, and Takarabe who supported the treaty helped in getting the Supreme Navy Council. They tried to persuade the navy hard-liner Togo in two ways. First, Takarabe agreed to resign in the future in order to get consent from him. Second, the Supreme War Council made it clear in the report that the treaty alone would not guarantee Japan's national defense perfectly so that further air power and improvement of training program would be necessary.

On July 2, Taniguchi and Okada asked Kato to persuade Togo to accept the treaty. When Taniguchi consulted Kato on the next day, Kato demanded the

⁵¹ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, pp. 235-236.

⁵² Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 4, p. 99.

⁵³ Ito ed., *Kato Diary*, p. 587.

Navy Minister's immediate resignation. Responding to Kato's demand, Takarabe went to see Togo early in the morning on July 6 and expressed his intention to resign.⁵⁴

On July 21, Togo, Prince Fushimi, Takarabe, Taniguchi, Okada, and Kato attended an informal meeting of the Supreme Navy Council at the Navy Minister's official residence. They discussed the draft of the report to the emperor.⁵⁵ Two days later, the Supreme Navy Council members met at the Imperial Palace. Taniguchi explained the report in detail. The participants of the Supreme War Council meeting agreed to state the treaty's possible shortcomings and future perspectives for overcome these shortcomings. Togo, accompanied by Taniguchi, presented the emperor with the report. After their meeting with the emperor, Hamaguchi informally presented the report at a cabinet meeting to get an approval from the cabinet members.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." pp. 131-133.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 137-138; Kobayashi and Shimada ed., *Okada Diary*, p. 25.

⁵⁶ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 139; Kobayashi and Shimada eds., *Okada Diary*, p. 26. The report stated:

The defense policy adopted by imperial decision in 1923 is the plan most appropriate to our present national condition. Acceptance of the present London Naval Treaty will cause shortcomings in the military strength required to support and implement the naval operational plans drawn up in conformity with the established policy. Therefore, if the present treaty should come into existence, we must, until 1937, adopt the countermeasures listed below in order to hold these shortcomings to a minimum.

1. Complete utilization of the strength allotted under the agreement: the maintenance and improvement of the capabilities of existing vessels; full development of the categories of vessels upon which no limitations are

The navy leaders cooperated with the Hamaguchi cabinet over the issues of military command and the navy's official report to the emperor. While hard-liners accepted the treaty, they succeeded in addressing the shortcomings of the treaty in an official report and created a favorable environment for claiming the navy's demands in the future. Now the final step in ratifying the treaty was to get an approval from the Privy Council.

VI. The Privy Council versus the Hamaguchi Cabinet

The final stage of the London Naval Conference was to get the treaty ratified. In the process of ratification, the Constitution required that the Privy

placed by the treaty.

2. Full provision of the air strength necessary to support and implement operational plans.

3. Improvement of defense facilities: full development of experimental research agencies; improvement of educational facilities; rigorous implementation of every kind of training exercise; improvement and full development of personal, materiel, amphibious equipment, arrangements for dispatching expeditionary forces, etc.

If the above countermeasures are adopted, we believe that under the circumstances presently existing the effects arising from the treaty's constraints can be mitigated, and there will be almost no difficulties with respect to national defense or the employment of forces.

However, from the standpoint of the intrinsic qualities of the armaments involved, there is an optimum distribution of strength among the various types of military forces. This distribution cannot automatically change in response to alternations in our national condition. Therefore, we would consider it very disadvantageous to our national defense if we were to be deprived of our freedom for a long time by this treaty. That is to say, as soon as this treaty expires, it is necessary immediately to perfect our national defense in accordance with the policies regarded as the best for our empire.

Council must approve the treaty and recommend it to the emperor for ratification.⁵⁷ Hamaguchi visited the Privy Council President Kuratomi Yuzaburo and arranged with him procedures for examining the treaty.⁵⁸ At the Privy Council, Vice President Hiranuma and Ito—both conservative nationalists—strongly opposed the treaty.⁵⁹

The Council's formal committee of inquiry was established on August 11. Ito was named chairman of the committee. The Privy Council members who clearly favored the treaty were excluded from the committee. The committee had to examine every aspect of the treaty and recommend its resolution to the Privy Council meeting. Then, referring to the committee's resolution, the Privy Council members would vote for approval. Here, over the ratification of the treaty, soft-liners and hard-liners confronted.

1) The Meetings of the Committee of Inquiry at the Privy Council

⁵⁷ Harada. *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 158-159. Theoretically, even if the Privy Council disapproved the treaty, Hamaguchi was able to ask the emperor directly for ratification.

⁵⁸ Kobayashi. "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 141. About the Minseito and the Privy Council, see Masuda Tomoko. "Seito Naikaku to Sumitsuin: Meiji Kenpotaisei no Genkai." pp. 155-158.

⁵⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 27, 1930; Harada. *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 44. They were strongly anti-Minseito, primarily because of their ideological position. Hiranuma was president of the ultra-nationalistic group named Kokuhonsha—National Foundation Society—and had been a close friend of the Seiyukai's Suzuki Kisaburo. Ito Miyoji was also known as anti-Minseito. At the Privy Council, he had previously rejected the Wakatsuki cabinet's request for an endorsement of offering a special loan for the Bank of Taiwan, which led the overthrow of the Minseito's Wakatsuki cabinet in 1927. See Wakatsuki. *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 326-329.

The committee of inquiry met thirteen times between August 18 and September 26. Hamaguchi, Shidehara, and Takarabe were all present at the meetings. The Hamaguchi cabinet defended its decision in two ways. First of all, Hamaguchi confidently stated that the government included naval experts' opinion in the decision-making process. Takarabe also actively supported him. Replying to a series of harsh questions about the issues such as the right of military command and shortcomings in national defense, Takarabe assured them that the national defense was safe under the treaty.

As for the right of military command, Kawai Misao, former Chief of the Army General Staff, and Kaneko Kentaro, a retired diplomat and Kato's friend, and Ito, Chairman of the inquiry committee, all criticized that the Hamaguchi cabinet disregarded the Navy General Staff's opinions. They denounced that the government intervened in the right of the military command that the Navy General Staff exclusively had.⁶⁰ In response, Hamaguchi contended that he understood the naval experts had not opposed the return instructions. Hamaguchi also replied to Kaneko's claim, saying that "the prerogatives are all united in the emperor so that one prerogative cannot infringe upon another prerogative. He claimed that if a defense problem should become a topic of debate in the Diet, the government bore the responsibility."⁶¹

⁶⁰ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," pp. 142-143; Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 157.

⁶¹ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 143; Ikei, Hatano and Kurosawa eds., *Hamaguchi Diary*, pp. 385-386.

As for shortcomings of national defense, Kawai and Ito criticized the treaty and suggested inviting Kato to discuss whether the treaty guaranteed Japan's security.⁶² To these criticisms, Hamaguchi responded that he did consider national defense, including military, diplomatic, economic, and other conditions. Only then, he concluded that the national defense was safe. In Hamaguchi's words, "if we make too much of military armament and do not conclude this treaty, then contrary to what might be expected, we will be worse off in our military defense when it is considered in its broadest sense. Though for one or two years the treaty may cause us some difficulties in connection with our armaments, we should sign it to bring to perfection our national defense."⁶³

Takarabe also pointed out that if a naval construction race began among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, the navy would be in a rather difficult position. Without the treaty, it would take 870 million yen to maintain the level of strength presently possessed by Japan. Considering Japan's poor economic situation, an unnecessary arms race would endanger Japan's security. Takarabe defended the government decision.⁶⁴

Second, Izawa Takio, Hamaguchi's close friend, lobbied non-hard-liners in the committee and persuaded several members of the inquiry committee to endorse

⁶² Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 143; Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 159; Ikei, Hatano and Kurosawa eds., *Hamaguchi Diary*, pp. 385-387.

⁶³ Quotation from Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku," p. 145.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

the treaty.⁶⁵ Understanding Hamaguchi's difficult situation, Izawa approached several council members.⁶⁶ He told them that the treaty would certainly guarantee national security. He also pointed out that some members had decided to support the government. In fact, although Kawai, Kaneko, and Ito harshly criticized the Hamaguchi cabinet, not all the members agreed with these hard-liners. Some did not have strong opinions about the treaty. Others disliked the fact that a few hard-liners dominated the committee.⁶⁷ Through intensive lobbying, Izawa persuaded a few council members to take the side of the Hamaguchi cabinet.

Gradually, Izawa's lobbying activities softened the hard-liners. In fact, Ito worried about his reputation as Chairman of the committee. He would have to resign if the plenary session of the Privy Council disapproved the committee resolution. Therefore, after exchanging opinions among the council members, Ito changed his mind. He proposed to the committee that "if the government did everything necessary to achieve the treaty's objective of reducing the citizen's tax burden and to carry out a sound supplementary plan based on full cooperation with

⁶⁵ Hamaguchi was an honest politician who disliked lobbying behind the scenes. He was determined to confront the Privy Council and ask the emperor to make a final decision if necessary. In Hamaguchi's words, "I don't know what move the Privy Council members will make, but I intend to hand them with unshakable determination." Ito, *Showashoki Nihon Seijishi Kenkyu*, p. 348; Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 168. In Hamaguchi's words, "I don't know what move the Privy Council members will make, but I intend to hand them with unshakable determination."

⁶⁶ Ito ed., *Kato Diary*, pp. 593-594.

⁶⁷ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 153, 171-172.

the military, then it would be suitable to ratify this treaty."⁶⁸

The full Privy Council met on October 1 at the Imperial Palace. The cabinet ministers were also present at the meeting. Because Ito changed his mind, the meeting proceeded quite smoothly and the treaty was ratified at the Privy Council.⁶⁹ The next day, the emperor formally handed over the certificate of ratification of the London Naval Treaty.⁷⁰ Finally, the official process of the treaty was completed. The final stage ended with great triumph of the Hamaguchi cabinet.⁷¹

The Hamaguchi cabinet was able to ratify the treaty at the final stage. The Navy leader such as Takarabe defended the cabinet's decision from the viewpoint of expert. Hamaguchi's close friend Izawa persuaded the committee members to accept the treaty, since the treaty would not endanger Japan's national security. Despite the hard-liners' criticism, thanks to enough support from them, the cabinet

⁶⁸ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 173; Ikei, Hatano, and Kurosawa, *Hamaguchi Diary*, p. 396.

⁶⁹ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 173; Ikei, Hatano and Kurosawa, *Hamaguchi Diary*, p. 398.

⁷⁰ Kobayashi Tatsuko and Shimada Toshihiko eds., "Sumitsuin Kankeishitsumon Oto Shiryo," in *Gendaishi Shiryo*, vol. 7: *Manshu Jihen* (Tokyo: Misuzushobo, 1964), p. 81; Ikei, Hatano and Kurosawa, *Hamaguchi Diary*, p. 399.

⁷¹ In the meeting of the Privy Council, Hamaguchi declared that the cabinet listened to navy experts' opinions thoroughly and judged that the treaty would not endanger national security. He criticized that hard liners in the navy who overemphasized the 10: 7 ratio confused the nation. Yet, Hamaguchi made a concession by declaring that for future national defense, the government will support the improvement of naval education and training and expansion of air force. *Record of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 58 [1930], National Archives of Japan, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1993), pp. 151, 157, 159.

gained approval from the Privy Council.

2) Aftermath

Unfortunately, Hamaguchi's triumph was short-lived. Paradoxically, this victory limited any possibility of soft-liners' civil-military cooperation in the future for four reasons. First, those who cooperated with the Hamaguchi cabinet were forced to retire. After they left the navy, the navy hard-liners became more powerful. They were determined not to make any concession in the next conference in 1936.⁷²

Second, through newspapers, hard-liners increasingly accused the Imperial Court members and Genro Saionji because they strongly supported the Hamaguchi cabinet to complete the arms reduction treaty. As early as April 1930, the Seiyosha, a right-wing group, criticized that Lord Keeper Makino and Imperial House Minister Ichiki worked for the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet behind the scenes. Thanks to their help, Hamaguchi was able to meet the emperor in a timely manner. In June 1930, the treaty opponents wrote that Suzuki did a special favor for Hamaguchi. In Jiji-shimpo newspaper, the right-wing group claimed that Chief Secretary of the Imperial Household Ministry Kawai was much more powerful than Lord Keeper of Privy Seal Makino and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki, and controlled the Imperial

⁷² Takagi Soichi commented that two factions had existed in the navy since the London Naval Conference, and this factionalism disrupted the discipline of the navy. Takagi Soichi in Ando Yoshio, *Showa Seiji Keizaishi heno Shogen*, p. 269. Later, Yamamoto Isoroku complained that after the London Naval Conference, the navy stupidly dismissed brilliant officers. See also, Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 363-364; Kiba Hirotsugu ed., *Nomura Kichi Saburo* (Tokyo: Nomura Kichisaburo Denki Kanko kai, 1961), p. 267.

House. The article added that the emperor disliked the Seiyukai. Other articles commented that Makino and his fellows not only violated the right of military command but also discharged Kato from the Navy General Staff. Harassing the Imperial Court members who indirectly contributed to the arms reduction, the right wing tried to weaken soft-liners' influence in politics.

Third, one month after the ratification of the treaty, on November 14, 1930, Hamaguchi was shot at the Tokyo station by a young right-winger who believed Hamaguchi had violated the right of military command. Hamaguchi was wounded and hospitalized.⁷³ Foreign Minister Shidehara, who was not a Minseito party member, became Acting Prime Minister. Shidehara was chosen in order to avoid factional fighting between the Egi and Adachi factions.⁷⁴ The Seiyukai members contended that it was inappropriate for a non-Minseito member to be an acting prime minister. Because the Seiyukai aggressively accused the Minseito in the Diet, the function of the Diet was temporarily suspended.⁷⁵ As Hamaguchi rightly

⁷³ Minobe Tatsukichi, *Gikaiseiji no Kento*, p. 293; Ikei, Hatano, and Kurosawa, *Hamaguchi Diary*, p. 419. Minobe rightly pointed out that political terrorism was undermining party politics and democracy.

⁷⁴ Royama Masamichi, "Seito Gikai," *Bungei Shunju*, February, 1931, pp. 184-187; Baba Tsunego, "Dai 59 Gikai no Kessan," *Bungei Shunju*, May, 1931, pp. 96-97; Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, pp. 134-135.

⁷⁵ Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, p. 134. According to Shidehara, the Egi faction claimed that although Shidehara was not a member of the Minseito, he was the right person to be an Acting Prime Minister because his order in the Imperial Court was the highest. It was famous that the Egi faction and Adachi faction competed with each other in the Minseito. Adachi, known as God of Election, was good at planning an election strategy. He was familiar with local politics. In contrast, Egi was an elite bureaucrat who was familiar with legal issues. Hamaguchi relied on Egi as a policy brain. Jonan Onshi, "Seikai Yobanashi," *Bungei Shunju*, December.

lamented, parliamentary politics in Japan was premature because neither the Minseito nor opposition Seiyukai party was able to carry out any fruitful policy debates. As the Diet came to lose its function as a place of policy debate, people became cynical about party politics. They lost confidence in it.⁷⁶

Finally, young army officers came to intervene into politics.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hashimoto formed a secret society named the Sakurakai. The Sakurakai members perceived that political corruption, uneven distribution of income between the rich and the poor, famine in villages, and the rise of the communist movement all damaged Japan's national security.⁷⁷ Hashimoto declared that the military had to start a revolution and form a government centered on the emperor.

The society was closely connected with right-wing ideologists such as

1930, pp. 120-121; Minobe, *Gikaiseiji no Kento*, pp. 265-267. According to Minobe, the Seiyukai made a statement that the Minseito launched a coup under the Constitutional politics. In reply, the Minseito pointed out that the Seiyukai intended to destabilize the Diet and tried to take over the government.

⁷⁶ Hamaguchi, *Zuisoroku*, pp. 145-6, 171-3. Baba Tsunego, "Dai goju kyugikai no Kessan." *Bungei Shunju*, May, 1931, pp. 92-97. Like Hamaguchi, Baba superbly criticized that party politicians were weakening the Parliamentary system.

⁷⁷ Nakano, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, pp. 24-33. Like the Sakurakai members, many military officers were skeptical about party politicians, although they did not consider a coup would be a solution. Suzuki pointed out that "political corruption and party competition between the Seiyukai and Minseito would damage national security. Besides, many soldiers are from rural areas and these officers listened to or observed serious social problems in rural areas." in *Kindai Nihonshiryō Kenkyukai, Suzuki Teiichi Danwa Sokkiroku*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyukai, 1968), p. 50. Likewise, Umanaki criticized that party politicians hardly understood national defense and only focused on political interests for their parties. Because they hardly discussed national defense, soldiers came to intervene into politics. Umanaki, Interview with Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 57.

Kita Ikki and Okawa. The Sakurakai members and Okawa attempted coups twice in 1931. In March, they launched the first coup. Some high ranking military leaders agreed on the plan. Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika and Kamei Kanchiro of the Social People's Party supported the coup plan as well. The coup plan was ultimately canceled because Army Minister Ugaki and the Issekikai members Nagata Tetsuzan, Okamura Yasuji, and Suzuki Teiichi all opposed it. They thought that illegal action and radical national reform would fail in the long term. It would also damage the cohesion of the army. They maintained that the army had to influence society, business, and party politics through propaganda and informal networks.⁷⁸

Conclusion

What determined Japan's decision to accept the arms reduction treaty? Was it the international pressure? Was it the result of internal politics between soft-liners and hard-liners? Under what conditions were civilian leaders able to persuade the military to make concessions to the United States and Great Britain? How effectively did they press the Navy General Staff? Did civilian leaders control the military successfully? Did civilians and the navy share policy preferences? Did they make a coalition? What is the role of the Imperial Court and the emperor? This conclusion section summarizes findings of the case study as follows.

First of all, Japan's decision to make an international agreement on arms

⁷⁸ Koiso Kuniaki, *Katsuzan Koso* (Tokyo: Koiso Kuniaki Jijoden Kankokai, 1963), pp. 489-515.

reduction is the result of internal politics between pro-treaty group and anti-treaty group. Although no strong soft-line coalition existed, leaders at the navy such as Takarabe, Okada, Saito, and Yamanashi defended the cabinet's choice. Takarabe and Yamanashi sacrificed their career to do so. In addition, although they were hardly involved in domestic politics, the emperor's aides played a significant role in this decision. Grand Chamberlain Suzuki delayed the Navy General Staff Chief Kato's meeting with the emperor. Suzuki also told Prince Fushimi not to oppose the treaty. Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara also agreed on Suzuki's arrangement. In the meeting with Hamaguchi, the emperor himself also endorsed the agreement. Later, responding to the emperor's request, Nara met Togo to make sure that he would accept the treaty and the new appointment of the Chief of the Navy General Staff.⁷⁹ At the same time, the emperor showed that he was pleased with the treaty, invited the delegation for lunch and offered special gifts.⁸⁰ Thanks to sufficient help from the navy and the Imperial House, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to sign the treaty.

Likewise, the cabinet was able to ratify the treaty because the navy leaders continue to defend the cabinet's interpretation about arms reduction and national security. Prime Minister Hamaguchi's close friend Izawa also lobbied the Privy Council Inquiry Committee members and asked them to agree on the treaty. While hard-liners at the Privy Council such as Ito and Kaneko harshly criticized the

⁷⁹ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, pp. 235-236.

⁸⁰ Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 3, p. 99

cabinet's decision. the Privy Council eventually approved the treaty. The case study tells us that Japan was able to make an arms reduction agreement because the cabinet gained enough support from the navy and other institutions. Thanks to their support, they were able to defend their choice from criticism by hard-liners.

Major Political Actors	Anti-Naval Treaty (Hard-liners)	Pro-London Naval Treaty (Soft-liners)
Political Party	The Seiyukai	The Minseito
The Navy Ministry	Those who do not deal with the cabinet were reluctant to agree on the naval arms reduction	Admirals Okada, Saito, Takarabe, Yamanashi, Koga, Saonji, Hori, Kobayashi ⁸¹
The Navy General Staff	Kato, Suetsugu and others	None
The Emperor and the Court	None	Emperor Hirohito, Makino, Suzuki, Ichiki
The Privy Council	Hiranuma, Ito	Okada, Mizumachi, Ishii
The Foreign Ministry	None	Shidehara, Matsudaira, Saito

Table 3.1 Hard-liners and Soft-liners in the London Naval Conference

Second, the higher the constitutional authority civilian leaders have, the more influence they have on policy outcome. As far as the London Naval Conference was concerned, from the beginning, Hamaguchi made it clear that naval arms reduction was one of the state affairs. He chose former Prime Minister

⁸¹ As Okada Keisuke, Kobayashi Keizo, and Takagi Soichi all implied, as naval experts, they are not pro-actively enthusiastic about arms reduction. But they were realistic enough to consider that unnecessary arms race would only endanger Japan's defense. During the negotiation, the Navy Ministry initially did not fully agree with Hamaguchi. Later, it cooperated with him.

Wakatsuki, who was a financial expert, as the chief delegate. At the London Naval Conference, without any intervention from the navy, Wakatsuki was able to negotiate with Stimson and formed an agreement. Hamaguchi was able to set the agenda and structured a political negotiation with the navy experts to his advantage.

Third, civilians have a large influence on policy outcome when they share policy preferences with the military experts. This case study suggests that due to Okada's tactful negotiation skills and at the cost of navy leaders' career, Hamaguchi was able to complete the agreement. Admiral Okada continuously persuaded the Chief of the Navy General Staff to agree on the arms reduction. At the same time, he was careful not to give an impression that the navy had made too many concessions to civilians.

Recalling that time, Wakatsuki commented:

It was Admiral Okada who worked the hardest to fight against the Navy General Staff members. He had the greatest contribution for the agreement. Without his efforts, we have no idea how the navy would have reacted. Vice Navy Minister Yamanashi was very smart and responsible. He worked hard to have the treaty ratified. But because the rank of vice minister was lower than that of the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Yamanashi could not challenge Kato. Besides, although Prime Minister Hamaguchi was Acting Navy Minister, he was not an expert of naval affairs. Okada understood this situation and worked for the ratification.⁸²

In addition to Okada, Takarabe and Yamanashi recognized that they might have to leave the navy because they were unable to defend the organizational interests. Later, Vice Minister Yamanashi was replaced by Vice Admiral Kobayashi Seizo. Yamanashi eventually left the navy after the London Naval

⁸² Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, p. 365

Treaty was ratified. The naval agreement was made possible because of the navy leaders' efforts and sacrifices.⁸³

Fourth, the Imperial Palace members played an important role helping Hamaguchi. In this case study, thanks to the arrangement by Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki, the Navy General Staff Kato reported to the emperor after Hamaguchi had already spoken with the emperor frankly about the naval agreement. Suzuki further asked Prince Fushimi not to disagree on the arms reduction, since the emperor sincerely expected it. To be sure, it was civilians and the navy leaders such as Hamaguchi, Wakatsuki, Okada, Takarabe and Kato who were directly involved in the decision-making process. However, sources that are used in this dissertation demonstrate that Grand Chamberlain Suzuki actively helped the Hamaguchi cabinet reach the arms reduction agreement. Soft-line coalition among civilians, the navy, and the court persuaded the hard-line coalition to accept the agreement.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 324. Yamanashi told Wakatsuki that he knew that without some expense it would be impossible to settle such a crucial issue.

	Political Leaders' High Constitutional Authority	Political Leaders' Low Constitutional Authority
Strong Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is large</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Acceptance of Compromise Plan ● Ratification of the Treaty 	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i>
Weak Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Chief delegation Selection ● Negotiation in London 	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is weak</i>

Table 3.2 Political Leaders' influence on Policy Outcome in the Hamaguchi Cabinet

Fifth, a confrontational attitude would only deepen the antagonism between politicians and the military. Surely, Hamaguchi was determined to stand firm against the navy hard-liners and make them accept the treaty. Yet, he should have paid more attention to the navy's feeling and made an effort to make the relationship easy. Fleet Admiral Togo, Admiral Kato, Vice Admiral Suetsugu and most members of the General Staff simply loathed party politics. Admiral Kato, for example, criticized the current cabinet as left-oriented. Officially, Togo kept silent, but he did discredit party politics.⁸⁴ Vice Admiral Kobayashi pointed out that:

⁸⁴ Kato's comment in Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, p. 129. He noticed that the navy can collapse the Hamaguchi cabinet and the London Conference if Navy Minister Takarabe resigned in the middle of the negotiations. After demanding the Navy Ministry's resignation to Okada privately, Togo told him that: "in my mind, I hope that the Navy Minister resigns as soon as possible. But I will not say so in

...if Prime Minister Hamaguchi had made much effort to see the naval leaders and sincerely explained to them the difficulties and domestic issues which Japan had to face, the navy leaders would have understood him well. On the one hand because of their landslide victory in the Lower House general election, Minseito politicians became very arrogant.... Never had Acting Navy Minister Hamaguchi shown up at the Navy Ministry. He never visited neither Fleet Admiral Togo nor the members of the Supreme War Council. He only talked with Admiral Okada once. Prime Minister Hamaguchi was very busy with various political affairs, but young officers who were dissatisfied with the London Naval Conference observed that the Prime Minister's arrogant attitude was simply unacceptable. This escalated their anti-government feelings.⁸⁵

Observing that the Minseito politicians had dominated the policymaking process at the treaty negotiations, naval officers were increasingly dissatisfied with party politics.⁸⁶

To make matters worse, young army officers became radicalized, as the Hamaguchi cabinet became powerful on the issue of national defense. Although

public. If I say so, it means that the navy intervenes in politics. However, if the Navy Minister resigns voluntarily, why should it become a political issue? These days many people visited me, but I only listen to them. I do not take them seriously. Because the military should not intervene in politics, I am very careful." Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Jyoyaku," pp. 131-132; Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku*, pp. 156-157.

⁸⁵ Ito Takashi ed., *Kindai Nihonshiryō Senshō vol. 3: Kaigun Taishō Kobayashi Keizō Oboegaki* (Tokyo: Yamashita Shuppansha, 1981), p. 53. In addition to Kobayashi, in his speech when he resigned, Yamanashi clearly requested Hamaguchi that the Hamaguchi cabinet shows a special appreciation to Admiral Kato who finally made concession and made the agreement possible. Aoki Tokuzo, *Taiheiyo Senso Zenshi* (Tokyo, Sekai Heiwa Kensetsukokai, 1951), pp. 61-63. In contrast, Uchida Nobuya complained that the military officers tended to keep everything secret and consider civilians were ignorant. Uchida Nobuya, *Fusetsu Gojunen*, pp. 96-99.

⁸⁶ Takagi criticized that the Seiyūkai used the Navy to overthrow the Hamaguchi cabinet. Takagi's comment in Ando ed., *Showa Seiji Keizaishi heno Shogen*, vol. 1, pp. 264-265.

the treaty hardly damaged the army's organizational interests directly. some army leaders and young officers feared that party politicians would initiate the army's arms reduction and organizational reform in the future. In fact, Hamaguchi demanded the Army Minister Ugaki to reduce the size and re-organize the structure of the army at that time. In addition, an international conference on the army's arms reduction was expected to be held in 1932 in Geneva. It was in this period that young officers, who believed that party politicians had threatened national security, formed the Sakurakai. With the assistance of some top military leaders in the army and other right-wing groups, the Sakurakai members declared that they would terminate parliamentary politics and replace it with a military government.⁸⁷

Sixth, civilian leaders had to take every opportunity to exchange opinions with the military and build a relationship of trust. In this case study, Prime Minister Hamaguchi neither communicated well nor built a good relationship with the navy. In this sense, it is not completely correct to describe that a strong political coalition existed between political and naval soft-liners. Rather, responding to Hamaguchi's determination, the navy leaders first tried to persuade Hamaguchi not to make concession. Later, when they failed to persuade him, they agreed to reach a naval arms reduction agreement.

As an honest politician, Hamaguchi held frank discussions with the navy leaders. But he was not a skillful politician who could ease the antagonistic

⁸⁷ Takamiya Tahei, *Jungyaku no Showashi* (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1971), pp. 79-87. Koiso, *Katsuzan Koso*, pp. 489-515. Koiso supported the coup plan because party politicians increasingly demanded budget cuts and military organizational reforms to the army.

emotions of the navy.⁸⁸ Hence, the majority of the navy was angry about not only his decision itself but also with his attitude. Vice Foreign Minister Yoshida observed that Minseito leaders looked cold and inconsiderate to the navy leaders who had greatly contributed to the treaty. To Genro Saionji, Yoshida commented that "at that party at the Shinkiraku, Okasa should have been advised to seat next to Wakatsuki or at least closer to the prime minister. He should have been treated more politely, and the prime minister and other cabinet ministers should have been more careful in exchanging toasts with Okada. Whether from insensitivity or inattentiveness, it was a good opportunity missed."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Hamaguchi himself acknowledged his poor communication skills. According to Hamaguchi.

...Many people think that one of the most important qualifications to be a politician is to be energetically sociable and be a great communicator. No single family and my close friends believe that I have this quality. I still do not have it even now. In my opinion, such an idea is stupid. Such a qualification is rather trivial. I am quite sure that the most important characteristics that politicians must have is to exclude oppositions bravely.... I admit to my unsociable personality is natural and I still have this personality although I have made efforts to improve it.

Hamaguchi, *Zuikan Roku*, pp. 8-9.

⁸⁹ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 205-206.

Chapter 4

The Wakatsuki Cabinet and the Manchurian Incident

Ishiwara ignored the non-enlargement principle that the army authority in Tokyo adopted. Not only did he ignore orders from Tokyo but he also threatened the central authority, saying that the Kanto army would be independent from Japanese army. Ishiwara directed the Kanto army freely, from north to south, and built the state of Manchukuo.

Ikeda Sumihisa¹

Some people criticize that the government and top military leaders were so indecisive that the Kanto army escalated military action in Manchuria. Yet, if the government and the military leaders had coercively imposed the non-enlargement principle, the military revolution would have occurred. ... Within the army, young radical officers were so rebellious that neither the Army Minister nor the Navy Minister could control them. Top army leaders would have probably controlled these radicals only if they had united themselves firmly and sacrificed their lives.

Shidehara Kijuro²

I think that the most difficult issue is how to deal with radical officers who are tightly united. These officers closely group with those who launched the Manchurian Incident. This makes the current situation graver. In order to settle the Incident, we have to control these officers. We have been unable to settle the Incident because we were unable to control these officers.

Makino Nobuaki³

Introduction

Many historians and political scientists agree that the Manchurian Incident

¹ Ikeda Sumihisa, *Nihon no Magari Kado* (Tokyo: Chishiro Shuppan, 1968), p. 76.

² Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, p. 185.

³ Makino, *Makino Diary*, p. 490.

had a significant impact on Japan's history.⁴ According to these scholars, the Wakatsuki cabinet lacked strong leadership necessary to control the military. Prime Minister Wakatsuki was not an aggressive politician. Rather, he was a smart politician who was good at making compromises. The indecisiveness and passivity of the Wakatsuki cabinet led to the victory of the hard-liners in the army. It ultimately changed the direction of Japan's national security policy.⁵

To be sure, the Wakatsuki cabinet failed to implement the non-enlargement policy completely and resigned about three months after the Incident broke out. Yet, careful reading of primary sources indicates that Prime Minister Wakatsuki's weak leadership was one of several factors that failed to limit the Kanto army's military campaign in Manchuria. Indeed, in the middle of the crisis, Prime Minister Wakatsuki, Foreign Minister Shidehara, and Chief of the Army General Staff Kanaya all made tremendous efforts to restrict the military action in Manchuria. It was the Wakatsuki cabinet's gradual loss of support from the Imperial Court, the Foreign Ministry and the Minseito party itself that weakened the cabinet.⁶ Unlike

⁴ In her work on the Manchurian Incident, Ogata pointed out that it was considered to be the prelude to Japan's expansionistic adventure through the whole of Asia. See Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*, xiii.

⁵ Many pieces of evidence show that Wakatsuki was indecisive. Ugaki, for instance, commented that "Wakatsuki was very smart...but he gave up too soon...When Adachi tried to make a deal with the Seiyukai, I suggested him to get rid of him from the Minseito." But Wakatsuki just lamented that he could not do it." See Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, p. 2.

⁶ Numerous public documents and books are available on the Manchurian Incident. Primary documents are: Nihon Kokusai Seijigakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu ed., *Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi: Bekkan Shiryohen* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1963), pp. 113-209 (Hereafter *Munshu Diary*); Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko

Hamaguchi, Wakatsuki was unable to form a soft-line coalition with the military and the Imperial Court to complete the non-enlargement principle.

This chapter consists of five parts. The first section briefly describes the historical background of the Manchurian Incident. As the Sino-Japanese relations severely deteriorated after Colonel Komoto murdered Zhang Zuolin, a local warlord in Manchuria, in June 1928. Observing local disputes between Japanese and Chinese in Manchuria, the Kanto army hard-liners and the Issekikai members, study group members among middle ranking army officers, reached a conclusion that Japan's domination of Manchuria would be the only solution to bring peace in Manchuria. The hard-liners, therefore, planned to create a crisis and initiated military action.

The second and third sections analyze how the Wakatsuki cabinet attempted to settle the Manchurian Incident. Once the Incident broke out, the Kanto army escalated its military action, ignoring the government's decision about non-enlargement. But both the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Army Minister agreed on the principle and cooperated to pacify the situation as quickly as possible. It will also point out that Emperor Hirohito commented that the government should minimize the Incident as much as possible. The fourth section

eds., *Gendaishi Shiryo*, vol. 7: *Manshu Jihen* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1964), pp. 103-586 (Hereafter, *Katakura Diary*); Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo and Shimada Toshihiko eds., *Gendaishi Shiryo*, vol. 11: *Zoku Manshu Jihen* (Tokyo: Mizuho Shobo, 1965), pp. 299-544, 858-887; Ishiwara, Tsunoda ed, *Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo*; Gaimusho, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy: The Manchurian Incident*, vols. 1-3 (Tokyo: Gaimusho, 1977); Ito and Hirose eds., *Makino Diary*; Terasaki and Terasaki Miller eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*; Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 5; Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3.

shows a few examples—the Kanto army’s political activities in Manchuria, its unauthorized military offense in Jinzhou and Qiqihar, and a coup attempt—about how the Kanto army members resisted the government’s principle about non-enlargement. The fifth section traces civilian leaders’ reactions to the Kanto army’s offenses. Despite the Kanto army’s threatening demands and rebellious behavior, the military leaders in Tokyo continued to support the Wakatsuki cabinet, although minimally. Yet, the cabinet gradually lost strong support from both the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial Court. To make matters worse, Adachi disagreed with Prime Minister Wakatsuki about how to control the situation. Lack of unity within the cabinet led to the collapse of the cabinet itself.

The final section summarizes why civilians were unable to fully control the Kanto army, even though they had support from the military authority in Tokyo. First of all, because the leaders at the Wakatsuki cabinet were soft-liners, the cabinet adopted the non-enlargement principle to settle the Manchurian Incident. Minami and Kanaya of the army were not soft-liners, but they cooperated with the cabinet to pacify the Incident. Second, without constitutional authority, civilian leaders were unable to carry out security policy effectively. While adopting the non-enlargement principle, the Wakatsuki cabinet failed to complete it because the Kanto and Korea armies continued to fight despite strict orders from Tokyo. It was the army, not the prime minister, that was in charge of dismissing officers or replacing the positions. Although top military leaders agreed on the non-enlargement principle, they were not strict enough to dismiss rebellious officers in the military. Third, the military leaders’ indecisive attitude towards disobedient

officers worsened the situation. Ignoring orders, rebellious officers continued to fight in Manchuria. Lack of discipline within the military deteriorated the Manchurian Incident. Fourth, as the Kanto army continued to ignore orders from Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry, the court and even a cabinet member lost confidence in Prime Minister Wakatsuki. Ultimately, by failing to unify the cabinet members, he gave up the prime ministership in the middle of the crisis. Wakatsuki needed a strong political coalition with the military, the Imperial Court and his own party. Finally, lack of communication between civilians and the military worsened the crisis situation. The Minseito leaders hardly noticed that military radicals were plotting the Incident and determined to launch a coup.

I. Historical Background of the Manchuria Incident

Manchuria, known in China as the Three Eastern Provinces, was a large, fertile, almost undeveloped and under-populated region. The total population of Manchuria was about 30 million; 28 million were Chinese or assimilated Manchus, 800 thousand were Koreans, and about 150 thousand were Russians who lived around the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway and especially in Harbin. Only about 230 thousand Japanese lived there; they mainly concentrated in the settlements along the South Manchurian Railway and in the Kanto Leased Territory.

Due to its geographical position, the Kanto army and the South Manchurian Railway Company had been the main institutions that were in charge of administrating business and public affairs for Japanese.⁷ After the Japanese victory

⁷ A general view of the Kanto army, see Shimada Toshihiko, *Kantogun*.

in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Office of the Kanto Governor-General was established in 1906. This office administered the Kanto Lease Territory and the railway zone in South Manchuria. For more than a decade the Governor-General was a general or lieutenant-general who also commanded the army stationed in the areas under his administration. When the Office became a civilian administration in 1919, the army was brought under the separate jurisdiction of the newly established Kanto army command. It was made responsible for the protection of the Kanto Lease Territory and the railway zone. According to the army, Japan needed to dominate Manchuria as the fortress against Russia. In addition, in the age of total war, Manchuria's natural resources were considered essential for state survival.

In the 1920s, several events worsened the Sino-Japanese relations. First of all, in accepting the Nine Powers Treaty at the Washington Conference in 1921, Japan reluctantly made concession to the United States and China with respect to Chinese sovereignty. This treaty agreed: 1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; 2) to provide opportunities for China to develop and maintain for itself an effective and stable government; 3) to use their influence for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; and 4) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action

inimical to the security of such states.⁸

Second, the northern expedition by the Chinese Nationalist Party was about to threaten Japan's special position in Manchuria. The Japanese army had supported Zhang Zuolin, a local warlord, in order to maintain its influence in Manchuria. By 1926, Zhang was in complete control not only of Manchuria but also North China. Yet, as his power grew in North China, he became more ambitious. He tried to challenge Chiang Kai-shek. In July 1926, the Nationalist Party's army began the Northern Expedition to unify all of China, being accompanied by Russian advisers and Chinese Communist Party members.⁹ China's civil strife was about to spread to the north and threaten Japanese interests in Manchuria.¹⁰

Third and most importantly, the Kanto army faced the most serious situation after Colonel Komoto murdered Zhang Zuolin in June 1928. Early in 1928, when it became clear that Zhang was not cooperative with the Japanese army, Colonel Komoto developed an assassination plan of Zhang Zuolin without any

⁸ For a general history on the Sino-Japanese relations in the 1920s, see Usui Katsumi, *Nitchu Gaikosh: Hokubatsu no Jidai* (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobo, 1971).

⁹ Originally, the army tried to make a deal with Chiang Kai-shek over Manchuria. But China specialists in the army noticed that even Chiang Kai-shek would be unable to control Chinese nationalism in Manchuria completely. To control Manchuria completely, the China specialists such as Ishiwara and Komoto reached a conclusion that state-building in Manchuria would be necessary. Nihon Kindai Shiryo Kenkyukai ed., *Suzuki Teiichi shi Damwa Sokkiroku*, vol. 1, p. 286.

¹⁰ Uyehara Yusaku Kankei Bunsho Kenkyukai, *Uehara Yusaku Kankei Bunsho* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976), letter from Honjo Shigeru, no. 6, April 9, 1927, pp. 439-442.

consultation with the top leaders in the Japanese army. Komoto believed that overthrowing Zhang and creating a political chaos in Manchuria would give the Kanto army an excellent opportunity to mobilize forces and control the area directly.¹¹

However, Zhang Xueliang, a son of Zhang Zuolin, learning that a Japanese soldier killed his father, decided to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek against Japan. The Three Eastern Provinces were about to be brought into political union with the rest of China. The Nationalist Party's flags were raised over government buildings in Fengtian as a symbol of the allegiance of the three provinces of Manchuria to the Nationalist Party Government. With the reunion of Manchuria with China proper, the anti-Japanese nationalist movement spread to Manchuria.¹²

As early as 1928, the idea to control Manchuria was not widely accepted.

¹¹ Komoto's murder of Zhang Zuolin, see Sakaki Toitsu, *Aru Gunjinn no Jiten*, pp. 192-193: "Komoto Daisaku Taiadan," in Mori Katsumi, *Manshujihen no Uramenshi* (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokan, 1970), pp. 262-272.

¹² Usui, *Nitchu Gaikoshi*, pp. 162-165. Suzuki commented that the Kanto army was very afraid if Chinese revolution and anti-Japanese movement spread around Manchuria. Kindai Nihon Shiryo Kenkyukai ed., *Suzuki Teiichi Sökkidan*, vol. 1, p. 288. See also, Uyehara Yusaku Kankei Bunsho Kenkyukai, *Uyehara Yusaku Kankei Bunsho*, letter from Takayama Kimimichi, August, 9, 1927, pp. 288-192; letter from Honjo Shigeru, no. 7, February 5, 1928, pp. 443-448. To be sure, China's nationalist movement had affected the region of Manchuria earlier, but the major activities had always been in China proper, such as Beijing and Shanghai. Now, it began to be systematically spread in Manchuria. Chinese demanded recovery of the leaseholds of Lushun and Dalian, the South Manchurian Railway, and the consular jurisdiction. Opposition to the construction of projected Japanese railways grew. Chinese house owners and landlords raised the rents of Japanese tenants or refused renewal of rental contracts. Observing daily conflicts between Chinese and Japanese, the Kanto army felt that it had to make a plan for final settlement of Manchurian problem.

Those who proposed occupation of Manchuria were the Kanto army hard-liners. Observing that major clashes between Japanese and Chinese were inevitable, they concluded that occupying the Manchuria was the ultimate way to solve the problem.¹³ Gradually this idea evolved within the army.¹⁴ Through the whole process of development of the idea, the Issekikai group played a significant role in institutionalizing the idea in the army.¹⁵ It did so in three ways.

¹³ Hattori, *Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kankyo no Hendo to Nihon Gaiko, 1918-1931*, pp. 197-200.

¹⁴ Indeed, even before Colonel Komoto's murder of Zhang Zuolin, the Kanto army informally discussed that Manchuria would be peaceful only if a local administration that is separated from China proper controlled it with a strong support of the Japanese army. In 1927 and 1928, an unofficial plan, drafted by the Kanto army intelligence members was to lead the highest responsible Chinese officials of Manchuria and declare the three eastern provinces autonomous and later independent of China. Then the newly independent state would sign a military alliance with Japan. Usui Katsumi, "Chosakurin Bakushi no Shinso." In *Bessatsu Chisei vol. 12: Hisomerareta Showashi* (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1956), pp. 30-31; Usui, *Nitchu Gaikoshi*, pp. 131-133. Yet, at the same time, some pieces of evidence imply that even among China specialists in the army, the idea that Manchuria should be an independent state was not popular. China specialists' personal letters and official documents imply that they only recognized the coming problem, but they did not spend time analyzing possible solution. See Uyehara Yusaku Kankei Bunsho Kenkyukai, *Uyehara Yusaku Kankei Bunsho*. A letter from Honjo to Uyehara, no. 6, dated April 9, 1927, pp. 439-442; A letter from Honjo to Uyehara, no. 7, dated February 5, 1928, pp. 442-448.

¹⁵ The Issekikai was an informal study group among elite officers who aimed to eliminate Choshu faction's influence in the army. The group members expect to revitalize the army through new personnel appointments, and lead firm policies toward Manchuria. Back in October 1921, Major Nagata Tetsuzan, then military attache in Switzerland, Major Obata Toshiro, who had just been posted to the Soviet Union, and Major Okamura Yasutsugu, who had been sent to Europe and the United States to study propaganda methods, met in Baden-Baden, Germany. They were all graduates of the sixteenth class of the military academy. They were elite officers, but they were "outsiders" with respect to the Choshu clan. Hence, they discussed that in the future they would work together in order to eliminate the Choshu faction. Several years later, back in Tokyo, they first formed the Futabakai around 1927 with

First of all, the Kanto army hard-liners such as Ishiwara and Itagaki engineered the plan for the independence of Manchuria, collaborating with members of the South Manchurian Railway and the Manchurian Youth League. In July 1929, the Kanto army carried out a reconnaissance mission. Its objectives included studying how to attack Harbin. During the mission, Ishiwara led a discussion based on his idea which was entitled "A plan for the solution of the Manchurian and Mongolian problems as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country's destiny."¹⁶ According to him, Japan would be the center of Eastern civilization

their peers and later merged into another study group named the Mumeikai (Unnamed Club), Kokusaku Kenkyukai (National Policy Research Club) or Mokuyokai (Thursday Club). This was the birth of the Issekikai (Evening Society). In the first meeting in May 1929, the Issekikai affirmed three goals. First of all, the army must carry out fair personnel policies based on the officers' abilities as well as weaken the Choshu clan. For this purpose, the Issekikai members demanded to deny men of Choshu birth entry into the staff college. Second, they would support Generals Hayashi Kijuro, Araki Sadao, and Mazaki Jinzaburo. Because the Issekikai members were still at the middle rank level in the army at that time, they decided to support top ranking officers who can revitalize the army and ultimately gain support from these leaders to implement policies. Generals Hayashi, Araki, and Masaki were considered promising non-Choshu leaders. Finally, they will work toward the ultimate solution of the Manchuria-Mongolia problem. Takahashi, *Showa no Gunbatsu*, pp. 57-73; Nihon Kindaishiryō Kenkyukai, *Suzuki Teiichishi Danwa Sokkiroku*, vol. 1, p. 10.

¹⁶ In Manchuria, the Kanto army leaders, research staffs of the South Manchurian Railways, and Manchu Youth League shared Ishiwara's view. The Manchuria Youth League was formally organized in November 1928 in defense of Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria. Many members of the League were junior officers in the South Manchurian Railway Company in Manchuria where anti-Japanese feelings by Chinese were intensifying. They felt that "the only way to survive would be to join hands with various racial groups living in Manchuria to devote themselves to the harmony of race...and to bring about a paradise-like republic to the land of Manchuria-Mongolia backed by Japanese civilization." Yamaguchi Shigeji, *Higeki no Shogun Ishiwara Kanji* (Tokyo: Sekaisha, 1952), pp. 95, 103. About the Manshu Youth League, see Manshu Seinen Someishi Kankō kai ed., *Manshu Seinen Somei shi* (Tokyo: Harashobo, 1968), pp. 520-521, 656-663:

while the United States would be the center of Western civilization. The two countries had a destiny to clash in the future. Thus, controlling Manchuria was necessary to prepare for future war with the United States. In addition, he believed that if Manchuria became a country of racial harmony among Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Manchurian, and Mongolian, then anti-Japanese agitation in China would be extinguished in the future. Hence, in a piece entitled "Plans for the Occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia by the Kanto Army," Ishiwara summarized each process in completing Japan's control over the region.¹⁷

In 1930, the Kanto army began drawing up serious tactical plans for action. Ishiwara and others drafted an "Outline for the Seizure of Fengtian" together with detailed topographical reports for night attacks. Beginning in January, the major staffs of the Kanto army met every Saturday in a seminar called "Project to Study the Operation and Administration of Manchuria and Mongolia."¹⁸ Sada Kojiro, chief of the research section of the South Manchurian Railway, Matsuki Tamotsu, the head of the legal division, and Miyazaki Masayoshi, the head of the Russia section all participated in this project. The Kanto army members and research staffs of the South Manchurian Railway developed a detailed plan of its domination of Manchuria together.

Second, through an informal study group named the Issekikai, not only

Ishiwara Kanji, "Kokuun Tenkai no Konpon Kokusaku taru Manmo Mondai Kaiketsusaku," in Ishiwara, Tsunoda Jun ed., *Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁷ Ishiwara, *Ishiwara Kanji Shiryo*, pp. 42-45.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-56.

the Kanto army members but also the army authority in Tokyo came to accept that ultimately the use of forces may be necessary to solve the Manchuria problem. This study group established a collective understanding of the nature of the Manchurian problem and possible solutions in the army.¹⁹ To be sure, not all the Issekikai members viewed the problem in the same way. Ishiwara and other Kanto army members considered that a military plot would create a golden opportunity for the army to carry out military actions and control Manchuria quickly: they gave little thought to the possible international criticism. In contrast, Nagata Tetsuzan, a founding member of the Issekikai, was very prudent. He believed that the army had to spend a great deal of time lobbying the United States, Great Britain, and the League of Nations and make them believe that Japan's military action would be legitimate. He also took into consideration that the army had to coordinate with the government and gain support from the public little by little.²⁰ Despite these

¹⁹ Okamura commented that the Manchurian problem was not on the central agenda of the Issekikai. But after some China specialists such as Komoto, Ishiwara and Itagaki took important positions related to the Manchurian problem, the Issekikai members discussed the Manchurian issue a lot. Okamura further argued that when the Incident broke out, the Issekikai members who were in Manchuria guided Japan's Manchurian policies. It was the staff members at the South Manchurian Railway and China specialists in the Issekikai that built the state of Manchukuo during the Incident. Okamura emphasized that it was both the Kanto army and civilians—staffs at the South Manchurian Railways or adventurers in Manchuria—that created the state. Okamura Yasutsugu, interview with Nakamura, Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, pp. 30, 38, 41.

²⁰ Suzuki also claimed that unlike hard-liners in the Kanto army, officers in the central army headquarters hardly considered a conspiracy to solve the Manchurian problem. *Nihon Kindaishiryō Kenkyūkai, Suzuki Teiichi shi Danwa Sokkiroku*, vol. 1, p. 296. Before the Manchurian Incident, the army authorities made efforts to appeal to the public by lecturing and organizing a forum. For instance, Takekawa held a lecture at the Tokyo Imperial University. Kariya Toru, *Showa Shoki Seij*

differences, the Issekikai members agreed that ultimately, the use of force would be inevitable.²¹ The army's official document entitled "situation estimate" proposed 1) to make the current authority carry out pro-Japanese policies in the Three Eastern Provinces and carry out negotiations in the interests of Japan; 2) to establish a pro-Japanese government and cooperate with it; 3) to solve the Manchurian problem for Japan's national defense even with the use of forces.²²

Third, the Issekikai members in Tokyo coordinated with the Kanto army members to prepare for the ultimate solution to the Manchuria problem. In October 1930, Nagata was sent to China and spent a month traveling in Korea.

Gaikoshi Kenkyu. (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1978), pp. 43-44. He also participated in a forum on the Manchurian problem with party politicians, a scholar of international law and a journalist. See "Manmo to Wagatokushu Keneki Zadankai." *Bungei Shunju*, 1931 October, pp. 136-153.

²¹ All of the Issekikai members did their best to get their comrades into important posts in the Army Ministry, the General Staff, and the Inspectorate of Military Education. From these positions they tried to influence the decision-making process and gain support from top military leaders. Indeed, as the danger of the Manchurian Incident was coming, the Issekikai members dominated important positions and led Manchuria policies in the army. The Issekikai advisor Takekawa was director of the operation department in the Army General Staff. Nagata was director of military affairs in the Army Ministry. Okamura Teiji was director of the appointment section. Shigeto Chiaki was director of Chinese section. Tojo Hideki was director of the organization and mobilization section. Nemoto was director of the Chinese sub-section. Obata was an instructor of the army war college. Itagaki was in the superior general staff division of the Kanto army. Watari Hisao was in the Section of Europe and the United States. Ishiwara was in the operation division in the Kanto army. Suzuki was in the China section of the military affairs. Doihara was Special Service division in the Kanto army. Cooperating with each other, all the Issekikai members held the unity of the army's position on Manchuria.

²² Seki Kanji, "Manshu Jihen Zenshi: 1929-1931." in Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyo Senso Genin Kenkyubu ed., *Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1963), p. 379.

Manchuria, and North China. He discussed possible solutions to the Manchurian problem with Ishiwara and Itagaki. Listening to Nagata's explanation, Ishiwara asked him to transfer weapons from Tokyo to Manchuria secretly. In this conversation, Ishiwara implied to Nagata where the Kanto army would combat.²³

In June 1931, to consider the Kanto army's view, top military leaders such as Minami, appointments section chief Okamura, organization section Chief Masataka Yamawaki, Europe-American section chief Watari, China section chief Shigeto, Nagata and Takekawa all organized a conference on the Manchurian problem and discussed possible policy options.²⁴ It adopted a "General Outline of a Solution for the Manchurian Problem."²⁵

The outline stated:

1. The Foreign Minister should undertake negotiations to stop anti-Japanese activities in areas controlled by Zhang Xueliang.
2. If anti-Japanese activities should get out of hand, military action will probably be necessary.
3. The Army Minister through the cabinet, the Military Affairs Bureau, and the General Staff Intelligence Division through close cooperation with various divisions of the Foreign Ministry should acquaint the Japanese people and foreign powers with the true facts of anti-Japanese activity; in the event that military action proves necessary, attention is to be given first to mobilizing national opinion and then to measures to prevent outside countries from exerting influence over the situation.
4. The General Staff should draw up plans for the size, operations, and

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Most of those who participated in the conference and drafted the outline were the Issekikai members. According to Okamura, the members discussed frankly and Takenaka summarized the discussion and submit the report to the Army Minister and Chief of the Army General Staff. Okamura's comment in Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 31.

²⁵ Inaba, Kobayashi, and Kojima ed., *Gendaishi Shiryo*, vol. 11, p. 164.

leadership of forces to take the field in the event military action becomes necessary.

5. A period of about a year, that is until the spring of 1932, is to be spent on working for domestic and foreign understanding of these aims.²⁶

This outline reflected the principles for the settlement of Manchuria problem that the Issekikai study group discussed. It demonstrated that the Issekikai group's principles became the army's official military doctrine. While opposing any immediate action, the Issekikai members transferred two heavy field guns from the fort of Lushun to Fengtian. These weapons were necessary to defeat the walled city of Fengtian with minimum time and loss.²⁷

II. The Wakatsuki Cabinet and the Breakout of the Manchurian Incident

Whereas the army perceived that the military clash between China and Japan in Manchuria would be inevitable, the Minseito considered that a cooperative relationship with China would be possible. After Colonel Komoto's assassination of Zhang Zuolin, when Hamaguchi formed his cabinet in 1929, in an official statement of the ten-policy principle, he stated:

It is of urgent necessity to improve diplomatic relations and promote good relations with China.... Each must understand a special position of the other and make efforts to seek a just and fair settlement. If each seeks parochial interests too much, both will fail to achieve the protection of the general interests. Furthermore, any reckless mobilization of troops will not promote national prestige. Co-existence and free and unshackled development of economic relations between the two countries should be

²⁶ In order to appeal to the public, Takekawa lectured the Manchurian problem at the Tokyo Imperial University and organized a forum for a magazine article. "Manmo to Wagatokushu Keneki Zadankai." *Bungei Shunju*, October, 1931, pp. 136-153.

²⁷ Seki, "Manshu Jihen Zenya." *Taiheiyo Senso heno Michi*, vol. 1, p. 379.

ensured. Japan not only disavows any kind of aggressive policy in any part of China, but also is ready to render that country friendly help in the realization of the national aspirations of the Chinese people.²⁸

In their public speeches, all the Minseito leaders showed sympathy and understanding for China. They emphasized co-existence and co-prosperity between China and Japan. The Wakatsuki cabinet which succeeded the Hamaguchi cabinet believed that these local disputes and some incidents were unfortunate, but rather trivial. For instance, in late June 1931, Chinese soldiers killed Captain Nakamura in the distant interior of Manchuria. He was an intelligence agent in the army who investigated the region of interior of Manchuria. While passing through Harbin, Captain Nakamura represented himself as an agricultural expert. But he was armed, and carried narcotic drugs. Chinese soldiers caught and shot him.²⁹ Shidehara started a negotiation with China in order to make it clear regarding China's responsibility for the shooting. In addition to demanding an apology, he pressed China to vow that similar incidents would not happen again. The Wakatsuki cabinet tried to settle these local disputes as much as possible and keep a good relationship with China.³⁰

In contrast, after the Nakamura Incident, hard-liners in the army had

²⁸Sakuradakai ed. *Soshi Rikken Minseito: Shiryo Hen*, pp. 47-48.

²⁹ *Manshu Jihen Kankei Zatsuroku* shows local unrests and increasing hostility between Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria. Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu. *Manshu Jihen Kankei Zatsuroku* (Tokyo: Sanbo Honbu, 1931).

³⁰ Gaimusho. *Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo Narabi Shuyo Bunsho* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, 1950), pp. 172-180.

advanced their operation plans to seize Manchuria.³¹ Ignoring any advice from Tokyo, the plotters made a plan to blow up a railway line in Fengtian in late September. Late in August 1931, Hanai Tadashi of the Kanto army went to Tokyo to scrutinize the likely reaction of central authorities in the army.³² He contacted reliable officers who were in the intelligence division of the General Staff. Hanai informed them that the plotters were determined to initiate military action.³³ Neither the Army Minister nor the Chief of the Army General Staff knew that a conflict was about to occur. The Issekikai members noticed the growing danger led by the Manchurian Incident plotter, but they did not know the details of the conspiracy plan.³⁴

From widespread political connection, Genro Saionji and Makino had noticed that the danger was coming in Manchuria. On August 19, they discussed the issue of lack of discipline in the army.³⁵ On September 10 and 11, upon

³¹ In the summer of 1931, Ishiwara claimed that the army should create such an opportunity. Inaba, Kobayashi, and Shimada ed., *Gendaishi Shiryo*, vol. 11, p. 162.

³² Hard-liners in the army are those who believed that the army had to create a crisis with use of forces and guide the government to settle the Manchurian problem. They are Itagaki, Ishiwara, Shigeto, Nemoto, Hahimoto, and Hanada.

³³ Hanaya Tadashi, "Manshu Jihen wa Koushite Keikakusareta." in *Hisomerareta Showashi*, p. 43. In addition to Hanaya, Itagaki and Amagasu Masahiko discussed the conspiracy with the hard liners in Tokyo. Nakano, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, pp. 107-110.

³⁴ According to Hanaya, Hahimoto and Nemoto knew 95 % of the the Manchurian plot. Takekawa and Shigeto knew 90 %, Nagata 85 %, Koiso and Ninomiya 50 %. Hanaya, "Manshu Jihen wa Koushite Keikakusaareta." p. 43.

³⁵ Makino, *Makino Diary*, pp. 465-466.

Saionji's recommendation, through Makino. Emperor Hirohito summoned the Ministers of Navy and Army respectively to question them on the state of military discipline.³⁶ Without knowing any plot plans in Manchuria, Minami replied to the emperor, saying "we are controlling radical young officers very carefully."³⁷ On the next day, Genro Saionji pressed Minami to be tough and be particularly careful about the behavior of radical officers.³⁸

A few days later, on September 15, Shidehara received a secret telegram from Consul-General Hayashi in Fengtian. The telegram said: "the Kanto army assembling troops bringing out munitions seems likely a start of action in the near future."³⁹ Responding to Shidehara's request, Minami and Kanaya immediately dispatched Takekawa to Manchuria to halt the plot.⁴⁰ While he was going to Fengtian, Hashimoto sent telegrams to Fengtian and advised that "if Takekawa arrives, take action before receiving his message."⁴¹ Takekawa arrived at Fengtian in the afternoon of September 18, and met the Manchurian Incident plotters. Instead of stopping the plot, he told them that, although the central authorities had sent him with orders to stop the plot, if they were fully confident, they should do it

³⁶ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 52-53; Makino, *Makino Diary*, p. 470.

³⁷ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 53.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

³⁹ Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan ed., *Shidehara Kijuro*, (Tokyo: Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955), p. 466; Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, pp. 140-146.

⁴⁰ Nakano, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, p. 119.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

prudently."⁴² Indeed, the Manchurian Incident broke out at 10 o'clock that night.

III. The Wakatsuki Cabinet and Constitutional Authority

For hard-liners in the army, the Manchurian problem was a matter of state survival. They believed that without dominating Manchuria, Imperial Japan would expire. In contrast, the Minseito party perceived that, although it must protect Japan's existing right in Manchuria, Japan must respect China's sovereignty over Manchuria.⁴³ That was the only way to avoid any conflict with China. Therefore, the Wakatsuki cabinet made a tremendous effort to diffuse the situation as much as possible.

When the Incident broke out, civilian leaders attempted to settle the crisis in four ways. First, they started diplomatic negotiations with China. Soon after the breakout of the Incident, Japanese Minister in Shanghai Shigemitsu Mamoru immediately visited Finance Minister of the Chinese Nationalist Government Song Ziwen to pledge a joint effort for solving the Sino-Japanese dispute through negotiations.⁴⁴ Even after China decided to appeal to the League of Nations to intervene in this dispute under Article 11 of the Covenant, the Wakatsuki cabinet continued to maintain the principle of direct negotiation with China.

Second, the cabinet opposed any reinforcement of troops. At the first

⁴² Takekawa mentioned that Commander-in-Chief Honjo hardly knew why he was sent to Manchuria. Takekawa's comment in Mori, *Manshujihen Uramenshi*, vol. 6, pp. 323-324.

⁴³ Banno, *Kindai Nihon no Gaiko to Seiji*, pp. 154, 159, 175.

⁴⁴ Shigemitsu, *Gaiko Kaiso Roku*, pp. 123-124.

cabinet meeting, reading various reports and telegrams from Fengtian. Foreign Minister Shidehara insisted that the Fengtian Incident was a part of the Kanto army's conspiracy. One report said that the Kanto army was making preparations for action on the night of September 18. Another said that the garrison army had planned maneuvers on September 17, in order to prepare for emergencies, but then changed the date to the 18th at the last moment.⁴⁵ Hearing these reports, the Army Minister Minami was unable to propose any reinforcements of troops. He was compelled to agree on the policy of non-expansion and to submit a report of investigation of this incident as soon as possible.⁴⁶

Third, the emperor and the palace entourage supported the government's non-enlargement principle. As early as September 19, Military Aide-de-Camp Nara told Minami that either the Imperial Liaison Conference's decision or the emperor's permission would be required when the Kanto army mobilizes troops beyond their regular duties. Nara also advised both Chief of Army General Staff Kanaya and Vice Chief Nihomiya to pay special attention to the Kanto army and check it carefully. He even considered that Kanaya and Hayashi, the Korea Army Commander were to be punished, being responsible to mobilize troops without

⁴⁵ Gaimusho, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Manchurian Incident*, vol. 1, Part I, telegraph from Hayashi to Shidehara, September 19, 1931, no. 5, p. 3; telegraph from Hayashi to Shidehara, September 19, 1931, no. 12, p. 6. Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, pp. 114-115. Morishima pointed out that on September 20, Hanaya threatened him not to send any telegrams that would restrict the military action in Manchuria. Morishima Morito, *Inbo, Ansatsu, Gunto* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950), pp. 55-56.

⁴⁶ Kantogun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 185.

permission from the emperor.⁴⁷

As for the emperor, at the meeting with Prime Minister Wakatsuki, the emperor told Wakatsuki that the government had to minimize the military dispute in Manchuria. When the Korea army crossed the border without any authorization from the emperor, the emperor showed his displeasure to Kanaya and demanded that he very careful in the future. Yet, unlike Nara, the emperor did not think it necessary to punish the army commanders.⁴⁸

Fourth and most importantly, civilian leaders gained support from the Chief of General Staff. Once the cabinet made a decision on the non-enlargement principle, Kanaya tried to control both the Kanto and Korea armies. He made an effort to pacify the situation quickly. Army leaders such as Minami and Kanawa did not fully share the idea of national security with Wakatsuki and Shidehara. However, they agreed on the government decision in principle.

As far as the Kanto army was concerned, both Kanaya and Minami issued orders in compliance with the cabinet policy prohibiting the Kanto army from expanding hostilities.⁴⁹ In addition, the army minister immediately sent Ando Toshikichi, Section Director of Weapon Affairs, to Manchuria in order to obtain accurate information about the clash.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 359.

⁴⁸ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, p. 377.

⁴⁹ Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, pp. 115, 117-8.

⁵⁰ For a comprehensive study on missions to Manchuria, Shiraishi Hiroshi, "Manshu Jihen ni okeru Haken Bakuryo no Koka: Gun Chuo no Fukakudai

On September 22, Prime Minister Wakatsuki also tried to maintain the non-expansion principle by reporting to the emperor that no expedition would be undertaken to protect nationals in Harbin and that in case of an emergency, residents would be evacuated. By doing so, Wakatsuki tried to forestall extensive action by the military. Following the cabinet decision, Kanaya and Minami pressed the Kanto army to limit its military action.⁵¹ Minami once again urged the Kanto army not only to advance the military action but also not to participate in any political activities. A telegram from the army minister made it clear that the military action should be confined within limits prescribed by the need to maintain public order. It warned that the central authority of the army wanted to neither occupy Manchuria and Mongolia immediately nor administer the territories.⁵²

The Vice Chief of Staff also persuaded the Kanto army to preserve the

Doryoku.” *Gunji Shigaku*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 19-36. According to Endo Saburo, who was sent to Manchuria on September 24, there were clear gaps between the Kanto army and the army authorities in Tokyo regarding the establishment of a regime in Manchuria. While the Kanto army considered that this crisis would be a perfect opportunity to control Manchuria, the army headquarters in Tokyo believed that it was too early to think about a new regime in Manchuria. Miyatake Tsuyoshi, *Shogun no Yuigon, Eido Saburo Nikki*, (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun sha, 1986), p. 48 (Hereafter, *Endo Diary*). Imai also witnessed that the Kanto army was very upset about the Tokyo army headquarters’ reluctant attitude. Ishiwara shouted at him, saying that as long as Tokyo was naïve, the Manchurian problem would be never solved. See Imai Hitoshi, “Manshu Hiwo fuku koro.” in *Hisomerareta Showashi*, p. 67. Imai also commented that the Kanto army checked the mission’s activities and restricted communication with the Kanto army members. Imai, Interview with Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, pp. 152-153.

⁵¹ Shimada Toshihiko, “Manshu Jihen no Tenkai.” in Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Senso Genin Kenkyūbu ed., *Taiheiyō Senso heno Michi*, vol. 1, p. 46; Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 5, p. 159.

⁵² Shimada, “Manshu Jihen no Tenkai: 1931-32.” p. 31

status quo and calmly monitor the situation. In his words, "if the Kanto army departs from its primary functions, goes beyond the objective of self-defense, expands its occupied territory, seizes railways, and otherwise extends the conflict, the present favorable tone of public opinion will steadily change."⁵³

On September 24, Kanaya made it clear to the Kanto army that "troops were not to be sent to Harbin even if the situation suddenly became critical." He also stressed that the Kanto army must prepare for withdrawal from Jilin. His message also emphasized that the Kanto army's cooperation would enable the army to act effectively in the cabinet. The Army General Staff further confirmed to the Kanto army that the army had agreed on the government's policy of withdrawal of nationals from Harbin in case of an emergency. This decision was unchangeable, for the policy had already been reported to the emperor. The cabinet had been determined to deal with an emergency without use of force.⁵⁴

Immediately after the breakout of the Incident, the Korea army coordinated with the Kanto army and was ready to cross the border. The Wakatsuki cabinet and the Army General Staff tried to prevent the Korea army from mobilizing. On September 20, Commander Hayashi Senjuo of the Korea army and Kanaya exchanged telegraphs several times over.⁵⁵ For the military leaders in Tokyo, the

⁵³ Ibid., p. 32.

⁵⁴ Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, p. 127.

⁵⁵ Hayashi was more active than Honjo. He decided to cross the border although such an action was clearly against orders from Tokyo. Yet, later he was praised as "border crossing general" in public. Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, pp. 119-123; Takahashi Masae ed., *Hayashi Senjuo Manshu Jiken Nisshi* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo,

mobilization of the Korea army was both rash and unnecessary. Kanaya judged that the situation in Fengtian did not call for reinforcement. Shortly after midnight of September 20, Kanaya stressed that he had given his consent to the cabinet decision not to extend hostilities for the time being unless unexpected conditions should develop.⁵⁶

However, ignoring the telegraphs from the General Staff, one division of the Korea army had left Korea and crossed the border.⁵⁷ On September 23, the emperor summoned the prime minister and stated that he approved the cabinet non-enlargement policy and emphasized that it should be faithfully observed. At the cabinet meeting, both Foreign Minister Shidehara and Finance Minister Inoue firmly opposed any approval of government expense.⁵⁸ However, since "soldiers could not live for a day without the government covering the expenses," the prime

1996), pp. 14-16.

⁵⁶ Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, pp. 119-121.

⁵⁷ The army authorities in Tokyo had opposed the Korea army's crossing border. Hence, when the Korea army crossed the border without any authorization, Nagata urged Kanaya to directly meet the emperor to get approval. Likewise, later Hayashi's rival Araki who consistently supported the military's expansion criticized Hayashi's crossing the border. According to Araki, although command and infantry manuals encourage field commanders to judge situation flexibly, crossing the border requires authorization from the emperor. Otherwise, it means that troops in Kyushu can go to Korea in emergency case. Takahashi ed., *Hayashi Senjuro Manshu Jiken Nisshi*, p. 43.

⁵⁸ According to Ninomiya, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, Finance Minister Inoue stubbornly rejected any special expenditure for the army while the Foreign Ministry came to cooperate with the army. Ninomiya's comment in Mori, *Manshu Jihen no Uramenshi*, p. 340.

minister gave in and allowed for the ex post facto approval of the emperor.⁵⁹

To be sure, the Wakatsuki cabinet failed to control the Korea army completely. It gave a follow-up approval to the Korea army for its mobilization and guaranteed special expenditures for it. However, overall, the Wakatsuki cabinet was able to gain policy control at this initial stage of the Incident. On September 24, the government issued its first official statement concerning the Sino-Japanese dispute. It confirmed that the government decided to make every effort to prevent the aggravation of the situation. It also noted that although a detachment was dispatched from Jinzhou to Jilin, it was not for the purpose of military occupation; it was only for the purpose of removing a menace to the South Manchurian Railway on its flank. The government emphasized that the bulk of the detachment was to be withdrawn as soon as that objective has been attained.⁶⁰

IV. Hard-liners' Challenge to the Wakatsuki Cabinet and the Army in Tokyo

While the Wakatsuki cabinet succeeded in maintaining the non-enlargement principle and compelled the army to accommodate, the Kanto army challenged the

⁵⁹ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, p. 377.

⁶⁰ The Privy Council was favorable to the government's decision. On September 30, 1931, at the Privy Council meeting, supporting the government's non-enlargement principle, Egi claimed that the Kanto army's occupation in Manchuria was not only unnecessary but also harmful for Japan. Egi argued that even if the Kanto army occupied the territory with the use of forces, Chinese nationalism hostility against Japan would remain or even increase. Under such a condition, it meant that Japan was surrounded by enemies. The fundamental solution was not to build a state in Manchuria. *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 66 [1931], National Archives of Japan. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 254-257. Ishii also criticized that the Korean army violated the right of military command.

cabinet with serious offenses.⁶¹ The Kanto army hard-liners were so determined to follow through with the incident. They even declared that if the central authorities in Tokyo oppose their action, they would continue to fight against Chinese by abandoning their Japanese citizenship and becoming Manchurian citizens.⁶² The Kanto army and the young radical officers in Tokyo challenged the Wakatsuki cabinet by participating in political activities in Manchuria, advancing military operations in both the north and south of Manchuria, and by attempting a coup.

First of all, the Kanto army was involved in political activities in Manchuria in order to smoothly control Manchuria, although the Army Minister issued strict orders that prohibited any participation in the movement to establish a new regime in Manchuria.⁶³ On September 22, General Staff members of the Kanto army Miyake, Doihara, Itagaki, and Katakura all agreed on the establishment of a new regime in Manchuria. Originally they planned to rule Manchuria directly. However, because they realized that the army in Tokyo would oppose such a plan, they concluded that it would establish a multi-racial autonomous state of

⁶¹ According to *Harada Diary*, the Kanto army hard-liners pressured the Commander-in-Chief Honjo in order to continue military campaigns in Manchuria. Top commanders in the Kanto army such as Honjo and Miyake was unable to control their subordinates such as Ishiwara, Hanaya, and Itagaki. These three did whatever they wanted to do. Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 77. Recalling that time, Katakura said that he discussed with Chief of the Kanto army Miyake that this was the Kanto army's conspiracy but if the authorities do not support it, it would end as the second Komoto Incident. If so, the Kanto army had to leave Manchuria forever. Miyatake, *Endo Saburo Diary*, p. 49.

⁶² Morishima, *Inbo, Ansatsu, Gunto*, p. 62.

⁶³ Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, p. 130.

Manchuria.⁶⁴ The Kanto army's official policy document designated the new regime to be established in Manchuria as "an independent state under Japanese protection." But Japanese were not to monopolize the ruling power of the new state. Rather the official slogan was to promote the happiness of the various races on equal grounds.⁶⁵ In Tianjin, on November 9, Colonel Doihara instructed some anti-Zhang Chinese to attack the peace preservation corps. Doihara used this confusion to abduct Puyi. The Kanto army planned to put him as the head of a new Manchurian state.⁶⁶

Second, the Kanto army continued to advance its military operations in Jinzhou, Harbin and Tianjin. Jinzhou had become the base of Zhang's army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Border Defense Army established military headquarters and a civil government at Jinzhou, and appointed Zhang Zuoxiang acting Commander in Chief. The Kanto army attempted to destroy the Jinzhou regime. It believed that, by employing bandits and ex-soldiers, Zhang Xueliang organized plots to murder Japanese and anti-Zhang Chinese officials. Thirteen planes left Fengtian, flew over Jinzhou, and dropped seventy-five 25-kilogram bombs over the government offices, the barracks of the 28th Division, and Zhang's

⁶⁴ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 189.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199, 248-257. According to *Katakura Diary*, it was Matsumoto of the South Manchurian Railway Company research bureau that drafted the independence principle of Manchukuo.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

residence on October 8. Some innocent civilians were victims of this attack.⁶⁷

Furthermore, despite the strict order of the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Kanto army dispatched troops to North Manchuria early in November. In the middle of October, the Heilongjiang army burnt bridges in the Lenjiang River in order to halt Zhang Haipeng's northward push. On October 26, Major Hayashi Yoshihide, the representative of the Kanto army in Qiqihar demanded Ma Zhanshan, commander of the Heilongjiang army and the acting head of the provincial government, to repair the damaged bridge. Major Hayashi threatened Commander Ma, by saying that the Japanese would repair the bridge themselves if it was not completed by November 3.⁶⁸

On November 4, Japanese troops at the Lenjiang River finally clashed with a battalion of the Heilongjiang army. When the Japanese repair corps advanced, Chinese infantry and artillery forces attacked the corps and forced them to retreat.⁶⁹ On November 17, the Kanto army advanced their northward move and attacked the Heilongjiang army. Entering the city of Qiqihar, the Kanto army

⁶⁷ Jinzhou bombing is a perfect example that the Kanto army hard-liners such as Ishiwara never followed orders from the above. Ishiwara fled to Jinzhou and bombed the city. But neither Chief of General Staff in the Kanto army nor Commander-in-Chief in the Kanto army ordered it. Ishiwara said that he bombed because he was afraid the bombs were exposed while he was flying. Endo criticized that Ishiwara violated the right of military command and privately used the Kanto army without any approval from the above. Miyatake, *Endo Diary*, p. 55. Mori, *Manshujihen Uramenshi*, p. 105. *Katakura Diary* also suggested that the main purpose of Jinzhou bombing was to exert pressure on top army leaders. Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 205.

⁶⁸ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 234.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 244-245.

occupied the city on November 19.⁷⁰

While advancing to the north, the Kanto army advanced to the south of Manchuria. When Chinese soldiers attacked the Japanese barracks in Tianjin on November 26, the Kanto army decided to mobilize a mixed brigade and infantry battalion from Qiqihar to Tianjin and assisted the Tianjin army. The Korea army Commander Hayashi supported the Kanto army once again by sending troops to Manchuria without any permission from Tokyo.⁷¹ On November 27, the 4th Mixed Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Battalion began moving south.⁷² Ignoring the Wakatsuki cabinet's non-enlargement principle, the Kanto army expanded its military operation around Manchuria.⁷³

Finally and most importantly, in Tokyo, young radical Sakurakai members planned a coup in order to install a military government. They thought that they could use this crisis to replace the Wakatsuki cabinet a military government.⁷⁴

This October coup plot was not well-planned, but the scope of the plan was quite large. They planned to attack the cabinet ministers in conference at the Prime

⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 273-274.

⁷¹ Shimada, "Manshu Jihen no Tenkai." p. 93.

⁷² Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 278.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 278-279.

⁷⁴ The most comprehensive study on the October Incident was Karita's *Showashoki Seiji Gaikoshi*. See also, Nakano, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, pp. 151-184.

Minister's Residence, occupy the Metropolitan Police Office, encircle the Army Ministry and General Staff Headquarters, and forcefully win over the senior officers. It was rumored that coup plotters intended to assassinate "evil" advisors at the Palace such as Makino, Ichiki, and Suzuki.⁷⁵ It is also said that they would kill the main cabinet members such as Wakatsuki, Shidehara, Inoue, and Adachi.⁷⁶

Then, the plotters considered that they would send Fleet Admiral Togo to the emperor in order to form a military government.⁷⁷ The cabinet candidates included Araki as Prime Minister and Army Minister, Hashimoto as Minister of Home Affairs, Tatekawa as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Okawa as Minister of Finance.⁷⁸ The coup plotters attempted to not only terminate party politics but also to replace the court members who worked closely with the emperor.⁷⁹

Despite their ambition, the plotters could not launch the coup because Vice Minister of the Army Sugiyama Hajime ordered the military police to arrest twelve plotters in the morning of the day that they planned a coup.⁸⁰ Yet, the military

⁷⁵ Prior to the coup, the emperor's advisors received information that the right wingers would threaten them. The police patrolled their residences and their neighborhood for their security. See Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 5, pp. 170-171.

⁷⁶ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 99-100.

⁷⁷ Nakano, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, p. 155.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-153.

⁸⁰ Nagata superbly persuaded Hashimoto to cancel the coup plan. Nagata told Hashimoto that "the coup would end up as a terrorism incident and would not influence current politics much. If so, it would be better to threaten the cabinet by

leaders never punished the plotters strictly. While awaiting punishment, they were given the best of treatment with drinks and geisha under the supervision of the military police outside Tokyo. Eventually, Hashimoto was given the severest punishment, which was only twenty days' confinement. After completing the confinement period, they were all transferred from the post they then occupied.⁸¹

V. The Decline of the Wakatsuki Cabinet

Facing the military offensive at home and abroad, the Wakatsuki cabinet was under fire. From the beginning, the cabinet tried to control the Kanto army. The army cooperated with the cabinet in order to settle the Incident, if minimally, but it was far from making a close coalition with the cabinet. For example, the army leaders did not punish rebellious military officers strictly. Also, as it became clear that the cabinet failed to effectively control the crisis, the Foreign Ministry and the court came to be less supportive of the cabinet. Major members in the court—Genro Saionji, Kido, Makino, and Prince Konoye—all criticized that Wakatsuki lacked strong leadership. In addition to their criticism, Minister of Home Affairs Adachi who advocated a Minseito-Seiyukai coalition government, declined to cooperate with Wakatsuki and led to the collapse of the cabinet early in December.

Wakatsuki gradually failed to handle the crisis without solid coalition with

a coup attempt". Nakata Minoru. "Shiryō: Nemoto Hiroshi Kaisō Roku." *Gunji Shigaku*, vol.11, p. 88.

⁸¹ Nakano pointed out that Hashimoto, Cho and others were quite rebellious and showed no respect to Kanaya when he issued them punishments. Nakano. *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, p. 181.

the military, the foreign affairs office, and the court. First of all, as soon as the army authority realized that the Kanto army had acted out of control, it attempted to limit its military action as much as possible. As for its advance to the north, the supreme command in Tokyo was aware that the Soviet Union had supplied arms to Ma's army. Consequently, the army leaders worried that the Kanto army would have a military clash with the Soviet Union. In light of this concern, on November 5, during an imperial audience, Kanaya asked the emperor to use the entrusted right command.⁸²

After the imperial sanction, the Chief of General Staff issued the first temporary entrusted order that the commander-in-chief of the Kanto army must confine military action in northern Manchuria. The second entrusted order showed some understanding of the Kanto army's position and authorized the corps already in the Lenjiang River area to encounter the enemy. The General Staff restricted pursuit of the enemy force, and ordered the Japanese units to return immediately

⁸² The entrusted right of command means that the emperor would be asked to entrust the chief of staff with command over operational matters in Manchuria. Namely, the emperor temporarily and partially delegates the right of supreme command to the chief of General Staff. Recalling that time, Wakatsuki commented that "Kanaya was a very honest man. I respect him as a great Chief of the Staff. Recognizing that the Kanto army's advance to Jinzhou would result grave situation for Japan, he issued entrusted order and checked the Kanto army. During my cabinet, the Kanto army did not enter into Jinzhou." While Kanaya consistently supported Wakatsuki, Minami supported Wakatsuki to the smallest extent. In particular, when it became clear that the Wakatsuki cabinet would not maintain unity in the middle of December, Minami supported the Kanto army's advance. In fact, while Wakatsuki considered Kanaya a great Chief of General Staff, he criticized Minami's incompetence, saying that he was unable to control the army. See Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 380, 424.

after they completed their objective.⁸³

As for the occupation of Qiqihar, on November 16, the fourth entrusted order instructed that Japanese troops should not permanently occupy Qiqihar. The Kanto army, moreover, was not to use the Chinese Eastern Railway. Military action along the railway was to be purely defensive.⁸⁴ On November 25, a fifth entrusted order told the Kanto army to carry out the evacuation of the forces immediately. This time, in order to complete the evacuation, the General Staff warned that if the commander-in-chief at Fengtian still hesitated, the central authorities in the army would remove him and his staff officers from the posts.⁸⁵

As far as the Kanto army's advance to the south is concerned, responding to a strong request from Foreign Minister Shidehara, the central army authorities once again sent a few entrusted orders and restricted the Kanto army's action. On November 27, in the seventh entrusted order, the General Staff telegraphed Fengtian that the Kanto army should not send forces west of the Liao River for the purpose of assisting the Fengtian army. Another telegram explicitly prohibited offensive action against Jinzhou and ordered that troops be retained east of the Liao. In addition, the General Staff sent a longer explanatory telegram to Vice Chief of Staff Ninomiya who was still in Manchuria. The telegram expressed that the General Staff was extremely dissatisfied with the Kanto army's offensive actions. With

⁸³ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 245-247, 268.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-278, 280-281.

repeated entrusted orders, the Kanto army finally issued an order to the 4th Mixed Brigade to return to Fengtian as quickly as possible.⁸⁶

Second, although the army leaders cooperated with the cabinet to minimize the military dispute in Manchuria, they hesitated to punish rebellious officers. In this sense, the coalition between civilian and military leaders was rather weak. The military's support was too minimal to implement the non-enlargement policy principle. As far as the Manchurian Incident is concerned, neither the Kanto army nor Korea army followed the restrict orders from the army headquarters in Tokyo. Despite restrict orders, the Kanto army officers such as Miyake, Doihara, Itagaki, and Katakura participated in political activities in order to build an independent state under the Kanto army's control in Manchuria. In Jinzhou, without any authorization from above, Ishiwara dropped bombs over the government offices, the barracks, and Zhang's residence. Ignoring Kanaya's order that the Korean army should not mobilize troops, the Korea Army Commander Hayashi left Korea and entered into Manchuria to back up the Kanto army. Despite all these mutinies, the Chief of Army General Staff never punished these rebellious officers. In fact, they later won honor medals for their achievements.

By the same token, the October coup plotters were never seriously punished.

Without doubt, the Sakurakai officers were a threat to the stability of Japanese

⁸⁶ Both Shidehara and Wakatsuki appreciated Kanaya's effort to restrict the Kanto army's advance in Manchuria. Shidehara was very afraid that if the Kanto army's military action continued, the Great Powers would intervene into the Incident with the use of forces. Without doubt, the Kanto army members who were ordered not to advance were quite upset about Kanaya's orders. Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, pp. 178-179. Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 379-380.

domestic politics. They were closely associated with right-wing activists and planned to assassinate major figures in political parties and the Imperial Palace. However, once they were arrested, they were only detained with drinks and geishas. Because no one was seriously chastised, civilian leaders were unable to effectively control the military.

Third, as far as the Foreign Ministry is concerned, because a diplomatic solution seemed next to impossible, the Foreign Ministry gradually made a compromise with the Kanto army. As early as October 28, the Foreign Ministry informed Yoshizawa Kenichi, Japanese representative at the League of Nations, that the Zhang Xueliang regime was no longer to be regarded as the legitimate power in Manchuria. In its opinion, although the kind of regime to be established in Manchuria was "the internal problem of the Three Eastern Provinces," Japan was obliged to comply with the existing situation in Manchuria, undertake police measures and promote the development of the Chinese "local organs for maintenance of peace and order."⁸⁷

At Fengtian, Consul-General Hayashi gradually changed his opinion.⁸⁸ On November 11, his telegram to Shidehara stated that because the military conflict had expanded, there was no room for a political solution to the North Manchuria

⁸⁷ Gaimusho, *Document on Foreign Policy Manchurian Incident*, vol. 1, part 3. From Shidehara to Yoshizawa, no. 398, October 28, 1931, pp. 426-427.

⁸⁸ According to *Harada Diary*, as early as October 2, Hayashi asserted that it is too late to control the Kanto army. Hayashi said that the Kanto army hard liners even planned to assassinate Hayashi if he restricted their activities. Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 77; Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, pp. 147-151.

question. It is also reported that a quick expedition to Qiqihar was imperative in order to maintain the prestige of the Empire.⁸⁹ On November 12, Foreign Minister Shidehara also formally declared that the government policy was to assist the Committees for the Maintenance of Peace and Order in Manchuria in view of the various complicated internal conditions. Shidehara undoubtedly knew that so called Committees for the Maintenance of Peace and Order were in fact virtually under the direction of the Kanto army, but he decided to support them. He now connected troop withdrawal not only with direct negotiations with China, but also with the development of the new political power in Manchuria.⁹⁰

Fourth, in addition to the Foreign Ministry, after the coup, the Imperial Court became less supportive. As for Emperor Hirohito, he strongly supported the government's non-enlargement policy. But when the Korea army crossed the border, the emperor only told Kanaya to be careful in the future. Hirohito did not try to punish army commanders who were responsible to mobilize troops seriously. In addition, after the Kanto army's bombing in Jinzhou on October 8, he commented that if necessary, he would approve the military escalation after good consultation with the Chief of the Army General Staff.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Shimada, "Manshu Jihen no Tenkai," pp. 68-70.

⁹⁰ Gaimusho, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy Manchurian Incident*, vol. 1, part 3, no. 498, pp. 517-519.

⁹¹ When the Kanto army made a statement that the Kanto army would welcome a new government in Manchuria, the emperor Hirohito pointed out that the Kanto army's comment was reckless. He criticized that the Kanto army intervened into China's internal politics. In addition, he advised Shiratori of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Saionji, Makino, and Kido were all afraid that Prime Minister Wakatsuki would not be able to control the military. Kido, a young member at the Imperial Palace, for instance, perceived that "in this grave crisis, the [Kanto] army had its policy principle." The army spent years studying the principle and training officers. No other institutions had as firm a policy principle as the army had. Kido thought that this was the reason why the cabinet failed to manage the crisis. Prince Konoye, another young member at the Palace, viewed the situation in the same way.⁹² Hence, they concluded that it would be necessary to replace the Wakatsuki cabinet with the Minseito-Seiyukai coalition cabinet led by Inukai or Adachi. They also considered that a cabinet led by General Ugaki, Barron Hiranuma, or Admiral Saito would be strong enough to control the army and settle this crisis.⁹³

Likewise, Saionji and Makino thought that Wakatsuki and Shidehara had neither clear policy direction nor the courage to fight against the army radicals.⁹⁴ Saionji further feared that, in the absence of the strong cabinet, radical young officers would even be a threat to the emperor. In fact, Makino once told Genro Saionji that in Manchuria, a rumor was heard that the emperor paid little attention to

not to be influenced heavily by the army. Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 5, pp. 170-171; Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 4, p. 164.

⁹² Kido, *Kido Diary*; vol. 1, p. 114

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.111.

⁹⁴ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 111; Makino, *Makino Diary*, p. 481. Makino described that Wakatsuki had a nervous breakdown, lost his appetite, and relied on sleeping pills at night. He was confused and often changed his opinion. The Court members such as Makino, Kido, Harada, and Saionji thought that Wakatsuki would not overcome this crisis.

state affairs but spent time playing Chinese chess with Lord Privy Seal and Grand Chamberlain.⁹⁵ At the same time, they fully recognized the fact that the radical officers intended to attack them. The radical officers viewed that Makino, Saionji, and Suzuki as evil advisors who encouraged the emperor to promote peace. Even after the October Incident, the right-wingers continued to harass the court through the newspapers. The articles criticized Makino and Suzuki for manipulating the emperor's will and thus declared that the right-wingers would attack them. Under such a condition, they were rather disappointed with Wakatsuki, since he was not brave enough to fight against the radical officers and right-wingers. Concluding that the current cabinet was too weak to settle the external and internal crises, the Imperial Court group started considering the possibility of a new strong cabinet.

Finally, after the October Incident, the Wakatsuki cabinet failed to maintain the unity because Adachi took this crisis as an opportunity to increase his influence in the Minseito party and become prime minister. Namely, Wakatsuki lost support from his fellow cabinet member. In the middle of the crisis, Prime Minister Wakatsuki thought that only a strong cabinet based on a coalition of both the Minseito and the Seiyukai would control the army. Responding to Wakatsuki's request, Adachi contacted the Seiyukai political leaders, Genro Saionji, and the army to see if a government based on the two parties would be possible.⁹⁶ However,

⁹⁵ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, pp. 88, 102, 112. The Imperial Court noticed another rumor that targeted the Court. When the emperor made a trip to Kumamoto in the middle of November, a rumor was spread that the Imperial Palace was bombed and burned and the Lord Privy Seal was murdered.

⁹⁶ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 383-387. Unlike Shidehara who firmly

Foreign Minister Shidehara and Finance Minister Inoue convinced Wakatsuki that such a government was simply impossible, for the two parties had quite different policy preferences in the field of diplomacy and finance.⁹⁷ Wakatsuki soon told Adachi to abandon the idea of a coalition government.

Yet, Adachi and some Minseito members thought that if the Minseito party made a coalition with the Seiyukai, it would lead to a reallocation of power within the Minseito and the cabinet.⁹⁸ Adachi had been denied the presidency of the

opposed any reinforcement of troops. Adachi understood the army's position. Adachi was a kind of mediator between the army and Foreign Ministry. Adachi Kenzo, *Adachi Kenzo Jijoden*. (Tokyo: Shinjusha, 1960), pp. 264-269; Aritake Shuji, *Araki Sadao Fuun Sanju nen*. (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1975), p. 61.

⁹⁷ Inoue was the toughest opposition to such a coalition government. Inoue believed that such a government would only appease the army and change the finance policy that Inoue had worked for since he joined the Hamaguchi cabinet. Inoue told Harada, Konoye, and Kido that a coalition government would only appease the army that had advanced its own expansionist plan and had been ruining the state without considering international criticism. Kido, *Kido Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 110, 114. Inoue Junnosuke Ronsou Hensankai, *Inoue Junnosuke Den*. (Tokyo: Inoue Junnosuke Ronsou Hensankai, 1936), pp. 809-810. Others commented that Inoue firmly opposed a coalition government because the coalition government would be very likely to change Inoue's finance policy. See Suginami Takahito, "Saihin Kuromaku Monogatari Nidai," *Bungei Shunju*, January, 1932, pp. 110-117. In the Minseito, Adachi was famous for his brilliant election strategy. He was familiar with local politics. In contrast, Inoue was a leader in the financial sector. Well connected with bankers and zaibatsu leaders, Inoue was a successful fund-raiser in the Minseito. Due to this difference, emotional conflict seemed to exist between the two. See Kawazoe Jiro, "Minseito no Hitobito," *Bungei Shunju*, December, 1929, pp. 106-109; Ando Masasumi, "Hitono Hyoban," *Bungei Shunju*, January, 1932, pp. 224-225.

⁹⁸ Nagai Ryutaro, Nakano Seigo and Tomita Kojiro supported Adachi's lobbying. As it made it clear that the Wakatsuki cabinet could not effectively handle the Manchurian Incident, Nagai and Nakano supported the idea of "national unity." Nagai, for instance, advocated re-organization of ministries to efficiently carry out colonial policies. He suggested the establishment of defense ministry which unit functions of military and political administrative bureaucracies. Nagai Ryutaro

Minseito after Hamaguchi's death; now he foresaw the possibility of becoming premier himself. Ignoring Wakatsuki's request to relinquish a coalition cabinet plan, Adachi made a secret agreement with the Seiyukai political leaders for the new cabinet. Furthermore, he made a public statement about the possibility of the establishment of a cabinet on November 21. It stated that a national unity cabinet based on the cooperation between the two parties would be necessary to overcome the current crisis.⁹⁹

Clearly at this time, Wakatsuki failed to maintain the unity of the cabinet. He requested Adachi to resign his position because the cabinet would not function as long as he continued to advocate the establishment of a coalition government. But he declined to do so and stopped participating in any cabinet meetings. Under these conditions, the Wakatsuki cabinet stepped down on December 12. The head of the Seiyukai, Inukai, succeeded him in the office.

Conclusion

This case study examines the Wakatsuki cabinet's policymaking process in the Manchurian Incident. Hypotheses that are tested are 1) Japan's security policy outcome is the result of internal balance of power between soft-liners and

Hensankai, *Nagai Ryutaro* (Tokyo: Nagai Ryutaro Hensankai, 1955), p. 294; Nakano Yasuo ed., *Seijika Nakano Seigo*, (Tokyo: Shinkokaku Shoben, 1971), pp. 553, 609, 662.

⁹⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 1931, November 21. On a coalition government, see: Royama Masamichi, "Kyoryoku Naikaku Mondai" *Bungei Shunju*, January, 1932, pp. 218-223; "Adachisan ni Shinkyo wo Kiku Zadankai" *Bungei Shunju*, February, 1932, pp. 44-57; Onshi Jonan, "Kiki myo myo na Seihen." *Bungei Shunju*, February, 1932, pp. 66-75.

hard-liners; 2) the higher constitutional authority civilian leaders have on the issue, the more effectively they can influence policy outcome; 3) the closer civilian leaders make a coalition with military leaders, the stronger the impact civilian leaders have on the policy outcome; and 4) civilian leaders' influence increases when other political actors such as the emperor, bureaucrats and the Imperial Court members support or join the coalition with them. This case study has the following implications.

First of all, the Wakatsuki cabinet adopted the non-enlargement policy principle in the Manchurian Incident because they were soft-liners who hoped to pacify the Incident through the diplomatic negotiation. The Minseito party had long advocated that Japan should deny any aggressive policy toward China, although China's unification may cause some trivial conflicts with Japan in Manchuria. The Minseito leaders considered that in any disputes, Japan should patiently deal with China diplomatically and should be careful not to use forces recklessly. For them, China is an important economic/trade partner who can co-exist and co-prosper with Japan. Therefore, even though they recognized that local disputes between Japan and China had escalated, they never tried to act belligerently. Surely, the Wakatsuki cabinet did not make a strong coalition with army leaders. But at least they were able to adopt the non-enlargement principle because they gave the army leaders pressure and gained minimal support from the army leaders.

Second, without constitutional authority, civilian leaders were unable to carry out military policy effectively. Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution stated that

the emperor, not the government, has the supreme command of the army and the navy. It implied that the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Army and the Navy held the right to report directly to and get approval from the emperor with only ex-post fact report to the prime minister. Furthermore, the prime minister had no right to punish the military officers who disobeyed the government decision.

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, the government was unable to press the Korea and Kanto armies not to escalate military action because the issue of military command and operation was beyond of the cabinet's authority. In addition, it was the army that decided all the personnel issues. Therefore, although both the Korea army and Kanto army disobeyed the government's decision, the cabinet was unable to dismiss any officers or commanders. Similarly, civilian leaders were unable to punish any coup plotters in the army in October, 1931. While recognizing that these plotters were very dangerous, the cabinet was unable to do anything directly. This situation only weakened civilian supremacy. These examples suggest that civilians would have effectively controlled the military and implemented non-enlargement principle better if they had larger constitutional authority on military affairs.

	Political Leaders' High Constitutional Authority	Political Leaders' Low Constitutional Authority
Strong Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is large</i>	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i>
Weak Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i> ● Adoption of Non-enlargement Principle	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is weak</i> ● No Punishment to Rebellious Officers

Table 4.1 Political Leaders' Influence on Policy Outcome in the Wakatsuki Cabinet

Third, if military leaders fail to punish defiant officers appropriately in a timely manner, it will lead to very dangerous domestic and international consequences. At the international level, the Incident expanded because military leaders failed to punish those who violated the right of supreme military command. Soon after its breakout, the Korea army crossed the border. It clearly violated the right of supreme military command. But the central army authority failed to punish the commander-in-chief of the Korea army. And the cabinet approved the special budget. Likewise, early in October 1931, the Kanto army damaged Japan's international reputation at the League of Nations by starting to bomb without any authorization from Tokyo. Yet, accepting an opinion that any personnel change in this serious situation was inappropriate, the army leaders failed to remove any rebellious officers. They were so indecisive that the Kanto and Korea armies were

able to expand the military action easily.¹⁰⁰ In fact, after the Incident, the plotters who disobeyed orders from the above won honor medals due to their victory in Manchuria.¹⁰¹ This situation only escalated Japanese militarism.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ In spring 1932, when Kanaya left his position as Chief of the Army General Staff, he invited Shidehara for dinner. There, he sincerely apologized that he was responsible for failing to control the army. Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, p. 184. It is debatable to what extent Kanaya succeeded in restricting the military action and coordinated with the government's non-enlargement principle. While the Kanto army did not obey the order from the army authorities in Tokyo, Kanaya at least restricted the military in both north and south parts of Manchuria. Yet, because Kanaya cooperated with Wakatsuki, his subordinates complained that Kanaya was not a good leader. Many of them pointed out that he drank with Minami all the time and stayed at his room alone. Umanaki's comment in Nakamura Kikuo, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 64. See also, Nihon Kindai Shiryo Kenkyukai ed., *Suzuki Teichishi Danwa Sokkiroku*, vol.1, p. 19. Recalling the Manchurian Incident, several officers mentioned that the fact that the army leaders decided not to punish the plotters deteriorated the discipline in the army. Okamura, Interview with Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 35.

¹⁰¹ The military's promotion system partially contributed to the escalation of the Incident. According to Ishii, as a rule, "military officers were able to receive a distinguished service medal if they participated in military operation and achieved victories in battles. It implied that if they fought in a war, they are very likely to receive medals and get promotion automatically. Even if the military officers created a plot and damaged Japan's national interests, they were able to get benefits personally." Indeed, recalling that time, Ishii Itaro further commented:

During the Incident, soldiers in my home town often came to visit me. We chatted. Through our conversation, I realized that they were desperate to receive distinguished service medals and get a large pension. They always talked about pension. They also expected to receive certain medals. These soldiers always considered their interests. Of course, like these soldiers, elite officers desired to receive distinguished service medals. Several months after the Incident, director of the board of decoration Mr. Shimojo Yasumaro visited Manchuria. The Kanto army welcomed him in the warmest way. Vice commander in Chief and major officers organized a big dinner party for him.

Ishii Itaro, *Gaikokan no Issho: Taichugoku Gaiko Kaiso* (Tokyo: Taihei Shuppan, 1972), pp. 168-169, 409.

At the domestic level, the army leaders never seriously punished Sakurakai members who organized a coup in March and October, 1931.¹⁰³ In fact, although the Sakurakai failed to launch a coup, they succeeded in intimidating the court and politicians enough. After this coup attempt, the court, some diplomats, and some Minseito party members concluded that a new cabinet could possibly handle this crisis. The army gradually increased its influence in domestic politics.

Fourth, Wakatsuki needed to form a strong political coalition with the military, other bureaucrats, the court and his own party. Without it, it was difficult to take leadership and implement policies. Chief of the Army General Staff Kanaya and the Army Minister Minami agreed with Wakatsuki on the non-enlargement principle—they both continued to restrict the Kanto and Korea

¹⁰² Imamura Hitoshi commented that Ishiwara and Itagaki planned the Manchurian Incident, believing that the Incident would save Japan's future. They had no personal ambition when they were planning. Yet, they should have been punished because they rebelled against the central authority in Tokyo. Indeed, five years later, ironically, Ishiwara faced the same situation. Ishiwara issued orders not to advance Japanese troops in Mongolia, but Muto Akira ignored it. When Ishiwara scolded Muto, Muto replied that he did what Ishiwara did five years ago. Imamura Hitoshi, "Manshu Hiwo fuku koro," in *Hisomerareta Showashi*, p. 70. See also, his interview with Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, pp. 156-158. Horike commented that from late Taisho to early Showa, young radical officers came to ignore their boss and did whatever they wanted to do. Instead of punishing them, the boss just let their subordinate do. Once they missed an opportunity to punish these rebellious strictly, similar rebellious activities emerged. Horike's comment in Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, p. 141. See also, Ikeda, *Nihon no Magarikado*, p. 76.

¹⁰³ Takamiya, *Jungyaku no Showashi*, p. 79. In the meetings at the Privy Council, Egi criticized that the army leaders failed to monitor the Kanto army hard liners and young radical officers in Tokyo properly. But neither Mimani nor Kanaya punished the plotters. *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 67 [1931-32], National Archives of Japan, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 80-83, 154-156.

armies' military action in Manchuria by issuing orders and sending missions there. However, as discussed, they failed to punish or dismiss those who disobeyed orders. Therefore, lack of discipline proliferated throughout the army.

As for the relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas Shidehara worked with Wakatsuki closely, some diplomats such as Shiratori and Hayashi became skeptical about the government's non-enlargement principle. Hayashi, for instance, claimed that as the military clash had expanded, the use of forces--not diplomatic negotiation--would be necessary. As for the emperor and the Imperial Court, without doubt, the emperor supported the non-enlargement principle. But he was not strict to those who disobeyed his orders. Although the emperor showed that he was dissatisfied with the fact that the Korea army was mobilized without any authorization, he never asked the commanders to resign. As far as the court members are concerned, after the October Incident, Genro Saionji, Makino and Kido were very cautious not to stimulate dangerous radical officers too much. Furthermore, instead of supporting the Wakatsuki cabinet, they became critical to Wakatsuki because he was unable to control the military.

To make matters worse, Wakatsuki lost support from his fellow politicians. Indeed, it was known that his political base within the Minseito was not so strong even though Wakatsuki was a veteran politician with distinguished experiences. Wakatsuki became the President of the Minseito because the dying Hamaguchi asked him to do so. As he admitted, Wakatsuki was a poor political leader who

was unable to raise funds for the Minseito.¹⁰⁴ Hence, he failed to administrate the Minseito party effectively.

Once this crisis occurred, lack of a political foundation became fatal. As is described above, the Wakatsuki cabinet fell because Adachi refused to cooperate with Wakatsuki. Adachi's ambition to dominate the Minseito and become a new prime minister collapsed the Wakatsuki cabinet. In order to implement policies successfully, a prime minister must have a strong political foundation within his party. Unlike the Hamaguchi cabinet at the London Naval Conference, the Wakatsuki cabinet was unable to form a strong soft-line coalition with the military, the foreign affairs office, and the Imperial Court. Without a solid political coalition, the Wakatsuki cabinet was unable to complete the non-enlargement principle.

Major Political Actors	Pro-Exansionism in Manchuria (Hard-liners)	Anti-Expansionism in Manchuria (Soft-liners)
Political Party	The Seiyukai	The Minseito
The Army	The Kanto, Korea armies, the Sakurakia and Issekikai members	The Army Minister Minami, The Chief of the General Staff Kanaya
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs		Shidehara, Yoshizawa
The Emperor and the Court		The Emperor, Makino.
Others	The South Manchurian Railway, Media, the Public	

Table 4. 2 Hard-liners and Soft-liners in the Manchurian Incident at the Wakatsuki Cabinet

¹⁰⁴ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 370-371.

Finally, lack of communication between civilians and the military worsens international crisis situations. Before the Manchurian Incident occurred, political leaders and bureaucrats of foreign affairs hardly discussed the Manchurian problem with the army. After the Wabaoshan Incident and the Nakamura Incident early in 1931, whereas the Kanto army believed that military action was the only way to solve the Manchurian problem, civilian leaders optimistically perceived that they were able to settle these incidents through diplomatic negotiations with China. Shidehara stressed that "Japan respected China's sovereignty and would like to participate in economic development projects. Co-existence and co-prosperity was Japan's principle toward China."¹⁰⁵ However, some diplomats in Manchuria considered that Shidehara was too optimistic.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Shidehara's statement in Gaimusho, *Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo Narabi Shuyo Bunsho*, p. 173

¹⁰⁶ Hayashi Kyujiro, *Manshujihen to Hoten Soryoji* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978), pp. 122-123. In Hayashi's words,

the Foreign Office always focused on diplomacy with the Great Powers, but not with China. The Foreign Office sent almost all the elite diplomats to the United States or Europe. It neither trained career diplomats as China specialists nor provided any financial support, except salaries.... In contrast, the army set intelligence agencies in important cities of China, sent enthusiastic elite officers there, and examined China's military, political, and economic situations. The army provided these intelligent agents with enormous budgets. The army and the foreign ministry neither shared the information that the army's China experts gathered nor discussed Japan's policy toward China together.

By the same token, Shigemitsu commented that Japanese diplomatic response to China was very slow. Shigemitsu, *Gaiko Kaiso Roku*, pp. 102-110. Also, see Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, pp. 126-140.

Indeed, while the Foreign Minister negotiated with China over the local disputes in Manchuria, the Kanto army prepared to fight against Chinese there.¹⁰⁷ Civilian leaders faced great difficulty in controlling the army.¹⁰⁸

Additionally, they should have discussed the subject of discipline of the military with the military leaders. Politicians hardly noticed how seriously radical officers tried to challenge the government. About a year before the Incident, radical officers formed a secret association, the Sakurakai, and engineered a coup in March 1931. Some top military leaders who were dissatisfied with the government's demands for budget cuts and military reform joined a coup plan. Yet, these political activities were kept secret even within the army.¹⁰⁹ But neither

¹⁰⁷ Underestimating the Kanto army's hostility against China, Shidehara contended that "only the Japanese government decides Japan's foreign policy. Hence although the army and individuals have their own opinions, they are not independent from the government's policies." Some often argues that it was Shidehara's naïve diplomacy that caused the breakout of the Manchurian Incident. Ogawa Heikichi, a veteran conservative politician at the Seiyukai party, for instance, commented that Shidehara diplomacy only deteriorated Sino-Japanese relations. Yet, thanks to Shidehara, Japanese hard liners united together and were determined to fight against China. Shidehara diplomacy had a reversed effect in Japanese diplomacy in long term. Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Bunsho Kenkyukai ed., Ogawa Heikichi, "Manshu Dokuritsu Kankei Keii, vol.1." in *Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Bunsho* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1973). Hayashi also implied that Shidehara's naïve diplomacy pushed the army hard liners to plot the Incident. Hayashi, *Manshujihen to Hoten Soryoji*, pp. 175-177.

¹⁰⁸ Hayashi, *Hoten So Ryoji to Manshu Jihen*, pp. 122-123.

¹⁰⁹ Makino illustrated how much radical officers were frustrated about party politics. Radical officers perceived that party politicians endanger national security by making a disarmament agreement, demand military reforms, reduce officers' salary, while they were corrupted and got benefits from capitalists. Makino, *Makino Diary*, p. 478. Furthermore, the Army Minister Minami implicitly encouraged the military's political intervention in August 1931. *Tokyo Asashi Shimbun*, 1931, August 4.

Prime Minister Wakatuski nor Shidehara tried to improve communication problems with the army.¹¹⁰ Undoubtedly, this lack of communication induced both the international and domestic crises.

¹¹⁰ Wakatsuki appeased angry Shidehara, asking him to bear with Minami, since Wakatsuki was afraid if Minami would resign and break down the cabinet. Takamiya, *Jungyaku no Showashi*, p. 95. In his memoir, Shidehara mentioned that he warned Minami that young radical officers in Manchuria were planning something. They were dangerous and may cause a big trouble for Japan. Shidehara told Minami that he had to be very careful and to do his best to maintain discipline in the army. According to Shidehara, Minami agreed with him and promised that he would make more effort. But Shidehara hardly knew what exactly Minami did. Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, pp. 170-171.

Chapter 5

The Inukai Cabinet and the Manchurian Incident

In order to change a course for the Japanese future, two groups have to closely cooperate with each other. These two groups are the military and political parties. Without a coalition between them, it would be impossible to overcome the difficulties that Japan is facing now.¹

Mori Kaku

The army alone will not be able to solve the Manchuria problem. Under the Meiji Constitution, the army is restricted without consensus among the top government leaders. Only in the highest state of emergency in which Imperial Japan would face the gravest crises, the army act alone to settle the problem.²

Nagata Tetsuzan

Introduction

The Manchurian Incident was the first step towards Japan's expansionism. Externally, the Kanto army plotted the Incident and expanded military operations in Manchuria. Internally, using this external crisis, the military radicals planned a coup in order to establish a military government. Coup plotters never succeeded in establishing the military government. But the army increased its influence in domestic politics gradually.

Many historians and political scientists who study the Manchurian Incident hardly articulate the different nature of the Wakatsuki and the Inukai cabinets and their relationship with the military. Did the Inukai cabinet handle the Incident in the

¹ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, p. 30.

² Nagata Tetsuzan Kankokai ed., *Hiroku Nagata Tetsuzan* (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1972), p. 402.

same way as the Wakatsuki cabinet did? Did the internal balance of power change from the soft-liners to hard-liners? Was the nature of civil-military relations in the two cabinets the same? What was the role of the emperor and court?

This chapter analyzes the nature of coalition politics, civil-military relations and policy change for the settlement of the Manchurian Incident in the Inukai administration. As for coalition politics, while Inukai, Takahashi, and Yoshizawa were not hard-liners, hard-liners dominated the cabinet and worked closely with the army hard-liners. The hard-line coalition promoted military escalation in Manchuria and endorsed the Kanto army's involvement in the state-building of Manchukuo.

The first two sections in this chapter briefly describe the Inukai cabinet's constitutional authority and its relations with the military. It stresses that, because the Seiyukai Party had traditionally viewed that Manchuria was essential for survival of the empire, it supported the Kanto army's active military action. As for political coalition, the Inukai cabinet worked closely with the military and appealed to the public in order to implement a positive policy principle toward Manchuria. The third section lists three examples--advancement to Jinzhou, governmental decision to dominate four provinces, and the Kanto army's participation in the state building of Manchukuo--that shows that Japan shifted its policy principle toward expansionism.

The fourth part discusses Inukai's personal resistance against the hard-liners. Inukai resisted the military by sending a secret mission to Shanghai, delaying the cabinet's formal recognition of Manchukuo and attempting to dismiss the military radicals. The fifth section illustrates the Shanghai Incident and the role of Emperor

Hirohito. The army made a truce with China very quickly in Shanghai because Hirohito personally requested Commander Shirakawa to do so. The sixth section focuses on the May 15 Incident. Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated by a group of young radical officers on May 15, 1932. His death brought a decline of Japanese democracy and rise of the military power in domestic politics. The sixth part illustrates “blow back” effects in foreign policy making process in the new Saito cabinet.

The final section summarizes characteristics of politics and foreign policy outcomes in the Inukai cabinet. First, it points out that Japan’s foreign policy principle changed as internal balance of power within the state shifted from soft-liners to hard-liners. Second, as the hard-line coalition promoted expansionism, “blow back effects” occurred. Without pondering it too seriously, the Saito cabinet approved the state of Manchukuo, allowed the Kanto army to launch further military campaign in Rehe, and decided to withdraw it from the League of Nations. Third, in order to implement policy, the prime minister needs to have a solid political foundation within his own party. Prime Minister Inukai was a rather weak leader in the Seiyukai. Due to lack of his political leadership, he failed to settle the Incident as he intended. Instead, Mori closely networked with the army and implemented series of expansionist policies.

Fourth, the emperor did not have an absolute power in the foreign policymaking process. In the Shanghai Incident, the emperor played a decisive role to make a truce with China. Yet, in the Kanto army’s attack in Rehe, the emperor’s order was ignored. As for Japan’s decision to leave the League, despite

his strong wish to accept the Lytton Report, the emperor unwillingly agreed on the government decision to reject the Lytton Report.

Finally, as the international and domestic situation changed early in the 1930s, the political situation in the Imperial Palace changed. In addition to Makino, Suzuki, and Genro Saionji, Kido and Prince Konoye became influential. Prince Konoye who was rather nationalistic was the rising star in the court group. In addition, Prince Kan'in became the Chief of the Army General Staff while Prince Fushimi became the head of the Navy General Staff. To some extent, they were rather figureheads. But having imperial family members as the head of the General Staffs, both the army and navy tried to maintain prestige. Indeed, Emperor Hirohito worried that the hard-liners influenced the Imperial family, as his brother Prince Chichibu showed sympathy with radical officers. The emperor even consulted with Nara if it would be a good idea to transfer Prince Chichibu to a new location in the army in order not to socialize with them.

I. The Seiyukai and the Manchurian Problem

After the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned, Inukai Tsuyoshi, the President of Seiyukai Party, formed a cabinet in December 1931. Unlike the Minseito, the Seiyukai had long believed that Japan had to intervene in China's civil war in order to maintain order and protect Japan's rights and interests. Responding to the Chinese Nationalist Party's expedition to North China, the Tanaka cabinet decided to send troops to Shandong in 1927 and 1928.³ In June 1927, at the Far Eastern

³ Usui, *Nitchu Gaikoshi*, pp. 61-93.

Conference, participants of the conference resolved that whereas Japan expected China to undertake the task of restoring order in China proper, it would take offensive measures in the event that its rights and interests were at stake. It also expressed Japan's positive obligation for the maintenance of peace and economic development of Manchuria.⁴

The Seiyukai's political slogan, "Industrial Nation," implicitly advocated that natural resources, economic development, and political stability in Manchuria were all essential for Japan to develop heavy industries and maintain the empire.⁵ For this purpose, like the army, the major Seiyukai members considered that Japan should actively participate in economic and political development in Manchuria.⁶ The Mitsui zaibatsu, the major financial contributor for the Seiyukai, was also involved in developing resources and investing in Manchuria. Two months before the breakout of the Manchurian Incident, Mori traveled to Manchuria. He examined the political situation there from July 16 to August 15, 1931. During his observation, he discovered that anti-Japanese sentiment was severely widespread in China. Mori believed that diplomatic negotiations would be insufficient to solve the problems.⁷

In his words,

⁴ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 581-187.

⁵ Rikken Seiyukai shi Shuppankyoku, *Rikken Seiyukaishi: Tanaka Sosai Jidai*, p. 47.

⁶ Yamamoto Jotaro Denki Hensankai, *Yamamoto Jotaro Denki*, pp. 596-604.

⁷ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, p. 709.

Even if Japan unilaterally cooperates, makes concession, or makes compromise through diplomacy, there is no use. Now the situation goes beyond the point that diplomacy can solve...The situation is that China carries out wide anti-Japanese policies and Japan's position in Manchuria has deteriorated. If Japan passively observes this situation, sooner or later, Manchuria will become Balkan of the East. If Japan tries to settle this with strong determination, this land would become the origin of world peace and development of world culture. In order to settle the Sino-Manchuria problem, we have no alternative but to use the whole national power.⁸

In addition, when the Manchurian Incident broke out, the Seiyukai perceived this as an excellent opportunity to criticize the Wakatsuki government's non-enlargement principle. The Seiyukai demanded that the army completely protect Japanese people where anti-Japanese movements escalated. It also claimed that the Japanese government would never allow the League of Nations to intervene. When the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution that set November 16 as the deadline for Japanese troop withdrawal, the Seiyukai adopted its own resolution. It stated: "Resolution: Manchuria-Mongolia is the life-line of the Imperial Japan. Japan's behavior in the Manchurian Incident was self-defensive. Unless Japanese people's safety and interests were guaranteed, the troops should not be withdrawn. If the League of Nations fails to recognize this and fails to regret its intervention, Imperial Japan would not hesitate to withdraw from the League of Nations. Imperial Japan must unite the whole nation and promote the maintenance of peace in Manchuria and the whole of East Asia."⁹

⁸ Ibid., p. 700.

⁹ Rikken Seiyukai Shi Hensanbu, *Rikken Seiyukai Shi vol. 7: Inukai Sosai Jidai* (Tokyo: Rikkenseiyukai Hensanbu, 1933), pp. 679-682.

II. Hard-liners' Political Coalition in the Inukai Cabinet and the Army

In the middle of December, once Inukai took office, the new cabinet changed course in the Manchurian Incident. Strictly speaking, the Inukai cabinet was divided because Prime Minister Inukai and Finance Minister Takahashi disagreed on Japan's expansionism. However, they were a minority in the Seiyukai. In 1929, after the death of Tanaka, Seiyukai members chose Inukai as president in order to avoid severe confrontation between different factions within the party. It was well known that Inukai was far from a powerful figure. In contrast, Mori was the real powerful figure in the Seiyukai. He was an energetic young leader in the Suzuki faction, the largest faction in the Seiyukai. He maintained strong networks with the army, right-wing activists, and the Privy Council. Under Mori's leadership, the Inukai cabinet promoted a hard-line policy in Manchuria. Soon after the Inukai cabinet took office, it stated officially that:

...the events of last September have, in spite of Japan's wishes, created both a new responsibility and a wider sphere of action for Japan. Attacked by Chinese violence, Japan's acts of necessary self-protection resulted in considerable embarrassment in its having to assume the duty of maintaining public order and private rights throughout a wide area. The local authorities might have been expected to cooperate in upholding law and order. But, in fact, they almost unanimously fled away or resigned. It was Japan's clear duty to assure her steps of self-defense as least disturbing as possible to the peaceful inhabitants of the region.... Japanese military has, at considerable sacrifice, spent much time and energy in securing the safety of persons and property in the districts where the native authorities had become ineffective. This is a responsibility which was thrust upon them by events, and one which they had as little desire to assume as to evade.¹⁰

¹⁰ The Inukai cabinet's first official statement on December 27, 1931. Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 323-324.

The Inukai cabinet was able to promote the military action in Manchuria because of the following reasons. First of all, it formed a close coalition among politicians, bureaucrats and the military.¹¹ In particular, Army Minister Araki and Secretary General of the Inukai cabinet Mori played significant roles to build a hard-line coalition and implement Japan's expansion in Manchuria.¹² As for the army, in mid- December before appointing a new army minister, army leaders such as Araki, Minami and Kanaya agreed that the army minister in a new government

¹¹ Koiso. *Katsuzan Koso*, p. 540. The army officials often argued that it was both the Inukai cabinet and the army that pushed Japanese control over Manchuria. The Inukai cabinet approved special expenditure for military budget. Although Inukai and Takahashi personally opposed the army's proposal, the cabinet officially endorsed the Kanto army's involvement in Manchuria. Inukai has little power to control political agenda. Rather, Mori dominated the cabinet and escalated the Incident with the army. Hayashi, *Manshu Jihen to Hoten Soryoji*, p. 150. See also Nihon Kindaishiryō Kenkyūkai, *Suzuki Teiichi shi dan wa Sokkiroku*, vol. 1, p. 34.

¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also supported the expansion. When Ninomiya came back from Manchuria, he noticed that the Foreign Ministry became quite supportive of the army. When he asked Vice Minister Arita if the Ministry would agree to the army's invasion to Jinzhou, Arita agreed on the idea. Shidehara also acknowledged it. Mori, *Manshu Jihen no Uramenshi*, p. 144. In the Foreign Ministry, Shiratori Toshio was the hard-liner who actively cooperated with the army. Unlike Shidehara, Shiratori was quite optimistic about international consequences of Japanese control over Manchuria. For a nice summary of internal politics within the Foreign Ministry, see "Oyakusho Fukei." *Bungei Shunju*, November, 1931, pp. 154-158; Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Gaiko Kaiso Roku* (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1997), pp. 189-190. The summary in *Bungei Shunju* shows that Shidehara's influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined as the Manchurian Incident escalated. About Shiratori, See, Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol.6, p. 22. Shiratori thought that due to the military situation, Japan's action was defensive, even if it advanced troops in both north and south in Manchuria. "Manshu Jihen to Tsugino Sekai Taisen Zadankai." *Bungei Shunju*, November, 1931, pp. 178-200. Of course, Hayashi and Ishii fully recognized that the Kanto army's occupation of Manchuria would only burden Japan financially and increased international hostility against Japan. See, Hayashi, *Manshu Jihen to Hoten Soryoji*, p. 149.

should adhere to three demands: 1) the Kanto army should be reinforced in order to achieve prompt and complete control over North Manchuria; 2) the army should cultivate a Manchurian independence movement in the area under its administrative control; and 3) the Kanto army should, if feasible, move into Rehe province.¹³

Araki became the head of the Army Ministry because he was the most popular leader among young officers. He was very friendly to them and listened to their opinions. In addition, as a principal author of field manuals that emphasized field commanders' active initiative for arbitrary decision and execution, he encouraged officers to behave pro-actively based on their own judgment.¹⁴ Paying little attention to international treaties, Araki stressed that the army had to win battles under any circumstances.

Army Minister Araki requested His Imperial Highness Prince Kan'in Kotohito to be the Chief of the Army General Staff. Because of his privileged class, other ministers would highly respect him, and it was assumed then that the army would maintain its high prestige. Furthermore, the Chief of the General Staff would be independent from the cabinet regarding the Manchurian issue. Having Prince Kan'in as the Chief of the General Staff, Araki managed to avoid any

¹³ Mitarai Tatsuo, *Minami Jiro* (Tokyo: Minami Jiro Denki Kankokai, 1957), pp. 285-286.

¹⁴ Ogawa Heikichi Bunsho Kenkyukai ed., *Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Bunsho*, vol. 1, pp. 566-567. Nagata sent a personal letter to Ogawa, an influential politician in the Seiyukai, and asked that the Inukai cabinet would choose Araki to be the Army Minister.

intervention from the cabinet.¹⁵ Mazaki Jinzaburo succeeded Vice Chief of General Staff Ninomiya in January 1932. In practice, Vice Chief Mazaki, who was as popular as Araki, controlled the Army General Staff.¹⁶

Mori was another key figure who promoted Japan's expansion in Manchuria. He was the young leader in the Suzuki faction. During the term of the Tanaka cabinet, in organizing the Far Eastern Conference, he strongly supported the notion that Japan had to be the Lord of East Asia. Well-connected with the Issekikai members of the army, Hiranuma of the Privy Council, and various right-wing activists, Mori believed that Japan had to use force to solve the Manchuria-Mongolia problem.¹⁷ As early as the spring of 1931, he noticed the

¹⁵ Baba Tsunego, *Gikaiseijiron*. (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1933), p. 220.

¹⁶ In Shigemitsu's words,

it had been said that at the time of the Manchurian Incident, Foreign Minister Shidehara made an urgent telephone call to Kanaya, the Chief of the General Staff. This incident lent credibility to senior staff officers' assertion that the prestige of the Supreme command would be lost if the Foreign Minister could summon the Chief of the Army General Staff to the phone so easily. Thereupon the army appointed Prince Kan'in Chief of the General staff. The purpose of this maneuver was to employ a member of the Imperial family as a figurehead so that the staff officers could move the army about as they please and use the prestige of the Imperial family to intimidate the government and the public....In practice, all this meant that the staff officers had acquired still greater power to manipulate the Supreme Command.

Shigemitsu, *Showa no Doran*, pp. 81-82. In fact, Endo commented that after Araki became the Army Minister, the army authorities in Tokyo totally changed its course. Before, the army still criticized the Kanto army that pushed the establishment of Manchukuo. But under Araki's leadership, the army encouraged the Kanto army to do so. Miyatake, *Endo Diary*, p. 61.

¹⁷ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 694-710.

coming danger in Manchuria and had closely kept in touch with Ishiwara and Itagai. Once he joined the cabinet, he organized intra-ministry meetings and subtly pushed Japan's expansion in Manchuria.¹⁸

Mori organized regular meetings among five ministries. In order to examine the management of Manchuria from the various viewpoints of politics, diplomacy, and economy, he held such meetings among vice ministers and section chiefs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Army, Navy, and Overseas Affairs. Mori set agendas, and skillfully guided the trend of discussion. If necessary, he intervened in the discussions and let civilian bureaucrats speak. Through the meetings, the five ministries reached an agreement on how to deal with the Manchurian problem without severe confrontation.¹⁹

Second, the media and entertainment industries glorified the Manchurian Incident. They widely appealed to the public with stories of soldiers' brave fighting and victories in the battlefields. Major newspaper companies such as the Asahi and the Mainichi used their airplanes to accelerate delivery of the news. They sent special correspondents to cover important stories. Receiving news from Manchuria, they used extras to break stories from the front. Japan Broadcasting Association known as Nihon Hoso Kyokai, NHK, developed live broadcast

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 781-787. Soon after Inukai took the office, Hashimoto Toranosuke of the army asked Mori if the cabinet would endorse the army's military expansion. Mori quickly replied that if necessary, he would endorse it. In this way, Mori supported the army's expansion in both the north and south of Manchuria. Hashimoto's comment in Mori, *Manshu Jihen no Uramenshi*, p. 331.

¹⁹ In the Foreign Ministry, Shiratori came to accept Mori's idea and became a leading hard-liner. Shigemitsu, *Gaiko Kaiso Roku*, pp. 189-190.

programs for news and military ceremonies. In addition to emergency news from the front, the NHK began to report various military ceremonies such as welcome parades, funerals, prayer ceremonies at the Yasukuni Shrine and military reviews. Through power of broadcast communications, war fever spread throughout Japan.²⁰

In addition to media, entertainment industries increasingly focused on the Manchurian Incident. In particular, the story about the three soldiers who exploded themselves in the line of duty was quite appealing and sensational for the entertainment industries. Five major movie companies, Nikkatsu, Toei, Tokatsu, Tokiwa, and Kamata, all produced films about the story of "the human bullets". Record companies released war songs such as "Arise Countrymen," "Ah, Our Manchuria," "Attack Plan," and "The Song of the Three Human Bombs."²¹ According to Young,

Books, magazines, movies, records, and other forms of popular entertainment took the sense of national crisis primed by the press and radio, and infused it with the boisterousness of a carnival, as Manchuria became the theme for vaudeville acts, Kabuki tragedies, and even restaurant menus. This culture deluge constituted a second dimension of the imperial jingoism of the Manchurian Incident. Mass-culture industries flooded their marketplace with Manchurian-theme products...Manchurian-theme products glorified military action, heroized the colonial army, and extolled the founding of Manchukuo. Telling and retelling the epochal moments of the Sino-Japanese conflict in every conceivable cultural form, the mass media helped shape public memory of the Manchurian Incident.²²

Third, the Inukai cabinet was able to mobilize the public through general

²⁰ Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 67-68.

²¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 1, 1932.

²² Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, p. 69.

elections in February, 1932. During the election campaign, Mori appealed to the public by declaring that the Seiyukai's strong policy was the right direction for Japan's future.²³ In a radio speech, Mori declared:

The Minseito's Shidehara diplomacy only obeyed to the Great Powers in the name of world cooperation and international justice....Since the breakout of the Manchurian Incident, ..fearing the United States, the Minseito government restricted the military to attack Jinzhou and consequently the Imperial Japan's policy toward Manchuria was stalemated. However, our Inukai cabinet promoted the military to attack Jinzhou, and made Zhang Xueliang's army withdraw from there. For the first time since the breakout of the Incident, we found the fundamental solution of the Manchurian problem...The Shidehara diplomacy failed to protect Japan's vital interests in Manchuria which the international treaty guaranteed....Japan's mission is now to pacify the whole China. Those who can solve this Manchuria-China problem are the Seiyukai members who are determined to carry out the strong diplomacy.²⁴

This general election resulted in the Seiyukai's unprecedented victory.

On February 22, the Seiyukai, which previously held only 171 seats, gained 301 seats in the Diet.²⁵ The Minseito obtained only 145 Diet seats. Once the Seiyukai

²³ Of course, it is debatable to what extent the Manchurian Incident was decisive for the Seiyukai's election victory. Voters might support the Seiyukai because the Minseito's financial policy caused severe economic depression. Jonan Inshi, "Sosenkyo Zengo," *Bungei Shunju*, April, 1932, pp. 118-125; "Sosenkyo Zadankai," *Bungek Shunju*, 1932, March, pp. 162-182.

²⁴ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, p. 756.

²⁵ In addition to the results of the general election, magazines and newspaper editorials supported Japan's invasion to Manchuria. Just before the declaration of independence of Manchukuo, Yomiuri newspaper said that the independence of the state would support Japanese industrial growth and reduce the Japanese unemployment rate. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 19, 1932. Major film companies produced war movies and glorified the Japanese invasion. *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* also wrote that business community would rush to participate in joint ventures in Manchuria. *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, March 1, 1932. According to *Tokyo Asahi*, Japanese Women Overseas Association was now in charge of emigrating single

dominated the Diet, it passed a resolution which stated that the Diet appreciated the achievement by both the army and the navy in bravely fighting against the Chinese and protecting Japanese lives.²⁶

III. Policy Change: Japan's Expansionism in Manchuria

Now the Inukai cabinet supported the Kanto army's dominance in Manchuria. Three events were particularly important: 1) the Kanto army's occupation of Jinzhou, 2) the cabinet decision to control the four provinces, and 3) the Kanto army's state-building of Manchukuo.

First of all, freed from the non-enlargement principle, the army justified its Jinzhou offensive as an inevitable part of its bandit suppression campaign. On December 15, the General Staff telegraphed Fengtian and instructed the Kanto army to combine the assault on Jinzhou with an attack on bandits. The General Staff was also supportive to the Kanto army's request for reinforcements. The telegram promised the dispatch of one mixed brigade from Korea and offered to consider sending another mixed brigade from Japan.²⁷

With assistance from Tokyo and Korea, the Kanto army announced that its military action had been launched solely in self-defense and for the purpose of suppressing bandits. The Second Division of the Kanto army began its advance

Japanese women to Manchuria for arranged marriage. *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, March, 4, 1932. See also, Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 55-114.

²⁶ Seiyukaishi Hensanbu, *Rikkenseiyukaishi*, vol. 7, p. 808.

²⁷ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 302; Takahashi ed., *Hayashi Senjuro Manshu Jiken Nisshi*, pp. 106-108.

toward Jinzhou while a steady flow of reinforcements began arriving in Fengtian.²⁸ By January 2, 1932, the Chinese had completely evacuated and on January 3, the 20th Division of the Korea army that was sent to assist the Kanto army proceeded peacefully to occupy Jinzhou.²⁹ Both the army headquarters and the government in Tokyo changed the course of the non-enlargement principle and supported the Kanto army's expansionism in Manchuria.³⁰

Second, Araki further advocated an enlargement plan that aimed to defeat Zhang Xueliang and control four Eastern Provinces. On January 30, at the meeting of the Privy Council, Ishii Kikujiro, a retired distinguished diplomat, criticized that the army violated the Nine Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations. He pointed out that the army intended to expand the Incident.³¹ Responding to Ishii's claims, Araki answered that it looked like expansionism in terms of area, but a decisive attack would be necessary to settle the Incident quickly.³² In the end, the cabinet decided to offer financial assistance to the army.³³

Third, and most importantly, the Inukai cabinet allowed the Kanto army to

²⁸ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 325.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

³¹ *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 67, [1931-1932], pp. 229-230.

³² *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 67, [1931-32], pp. 229-231. Araki described the escalation of the Manchurian Incident as expansion of peace. *Chuo Koron*, February, 1932, p. 190.

³³ Aratake Shuji, *Araki Sadao Fuun Sanjunen*, pp. 86-87.

be involved into building the state of Manchukuo. While Prime Minister Inukai personally opposed it, the Kanto army and central army authority started coordinating this project in January 1932. As far as the state building is concerned, once the Incident broke out, the Kanto army staged the political reshaping of Manchuria at provincial level. The Liaoning Sheng Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order was formed on September 25, 1931, the Provincial Government of Jilin on September 26, the Emergency Committee of the Special District of the Chinese Eastern Railway on September 27, and the Provincial Government of Heilongjiang on January 1, 1932. The Kanto army imposed prominent local figures to form these committees.

The Kanto army issued "Fundamental Policy for a Settlement for the Manchurian Question." on October 24, 1931. It stated that "our aim is to establish an independent new state in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, separated from China proper, which will outwardly be under unified Chinese administration but actually under our control. We will undertake the transfer of power as quickly as possible and meanwhile extend our influence in all directions and found a solid and unshakable base."³⁴ Fengtian would be the capital of the state. Political institutions would take the form of a republic. The Kanto army was also planning to make Puyi the head of the state as a symbol of Manchukuo.

Matsuki of the South Manchurian Railways worked on further specific details of the proposed republican government. On November 7, a document entitled

³⁴ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 232.

"Basic Principles Concerning the Proposed Establishment of the Free State of Manchuria and Mongolia" was drafted. The prominent principles were:

1. Warlordism will be eliminated and a civilian-controlled administration will be instituted.
2. Government will be left to the people to the greatest degree possible, reducing bureaucratic control.
3. An open-door policy of equal opportunities will be pursued with vigor; and domestic and foreign capital and technology will be invited to exploit natural resources and promote industry.
4. A land of happiness and freedom will be created in which taxes will be reduced, public order will be maintained, and the people will have enough to eat and will enjoy peace.

With respect to the political institutions of the new state, the memorandum described them as democratic and constitutional, then immediately qualified these terms by asserting that since the people's political consciousness was not very advanced, there would be no representative government: "Constitutionalism," it stated, merely referred to the principle of the separation of powers. Administratively, the new state would consist of six regions. Administrative organs at the city level would first be instituted, and once they were functioning effectively, autonomous provincial governments would be established. These would be federated to form a central government whose power ultimately would include military, constitutional, jurisdiction and taxation matters. Once these institutions were sufficiently developed, Japan would recognize the independence of the new state.³⁵

³⁵ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 248-257. The fact that a research staff of the South Manchurian Railways drafted the independence declaration of the state of Manchukuo shows that both the Kanto army hard-liners and Japanese civilians in Manchuria worked together to build the state of Manchukuo. See Yamaguchi Shigeji, *Higeki no Shogun Ishiwara Kanji*. It is debatable to what extent the Kanto army believed that a new state would be Japan's puppet state. On

Both the army and the Kanto army engineered to build a new state.

After the Kanto army occupied Jinzhou on January 3, Araki invited Itagaki to Tokyo in order to coordinate Tokyo's policy with the Kanto army's plan.³⁶ On January 6, section chiefs of the ministries of Army, Navy, and Foreign Affairs all together drafted "Outline of Principles of the Solution of the China Problem". It stressed that a new state should be organized in Manchuria, that its police force be under Japanese direction, and it should be relied upon for the maintenance of public order and the protection of railways other than the South Manchurian Railway; that the new state should not be allowed to have an army; that Manchuria and Mongolia should be made the first line of defense against the Soviet Union; and that negotiations with the new state should be undertaken to revive and expand Japanese treaty rights in the region.³⁷ It implied that the Nationalist Party government should give up Manchuria; that Japan should demand strict suppression of anti-Japanese agitation; and that Japan should endeavor to overthrow communism, anti-Japanese warlordism, and anti-Japanese factions in China proper.

the one hand, Ishiwara argued that because Chinese were not able to develop political stability in Manchuria, the Kanto army had to guide and administer Chinese in Manchuria. Yet, at the same time, Ishiwara seemed to believe that racial harmony in Manchuria and Asian-federalism was possible. It is said that after the war, Ishiwara apologized to Chinese journalists for Japanese monopoly in Manchuria. He felt sorry for Chinese who cooperated for independence of Manchukuo. Miyamoto, *Endo Diary*, pp. 53-54.

³⁶ Until Itagaki's arrival in Tokyo, the army authorities in Tokyo hardly knew such a plan in detail. Yet, Araki encouraged Itagaki to build the state. Itagaki's comment in Mori, *Manshujihen no Uramenshi*, pp. 298-299.

³⁷ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 342-345.

After Itagaki's return from Tokyo, a Kanto army memorandum of January 27 spelled out how to organize the new state. It stipulated that the Supreme Administrative Council should be organized, and made up of the chairmen of each province, to prepare for the founding of the new state. The Council then was to decide on the name of the new state, its flag, system of government and personnel.³⁸ The Kanto army gathered four provincial governors—Xi Qia, Chang Shiyi, Zhang Jianghui and of the Special District, Ma Zhanshan.³⁹ With Itagaki's participation, the Northeastern Administrative Council was organized under the chairmanship of Zhang Jianghui in order to prepare for the declaration of independence and for administration of the new state.⁴⁰ On February 25, the council declared its intention of creating a new state, to embrace the four northeastern provinces and four Inner Mongolian regions.⁴¹ A republican government was proclaimed with Puyi as "regent." The state of Manchukuo was finally born on March 1, 1932.⁴²

IV. Prime Minister Inukai's Resistance

In the Inukai cabinet, the Kanto army's expansionism became an official government principle. However, not all the cabinet members and the Imperial Court members agreed on the army's expansionism. Indeed, Finance Minister

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 356-357.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 361-362.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 385-386.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 392-394.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 396-399.

Takahashi strongly disagreed on the escalation of the Incident.⁴³ More importantly, Emperor Hirohito seriously worried that confrontation between Japan and the League of Nations would be inevitable as long as Japan continued to control Manchuria. Hirohito occasionally mentioned to the prime minister and cabinet members that Japan had to be cautious in order to avoid any criticism from the League and the United States.⁴⁴

As far as Inukai is concerned, in his speech in the Diet, Prime Minister Inukai emphasized that "this Incident in Manchuria was a grave problem...Japan has no territorial ambition toward neighboring countries. What Japan sought was to respect the existing treaty and to protect the existing interests."⁴⁵ As a supporter of Su Wen in his days of exile, Inukai had developed personal connections with the Nationalist Party members.⁴⁶ He acknowledged that resources in Manchuria would be necessary for building strong industries. But he believed that Japan would access raw materials there in the framework of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. In his opinion, Japanese involvement in state building in Manchuria would be bound

⁴³ Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p. 23.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

⁴⁵ Inukai and the army considered the way to settle the Incident quite differently. Inukai agreed with neither the establishment of Manchukuo nor the Shanghai expedition. See Rikkenseiyukaishi Hensanbu, *Rikkenseiyukaishi: Inukai Sousai Jidai*, p. 728; Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p. 21.

⁴⁶ About Inukai's involvement in China, see Tokito Hideto, *Meijiki no Inukai Tsuyoshi*, (Tokyo: Keiyo Shobo, 1996), pp. 243-254.

to fail because Japan would not be able to control Chinese nationalism.⁴⁷ Finance Minister Takahashi also objected to Japan's military expansion because of Japan's poor financial situation. He remembered that series of expeditions—the Siberian Expedition and Shandong Expeditions—all ended in disaster. He clearly opposed any unnecessary expeditions.⁴⁸

However, they were too weak.⁴⁹ To be sure, Inukai was the president of the Seiyukai. But he became president as a result of political compromise between competing factions. Indeed, it was Mori of the Suzuki faction who controlled policymaking among ministries. He skillfully limited Inukai's influence in the cabinet. Therefore, Inukai's efforts to check the military were in vain. First of all, soon after he formed the cabinet, Inukai sent Kayano Nagatomo, a continental adventure, on a secret mission to China for an informal negotiation.⁵⁰ Inukai kept the Kayano mission secret from any cabinet members because he was afraid to face any objections within the cabinet. Yet, Kayano was unable to negotiate

⁴⁷ Yoshizawa Kenkichi. *Gaiko Rokujunen* (Tokyo: Jiyu Ajia sha, 1956), pp. 140-142.

⁴⁸ Takahashi's attitude toward the army, see Uchida. *Fusetsu Gojunen*, pp. 158-159.

⁴⁹ This is one of the most serious problems in Japanese political party in the Pre-World War II period. The head of the party was not necessarily the most powerful politician who was able to unite and lead the party. As Wakatsuki and Inukai exemplifies, the heads of Japanese parties were unable to carry out policies because their fellow politicians disagreed with them.

⁵⁰ Inukai sent Kayano to Shanghai just a day after he formed the cabinet. Inukai tried to settle the Incident by using an informal diplomatic channel. See, Furushima Kazuo. *Ichiroseijika no kaiso* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1951), pp. 264-266; Tokito Hideto. *Inukai Tsuyoshi, Riberarizumu to Nashonarizumu no Sokoku* (Tokyo: Rososha, 1991), pp. 230-240.

substantially because Mori, who found Inukai's secret mission, interrupted Kayano's communication with Inukai. Mori held Kayano's telegrams to Inukai. Shigemitsu of the Foreign Ministry in Shanghai also claimed that the Inukai cabinet should establish a formal negotiation channel with China. Facing strong objections within the government, Inukai ordered Kanaya to return to Japan.⁵¹

Second, Inukai tried not to formally recognize the state of Manchukuo, although it would implicitly recognize it in practice. On February 15, at the meeting of Privy Council, Inukai declared that the government would not initiate any action to build an independent state in Manchuria.⁵² On March 12, the cabinet adopted "Outline of Manchuria-Mongolia Problem Settlement Policy." In this outline, the fundamental objective with regard to Manchuria was changed from making it function "under the power" to "under the assistance" of the Imperial nation. The new regime in Manchuria was to be directed toward possessing not "the form" but "the substance" of a state.⁵³

Third, Inukai asked Field Marshall Uyebara to structure the army discipline strictly in his sincere letter. In it, Inukai wrote that:

What is most worrisome is the fact that the will of the senior officers is not thoroughly observed by their subordinates. For example, the action in Manchuria seems to have been brought about the united power of the

⁵¹ Tokito, *Inukai Tsuyoshi*, p. 239.

⁵² Kido rightly considered that Inukai's assertion that the government would not formally recognize the state of Manchukuo would create a severe confrontation with the army. Kido, *Kido Diary*, vol. 1, p. 139. See also, *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 67 [1931-1932], pp. 245-246.

⁵³ Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, p. 172.

field-grade officers, who made their superiors acquiesce automatically. It is feared that it might become customary to act single-mindedly upon the belief that should those who hold direct command over regiments units and cause a disturbance, the superiors would finally give ex post facto approval to all matters, and that might create a major change in military control and discipline. Young officers had lamented the corrupted political situation... Although any improvement of political situation is difficult, now the Seiyukai gained the majority in the Diet, and I am sure that the political situation will be improved to some extent. ⁵⁴

Inukai also told Foreign Minister Yoshizawa that he would like to ask the emperor to dismiss about thirty young officers with the approval of the Chief of General Staff Prince Kan'in. It would be the effective way to control the discipline of the military. Yet, Yoshizawa replied that it would be impossible if Araki disagreed. Inukai appeared hopeless. ⁵⁵

V. The Shanghai Incident and Emperor Hirohito

Inukai was unable to control the army. In fact, strictly speaking, while paying sufficient attention to Japan's international reputation at the League of Nations, Emperor Hirohito himself was not strict to control the army and limit the military advancement in Manchuria. After Itagaki explained to the emperor about the situation in Manchuria, the emperor offered an Imperial Rescript that the Kanto army's quick action was defensive and that he expected that the army would contribute to the establishment of peace in the East. ⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Kidoh Sensei Denki Kankokai, *Inukai Kido Den*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1968), p. 944.

⁵⁵ Yoshizawa, *Gaiko Rokujunen*, pp. 144-145.

⁵⁶ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, p. 337; Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p. 8.

The Shanghai Incident was the only exception that the army demonstrated its strict discipline in response to the emperor's request.⁵⁷ In March 1932, the army made a truce with China in a timely manner in Shanghai because the emperor directly asked Commander Shirakawa to do so. Before the Manchurian Incident, Shanghai had been a center of anti-Japanese agitation. In July 1931, following the Wabaoshan Incident, an anti-Japanese committee was organized to conduct a boycott of Japanese goods. It is reported that beyond the economic boycott, many anti-Japanese volunteer corps were preparing for attacking Japanese.

Under this condition, a Chinese mob group attacked five Japanese priests of the Nichiren sect early in January 1932. The attack had been, in fact, instigated by Major Tanaka Ryukichi, for such an incident would divert foreign attention from Manchuria, where a new state was being established. In retaliation, several young Japanese, led by Major Tanaka, set fire to a storeroom of a factory. The Japanese clashed with the Chinese police of the International Settlement. The Japanese residents demanded reinforcements immediately. They hoped to completely destroy the anti-Japanese movement.

Fighting began at around midnight on January 28, when Japanese marines were suddenly attacked as they reached the western side of North Szechwan Road. Over the next day, planes began bombing. Navy Minister Osumi Mineo had asked for army support on January 31. At the cabinet meeting on February 2, although the finance minister strongly opposed the dispatch, the prime minister

⁵⁷ Terasaki and Terasaki Miller eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 28-30.

decided to send reinforcements to Shanghai. ⁵⁸

Emperor Hirohito had long worried that Japan violated the Nine Power Treaty.⁵⁹ When the Inukai cabinet decided to send further troops to Shanghai on February 4, the emperor consulted with Makino on whether or not the emperor should organize Imperial Liaison Conference and discuss this with the cabinet members.⁶⁰ When Makino declined it, the emperor tried to convey his wish to military commanders in person. When the emperor met Chief Commander of the Kanto army on February 19, 1932, the Hirohito told him to settle the Manchurian Incident from viewpoints of international environment, rather than from viewpoint of the South Manchurian Railway Company's narrow self-interest.⁶¹ On February 25, the emperor directly requested Commander Shiratori to make a truce by March 3 when the General Assembly of the League of Nations was scheduled to convene. Hirohito told General Shirakawa that the army betrayed him several times. But he added that the general would keep this promise.⁶² Now a new headquarter was

⁵⁸ Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p. 21.

⁵⁹ Emperor Hirohito well realized that due to Japan's continuing military clashes, Japan deteriorated its relationships with the League of Nations and the United States. Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and Nara also conveyed Mori and Shiratori that the emperor expected that Japan should keep the Nine Power Treaty. Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol.6, p. 32.

⁶⁰ Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p. 23.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶² Terasaki and Terasaki Miller eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, p. 30. The emperor seriously worried about the Shanghai Incident because Shanghai was an international city where the Great Powers had their own interests. Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 6, p. 33.

organized in Shanghai. General Shirakawa directed the expeditionary force to act quickly and give a decisive blow to the enemy. Because the Chinese army managed to escape their pursuers, the Japanese forces were determined to pursue the Chinese army further. Yet, on March 3, Shirakawa ordered the Japanese forces to give up further pursuit. Then he declared his intention to make a truce with China. This unusual decision was possible because of the emperor's direct request.⁶³

VI. Political Terrorism, Hard-line Coalition, and the “Blow Back” Effect

The Inukai cabinet clearly changed Japan's policy direction. Externally, Japan dismissed the non-enlargement principle. Backing up the state building of Manchukuo, Japan intended to control Manchuria. Internally, hard-liners in the Seiyukai and the army became quite powerful. Indeed, once right-wingers found that Inukai sent a letter to Marshall General Ueyhara to restore the discipline within the army, a right-wing group attacked Inukai. Inukai was a victim of political terrorism.

Prior to Inukai's death, two politically-motivated assassinations, called the Ketsumeidan Incident, shocked the society. In February, former Finance Minister Inoue was assassinated in the middle of his election campaign. The following month, Baron Dan Takuma, the managing director of the Mitsui zaibatsu, was murdered in front of the main gate at the Mitsui Bank. An ultra-nationalist group, which was later named the Ketsumeidan, the Blood Brotherhood Society, led by the

⁶³ Sakurai Tadaatsu, *Taisho Shirakawa* (Tokyo: Shogokukai, 1933), pp. 634-636; Shigemitsu, *Gaiko Kaisoroku*, pp. 141-151.

Buddhist priest Inoue Nissho, organized these assassinations.⁶⁴ More than a dozen other prominent figures in business and politics had been marked down for assassination.⁶⁵

On May 15, Inukai was killed at home by the Ketsumeidan members. They consisted of navy company-grade officers, students from the military academy and members of Tachibana Kosaburo's patriotic association named Patriotic Land Academy. They broke into Prime Minister's residence and shot him. In addition, the group threw a bomb at Makino's home. Assaults were also made on other targets such as the Seiyukai headquarters, two major banks and the Metropolitan Police Station.

Surprisingly, the navy and army authorities both showed some sympathy to the assassins. While stating that "the crime was indeed committed in violation of national law and therefore must be punished without mercy," Army Minister Araki emphasized that "they acted neither for the sake of fame nor gain. They had no intention of treason. They acted upon the genuine belief that this was for the interest of the Imperial Nation. Therefore, the present case should not be dealt with

⁶⁴ Unlike the coup plotters in March and October 1931, the Ketsumeidan group only focused on the destruction of the establishment. They never considered taking on duty of constructing a new government. Inoue Nissho, *Hitori Issaatsku* (Tokyo: Nihon Shuhosha, 1953), pp. 275-280.

⁶⁵ A list of statesmen and business leaders who were to be assassinated was: Takuma Dan, managing director of the Mitsui holding company; Ikeda Seihin, managing director of the Mitsui Bank; Inoue Junnosuke, former Finance Minister; Makino Nobuaki, Lord Keeper of the Imperial Seals; Genro Saionji Kinmochi; Shidehara Kijuro, former Foreign Minister; Suzuki Kisaburo, Minister of Home Affairs; Tokonami Takeji, Railway Minister; Tokugawa Iyesato, President of the House of Peers; Wakatsuki Reijiro, former Prime Minister. Ibid.

simply in a narrow-minded and business-like way."⁶⁶

1) The Consolidation of Hard-liners in Politics and the End of Party Cabinet

The May 15 Incident had significant impacts on both domestic and international politics. First of all, at the domestic level, the incident brought a party cabinet to an end. After the Incident, the immediate problem was forming a new cabinet. In a normal situation, it was the succeeding president of the Seiyukai. However, Genro Saionji, Makino, Kido and even veteran party politicians like Wakatuski all considered that the next prime minister had to be a person who could properly control the military and settle the Manchurian Incident.

Genro Saionji, who was in charge of recommending the succeeding Prime Minister, consulted with the Chief of the Privy Council, the Army Minister, former Prime Ministers Yamamoto Gonbei, Kiyoura Keigo, and Wakatsuki. At the same time, he met Field Marshall Uyehara and Fleet Admiral Togo to examine the situations of the army and the navy.⁶⁷ The army implicitly opposed any party politicians becoming prime minister, although it respected both the Meiji Constitution and political parties. What the army hoped was to build "the whole national unity" cabinet. The army thought it better to suspend party politics temporarily.

On May 17, Vice Chief of General Staff Masaki, Commander of Military

⁶⁶ *Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun*, May 20, 1932. Araki's comment illustrated how Japanese army leaders seriously lacked any legal mind.

⁶⁷ According to Suzuki, Uyehara told Saionji that radical officers would calm down if corrupted politicians were cleaned up. Nagata Tetsuzan Kankokai, *Hiroku Nagata Tetsuzan*, p. 65.

Police Hata, Vice Minister Koiso, and Obata all visited Army Minister Araki. They requested Araki to inform Genro Saionji that "the Seiyukai party cabinet would not get through this grave crisis. The army absolutely opposed the formation of a party cabinet."⁶⁸ Responding to the request, at the meeting with new president of the Seiyukai, Araki said that he had a hard time controlling these young officers. He suggested that it would be better to clean up the negative atmosphere of domestic political situation.⁶⁹

In addition to Araki, Nagata and Suzuki of the Issekikai met Kido, Harada and Konoye. Through young members at the Imperial Palace, they put pressure on Genro Saionji and implicitly opposed any party cabinet. As far as young members at the Palace were concerned, Konoye was the rising star among young conservative members of the House of Peers. He was vice president there in 1931, and became president in 1933. His vision of Japan and the world was much more nationalistic than that of Saionji and Makino. Konoye viewed that Japan had a mission to save Asia from European rule. After the Versailles Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, he harshly criticized the Anglo-American great powers, saying that the Washington Treaty order only allowed the United States and Great Britain to shut out Japan's opportunity to expand in Asia.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Kido, *Kido Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 163-164; Suzuki Kisaburo Sensei Denki Hensankai, *Suzuki Kisaburo*, p. 296.

⁶⁹ *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, May 21, 1932.

⁷⁰ About Konoye, see Oka Yoshitake, *Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography*. Trans. Shumpei Okamoto and Patricia Murray. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983).

Kido was a grandson of Kido Toshiaki, one of the founding fathers of the Meiji Japan. He started working as Makino's chief secretary in late 1930 at the Palace. He was not as nationalistic as Konoye. Kido always thought that the emperor should avoid speaking out something that the military would be dissatisfied with. Rather, Kido advised the court and the emperor to consider the military's situation in order to protect the palace from the radical officers.⁷¹ During the Manchurian Incident, the military officers such as Nagata and Suzuki visited Kido, Harada and Konoye. Although they were not politically powerful, given their positions, they exchanged opinions with the emperor and thus they have a certain impact on domestic politics. At the meeting with Kido, Nagata warned that any party cabinet would fail to appease hard-liners in the army. He made it clear that if a single political party cabinet was to be formed, nobody would like to take the post of the Army Minister.⁷² Harada conveyed their views to Genro Saionji.

The Seiyukai members were infuriated by the fact that the army not only killed Prime Minister Inukai but also opposed the formation of a party cabinet. On May 18, the Seiyukai juridical group adopted a resolution which criticized the army's political intervention and demanded strict discipline of the army. The group also claimed that the coming atmosphere of fascist ideology was dangerous because it would eventually deny the Meiji constitution and party politics.⁷³

⁷¹ About Kido's political role, see Kido, *Kido Diary* vol. 1 and vol. 2.

⁷² Kido, *Kido Diary*, vol. 1, pp. 165-166.

⁷³ *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, May 21, 1932. On May 20, at the meeting, the Seiyukai members harshly criticized the military's political intervention and declared to

Paradoxically, the stronger the Seiyukai raised its voice against the military, the less chance the Seiyukai had to form a cabinet. Saionji feared that the Seiyukai's claim would deteriorate the domestic political situation. Therefore, he reached a conclusion that the next prime minister must be a person who can avoid any direct confrontation with the army.⁷⁴ Wakatsuki also advised Genro Saionji that the type of the cabinet would not matter much as long as the government can control the military under the Meiji constitution.⁷⁵ The emperor's own request was that the succeeding prime minister have a great personality, improve obstacles of current politics, and control the discipline of the army and navy. At the same time the coming prime minister must absolutely not be sympathetic with fascism ideology and must maintain the Meiji constitution.⁷⁶

Finally, Saionji chose Admiral Saito, who was a former governor of Korea. Saito was known as an internationalist who participated in the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927.⁷⁷ On May 22, a week after the assassination of Inukai, Admiral Saito organized a coalition cabinet. Leading politicians from both the

defend the constitutional government. It is ironic that Suzuki who originally was skeptical about the growth of democracy and party politics asserted that the Meiji Constitution guaranteed the Parliamentaryism and the decline of party politics was dangerous for the society. "Suzuki Seiyukai Sosai ni Mono wo kiku Zadan kai." *Bungei Shunju*, January, 1931, pp. 194-195.

⁷⁴ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 288.

⁷⁵ Wakatsuki's comment, *Tokyo Asahi Shinbun*, May 17, 1932.

⁷⁶ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 288.

⁷⁷ Kido, *Kido Diary*, vol. 1, p. 168.

Seiyukai and Minseito joined the cabinet. Araki remained in his post because no military leaders would control young officers. He was expected to restore the discipline in the army.

2) The “Blow Back” Effect in Japanese Diplomacy

In the Saito cabinet, three events occurred as results of “blowback” effects.⁷⁸ One was the Saito cabinet’s immediate recognition of Manchukuo.⁷⁹ On June 14, less than one month after the cabinet was formed, the Lower House unanimously approved a proposal that the government should quickly recognize the state of Manchukuo.⁸⁰ After serious discussion among ministers of Foreign Affairs, Army, and Overseas, the cabinet decided to appoint General Muto Nobumasa as Special Ambassador to Manchukuo. The ambassador concurrently held the offices of Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto army and Governor of Kanto. As an ambassador, Muto was under the direction of the minister of Foreign Affairs. At

⁷⁸ As Snyder argues, “blowback” from political propaganda means that a politically strong group could become the agent of extreme overexpansion by mobilizing elites inadvertently socialized successor elite generations to believe the imperial myths, failing to explain their instrumental origins. It could happen as a result of subconscious psychological processes, which convince people that what is good for them is good for their country. Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, p. 41. Of course, strictly speaking, it is oversimplification that all the politicians started advocating expansionism. To the contrary, there were politicians and journalists who warned and criticized Japan’s expansionism. Yet, in total, such a voice was not strong enough to influence policy outcomes. Sassa Hiroo, “Kyodatsu Seiji no Kikensei.” *Bungei Shunju*, March, 1933, pp. 206-212.

⁷⁹ A nice summary of the establishment of Manchukuo, Usui Katsumi, *Manshukoku to Kokusai Renmei* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobun Kan, 1995), pp. 114-127.

⁸⁰ Rikken Seiyukai Hensanbu, *Rikken Seiyukaishi Suzuki Sosai Jidai* (Tokyo: Rikken Seiyukai, 1934), p. 39.

the same time, as Commander-in-Chief of the Kanto army, he was directly responsible to the Supreme Command. On September 13, at the Privy Council, Okada Ryohei and Ishii claimed that Japanese recognition of Manchukuo would only deteriorate Japan's relationship with China and the Great Powers. Ishii worried that the Japan-Manchuria Protocol would be the first step for the decline of Japanese Empire.⁸¹ Yet, in the end of the meeting, the Privy Council members approved the government's decision about Japan's recognition of Manchukuo.⁸² Two days later, the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol was officially signed.

The second one is that the Kanto army attacked Zhang Xueliang's army in Rehe. In order to eliminate Zhang Xueliang's influence in Manchuria, the Kanto army had planned to conduct military campaigns in Rehe late in 1932. Early in January 1933, Chief of the General Staff Prince Kan'in consulted with the emperor for military readiness. Emperor Hirohito frankly told Prince Kan'in to be very careful in this military campaign.

The emperor added that the Kanto army should not go beyond the Great Wall during the campaigns. When the emperor found that the Saito cabinet disagreed on the military campaign, he asked Chief Military Aide-de-Camp Nara to tell Prince Kan'in to stop all military campaigns.⁸³ He worried that the military campaigns would only worsen Japan's relations with the League and the United

⁸¹ *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 71, [1932-1933] (Tokyo: National Archives of Japan, University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 125-126

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

⁸³ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 507.

States. Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Mazaki replied to the emperor, saying he would go to Manchuria and discuss this issue with the Kanto Army Commander Muto.⁸⁴ The emperor also attempted to cease the military's advancement by organizing the Imperial Liaison Conference.⁸⁵

Despite the emperor's strong request, the Kanto army started attacking Zhang Xueliang's army in Rehe. Ignoring the orders from Tokyo, the Kanto army also entered into the Great Wall and continued to advance. Paying little attention to international criticism and the emperor's command, it continued to advance its military actions.⁸⁶

The third blow back effect was Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. According to Shiratori Toshio, a hard-liner in the Foreign Affairs Office, "at that time few hoped to withdraw from the League of Nations in their minds. Both Foreign Minister Uchida Kosai and Matsuoka of the Japanese delegate of the League of Nations stated that Japan would not withdraw from the League of Nations in front of Genro Saionji."⁸⁷ In fact, even Vice Chief of the Kanto army Koiso and Army Minister Araki, who were the strongest supporters of Manchukuo,

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 511.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 514.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, p. 749.

maintained that Japan should remain in the League of Nations.⁸⁸

However, once the Saito cabinet officially recognized the state of Manchukuo, the confrontation with the League became inevitable. As for the League's involvement into the Manchurian Affairs, responding to China's appeal, the Council resolved to dispatch a commission to investigate the situation. Victor A.G. R. Lytton of Great Britain chaired the commission. Its members spent more than four months meeting with Japanese, Chinese and Manchurian leaders to understand the situation.

Published in October 1932, the Lytton Report stated that the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be unsatisfactory. It prescribed the continuity of a special regime for the administration in Manchuria that would be consistent with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China but would possess a large measure of autonomy designed to meet the local conditions and special characteristics there.⁸⁹

The Lytton Report fairly respected claims from both China and Japan, and skillfully avoided any direct conflicts. Yet, Japan had already recognized Manchukuo so that it could not accept the Report regarding the issue of Chinese sovereignty. Emperor Hirohito thought this report was acceptable. Being afraid

⁸⁸ *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, January 3, 1933. Koiso's comment in Inoue Toshiaki, *Kiki no Naka no Kyochō Gaiko: Nitchu Senso ni Itaru Taigai Seisaku no Keisei to Tenkai*. (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), p. 26.

⁸⁹ About the Manchurian Incident and the League of Nations, see Henry L. Stimson, *The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollection and Observation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936); Westeel W. Willough, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations*. (New York: Greenwood, 1968).

of Japan's isolation in the League, Hirohito consulted with Genro Saionji about the possibility of Japan accepting it.⁹⁰ Genro Saionji advised him not to oppose the cabinet decision.

Contrary to the emperor's intention, on February 21, the Saito cabinet decided that if the League adopted the Lytton Report, the Japanese government would have to leave the League. On February 24, at the General Assembly, the Report of the Committee of Nineteen which was based on the Lytton Report was adopted by 42 votes to one--Japan, voting against and Thailand abstaining. On March 27, rejecting all the recommendations by the Lytton Commission, Japan formally notified the League of her withdrawal. Japan was to go its own way in dealing with its neighbors in Asia.⁹¹

Conclusion

This chapter examines the Inukai cabinet's foreign policy decision-making process, referring to the following hypotheses: 1) Japan's security policy outcome is the result of the domestic balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners; 2) Japanese political leaders can carry out security policy effectively when they have constitutional authority on the issue; 3) Japanese political leaders can carry out security policy most effectively when both political and military leaders make a coalition; and 4) Japanese political leaders have greater impact on policy outcome when other civilian political actors—such as the emperor and his advisors, the

⁹⁰ Terasaki and Terasaki Miller ed., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, p. 25.

⁹¹ *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 72 [1933] (Tokyo: National Archives of Japan, University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 14-15.

Genro, and/or government officials supported them. The case study in this chapter implies the following conclusions.

First of all, as the domestic coalition changed from soft-line coalition to hard-line coalition, Japan's diplomatic direction shifted from the non-enlargement principle to expansionism in Manchuria. Whereas the Wakatsuki cabinet made a tremendous effort to minimize the military dispute in Manchuria, the Inukai cabinet closely worked with the military and promoted Japan's control in Manchuria. Soon after the Inukai cabinet took the office, the army launched offensive campaigns in Jinzhou. The General Staff approved the Korea army to support the Kanto army in order to attack bandits there. After occupying Jinzhou, the Kanto army and the army both coordinated together in order to establish the state of Manchukuo. Mori organized meetings among different ministries to discuss state-building of Manchukuo. Through the meetings, the army and navy, ministries of Foreign Affairs, Overseas Affairs, and Finance all agreed on Japan's expansion. Recalling Mori's role, Suzuki of the army said: "thanks to Mori's maneuver, what the Inukai cabinet did was completely what the Army wanted to do...In order to settle the Manchurian Problem, the government had to deal with various problems which were linked with Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, or Agriculture and Forest. Mori put these matters on agendas, and vice ministers discussed them. It was all due to Mori's effort that all decisions and agreements were smoothly made in the cabinet meeting."⁹² The Inukai cabinet's hard-line coalition with the army

⁹² Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 786-787. Shigemitsu commented that after meeting with Mori and Suzuki several times, Shiratori came to agree with them and

promoted Japan's dominance in Manchuria as the official foreign policy principle.

Major Political Actors	Pro-Expansionism in Manchuria (Hard-liners)	Anti-Expansionism in Manchuria (Soft-liners)
Political Party	The Seiyukai	The Minseitō
The Army	The army. The Kanto. Korea armies, the Sakurakia and Issekikai members	None
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Uchida. Shiratori. Arita	
The Emperor and the Court		The Emperor. Makino. Saionji
Others	The South Manchurian Railway. media, the public	Ishii of the Privy Council

Table 5.1 Hard-liners and Soft-liners in the Incident at the Inukai/Saitō Cabinets

Second, as the "blow back effect" implies, once the hard-line coalition agreed on the principle of expansionism, it was difficult to change the direction. To be sure, party politicians, former diplomats, and journalists such as Ashida Hitoshi and Ishii warned that Japan's invasion to Manchuria, its recognition of Manchukuo and its withdrawal from the League of Nations all would only undermine Japan's national defense.⁹³ Emperor Hirohito and his court aides also

coordinated with them to solve the Manchurian problem. Shigemitsu, *Gaiko Kaisō Roku*, p. 186.

⁹³ Ishii's comment in *Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council*, vol. 72 [1933], p. 13; Ashida's statement, *Records of the Lower House committee meetings of the Imperial Diet*, vol. 27 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992), p. 363.

repeatedly warned of increasing international criticism against Japan, as the army continued to advance and control Manchuria. In fact, as Japan's recognition of Manchukuo and its withdrawal from the League of Nations exemplified, few cabinet members enthusiastically supported these decisions. Yet, no one strongly opposed them. Being unable to ponder possible consequences or alternative options, the Saito cabinet led Japan's expansion in Manchuria and its isolation from the League of Nations. Journalist Kiyosawa criticized Uchida's careless diplomacy, saying that "because Foreign Minister Uchida had stubbornly claimed 'scorched-earth diplomacy' from the beginning, he could not find any ways to change diplomatic direction."⁹⁴ Likewise, according to Ian Nish, a distinguished historian of modern Japanese history, "on the one hand, an attack on Jehol [Rehe] would be a new, unprecedented expansion of the Manchuria crisis and would be anathema to international opinion. On the other, it would merely be another in a long chain of crisis escalations brought about by the army: the use of troops from Korea in Manchuria; the attacks on Chinchou [Jinzhou]; the creation of Manchukuo. In each case, the Tokyo government had been dragged along a particular course."⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Kiyosawa Taku, "Matsuoka Zenken ni Tofu" *Chuo Koron*, May, 1933, p. 169. However, while liberal journalists like Kiyosawa criticized Japanese diplomacy, many media experts supported Japan's Manchurian policy. Major newspaper articles indicated that Manchuria would bring Japanese people excellent economic opportunities. See Yanagawa Heisuke, "Manmo Mondai no Saikaunin," *Gaiko Jihō*, vol. 668, October 1932, pp. 47-48.

⁹⁵ Ian Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931-1933* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), p. 206.

	Political Leaders' High Constitutional Authority	Political Leaders' Low Constitutional Authority
Strong Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is large.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Recognition of Manchukuo ● Withdrawal from the League 	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate.</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The State-building of Manchukuo ● Military Campaign in Rehe
Weak Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate.</i>	<i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is weak.</i>

Table 5.2. Political Leaders' Influence on Policy Outcome in the Inukai/Saito Cabinets

Third, a chair of a political party needs to have a powerful political base within that party. Like Wakatsuki, Inukai was a veteran politician in domestic politics. Yet, he was a head of a minor faction in the Seiyukai.⁹⁶ He was chosen to be the president because he was not powerful and was an outsider. After Tanaka's death, most party members desperately hoped to avoid any clashes between the competing factions in the Seiyukai.⁹⁷ As a politician who was familiar

⁹⁶ After the 1932 February election, the Seiyukai gained more than 300 seats. Yet, it is said that Inukai faction remained around 20 seats while Suzuki faction gained more than 100 seats.

⁹⁷ The historical process that Inukai became the President of the Seiyukai, see "Seikai Uchimaku Zadankai." *Bungei Shunju*, November, 1929, pp. 146-148; Uchida, *Fusetsu Gojunen*, pp. 117-120.

with China's political development. Inukai doubted Japan's control of Manchuria and the future of the state of Manchukuo. In fact, his personal view was rather similar to that of Foreign Minister Shidehara. However, Inukai was unable to limit Japan's expansionism, because he was too weak to control the hard-liners in his own cabinet. His attempt to negotiate with China through Kayano failed because Mori strongly opposed it. Mori cut the communication between the two.

In addition, lack of leadership on the part of Prime Minister Saito worsened Japan's international reputation because the government was simply dragged by the army. Late in 1932, the Kanto army planned to attack Zhang's army in Rehe. In February 1933, the Chief of the Army General Staff Prince Kan'in sought the emperor to execute this plan. But the Saito cabinet, the Army General Staff, and the Kanto army hardly discussed this plan together. When Emperor Hirohito found that the cabinet had not approved the plan, he tried to call off his order. Observing the emperor's effort to prevent military escalation, Chief Military Aide Nara criticized that Prime Minister Saito took no leadership in this important decision-making.⁹⁸ These exemplify that the prime minister could neither influence policy outcome nor control the army without a strong political foundation in the cabinet.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Nara. *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 510.

⁹⁹ In addition, using a political campaign, Mori appealed to the public and achieved unprecedented victory in the general election in February 1932. In fact, once the Seiyukai achieved the overwhelming victory in the election, Mori further attempt to build a strong non-party government led by Baron Hiranuma who was a hard-liner. In Mori's view, the Hiranuma government in which both parties were represented would prove the best instrument for consolidating Japan's position in Manchuria and

Fourth, this case study demonstrated that Emperor Hirohito was not always able to influence policy outcome. The Meiji Constitution stated that the emperor was the head of the Empire and the sovereign of the state; he had the supreme command of the army and the navy. But in practice, the emperor rarely participated directly in the decision-making process to influence policy outcomes. Since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, the emperor worried about international criticism from the League of Nations and the United States. When the confrontation between Japan and the Great Powers intensified, the emperor tried to maintain Japan's international reputation by implicitly conveying his opinion to his court aides and the cabinet members.¹⁰⁰

In the Shanghai Incident, the emperor first tried to organize the Imperial Conference in order to settle the Incident quickly. When his aides turned down such an idea, Emperor Hirohito directly asked General Shirakawa to make a truce with China before the General Assembly of the League of Nations opened. The emperor played a decisive role in the Shanghai Incident. In contrast, in other instances, the emperor's requests were ignored. In the Kanto army's attack in Rehe, the emperor strictly ordered Prince Kan'in not to send troops beyond the Great Wall. Yet, the Kanto army ignored the order of the supreme command and continued to

China. About Mori's political power compared with Inukai's, see Baba Tsunego, *Seikai Jinbutsu Fukei* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron sha, 1931), pp. 34-37.

¹⁰⁰ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, pp. 510-511, 513. The emperor was very clear that Japan should not advance its military action toward Rehe, since it would cause a serious problem in the League of Nations. While viewing the Manchurian Incident would not cause a grave issue at the League, the emperor was eager to halt the Kanto army's attack in Rehe.

advance once the military clash started. As for Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the emperor considered that Japan should accept the Lytton Report in order to maintain cooperative relationships with the League and the United States. Lord Keeper Makino agreed with him. However, following Genro Saionji's advice, the emperor eventually decided to accept the government's decision that if the League adopted the Lytton Report, the Japanese government would have to leave the League.

Finally, this case study implies that the political situation within the Imperial Palace changed gradually. Namely, in addition to Makino and Saionji, younger members such as Kido and Konoye also became gradually influential at the Palace. Now, hard-liners tried to influence the court and the emperor by networking with these new court members. In addition, imperial family members came to be related more closely with the military. During the Inukai Cabinet, Prince Kan'nin became the Chief of the General Staff at the army. In order to maintain similar prestige, the navy chose Prince Fushimi to be the Chief of General Staff at the navy. Emperor Hirohito also saw that Prince Chichibu, his younger brother, was sympathetic with radical officers in the army. He worried by socializing too much with them, Prince Chichibu had become radical. The emperor consulted with Nara to transfer him to another division in the army.¹⁰¹ As Japanese domestic political situation shifted from the Hamaguchi cabinet to the Inukai cabinet, the Imperial Palace's situation also gradually changed.

¹⁰¹ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 4, p. 168. Indeed, it is well known that in the February 26 Incident, coup planners understood that Prince Chichibu would back up them.

Conclusion

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and change depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.¹

Carl Van Clausewitz

Introduction

This dissertation is about Japan's security policy and civil-military relations. Examining cases of the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the Manchurian Incident in 1931-33, it analyzes sources of Japan's security policy. Why did Japan change course from international cooperation to international conflict? Was it the result of international pressure? Was it the result of domestic politics? Did civilian politicians agree with the military in changing Japan's foreign policy direction? Did the Meiji Constitution make it clear who was responsible for the military affairs? Did civilian and military leaders consider Japan's national security differently? Did civilian leaders always follow the military's advice? What was the role of Emperor Hirohito and his court aides?

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz. *On War* Michael Howard and Peter Paret edited and translated. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

This dissertation argues that Japan's security policy shift resulted because the domestic balance of power changed from soft-line coalition to hard-line coalition among party politicians, the military, and the court group. Late in the 1920s and early in the 1930s, the military and the court members became politicized in Japan's policymaking process, although they did not participate in politics directly.² Party politicians, the military, and the court members who shared policy preferences formed an implicit or explicit coalition and worked together in order to implement a certain policy. It was the dynamics of coalition politics that shaped Japan's security policy direction.

Regarding the civil-military relations, the three case studies imply that despite the military's institutional autonomy and exclusive constitutional authority in military command, civilian leaders are able to maximize their influence on policy outcome under two conditions. One is when they have constitutional authority on the military affairs. Although the military held a significant autonomy under the Meiji Constitution, the military did not determine security policy solely. Rather, since national security covered a wide range of issues, civilian leaders did have constitutional authority in the area. Due to this authority, they structured agenda, negotiated with others and eventually influenced policy outcome.

The other is when they make a coalition with the military and the court leaders. If both civilian and military leaders share an idea about national security, then civilian leaders are able to carry out security policy more effectively. The

² On the court and politics in the 1920s, see Sakamoto, "Atarashii Koshitsuzo wo Motomete."

military experts' endorsement gives legitimacy to civilians for their policy choice. In addition to the military leaders, if civilian leaders gain enough support from the court, they may stand firm against opponents and persuade them to accept a certain policy choice. Although the emperor hardly determined policy outcomes, whether or not he strongly agreed on the government's policy principle may influence the policy implementation. Also, as mediators between the emperor and policymakers, the court aides were able to manipulate political situations to some extent. The emperor and his aides influenced internal balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners in politics and the military.

Because of a loose soft-line coalition among the Minseito, the navy and the court, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to achieve international agreement on naval arms reduction with the United States and Great Britain. Prime Minister Hamaguchi considered that arms reduction was an issue of state affairs. In his opinion, arms reduction was an issue of the military budget during the peace time, not military command.³ He understood that even if the Navy General Staff would disagree with the cabinet, the cabinet had constitutional authority to make the treaty.⁴ In addition to constitutional authority, the navy leaders, Emperor Hirohito, and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki backed up Hamaguchi.⁵ It was because of this coalition that Hamaguchi was able to secure the treaty.

³ Kato, "Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai no Ronri."

⁴ Ibid., pp. 168-172.

⁵ Hatano, *Hamaguchi Osachi*, pp. 164-169, 171.

In the Manchurian Incident, the Wakatsuki cabinet adopted the non-enlargement principle but failed to complete it. The Meiji Constitution stated that rights of military command belonged to the emperor, not the prime minister. While the cabinet negotiated with China at the League of Nations, the Kanto army continued to advance military campaign in Manchuria.⁶ Prime Minister Wakatsuki was unable to control the military because he did not have full constitutional authority to supervise military operations and issue orders.⁷ Surely, Minami and Kanaya agreed to cooperate with Wakatsuki to some extent. But they did not strictly punish rebellious officers who attempted a coup in Tokyo and disobeyed orders in Manchuria.⁸ The emperor also did not demand the army leaders to punish them harshly.

Observing that the prime minister was unable to settle the Incident smoothly, the court members such as Makino and Genro Saionji were disappointed with Wakatsuki and discussed a so called cooperative cabinet between the Seiyukai and Minseitō. To make matters worse, Adachi became unsupportive to Wakatsuki when the Manchurian Crisis gave him an opportunity to replace Wakatsuki's position. Gradually losing supports from the court, the army, and his own party, the Wakatsuki cabinet was unable to implement the non-enlargement principle effectively.

⁶ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 376-377.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Later, Kanaya sincerely apologized to Shidehara for his lack of leadership in the Manchurian Incident. See, Shidehara, *Gaiko Gojunen*, p. 184.

After the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned, Inukai formed a new cabinet. While Inukai, Takahashi, and Yoshizawa were rather soft-liners, the core members of the Inukai cabinet were hard-liners who actively supported the Kanto army's occupation in Manchuria. Once the Inukai cabinet was formed, the hard-liners such as Mori and Araki coordinated with the Kanto army and other civilian ministries to control Manchuria. They were powerful enough to set agendas in the cabinet, lead a series of discussions among different ministries and carry out policies.⁹ Responding to shift from soft-line coalition to hard-line coalition in domestic politics, Japan changed course in the Manchurian Incident.

As for the role of the emperor and court members, the emperor's influence was not always absolute in the Manchurian Incident. On the one hand, Emperor Hirohito strongly asked General Shirakawa to make a truce with China in Shanghai before the League of Nations would open. Emperor Hirohito considered that Japan would be isolated from the League if the military dispute continued in Shanghai, an international city where the Great Powers had their own vested interests.¹⁰

On the other hand, while the emperor hoped that Japan would keep good diplomatic relationships with the Great Powers and the League of Nations, Genro Saionji advised the emperor not to intervene in the cabinet decision to leave the League.¹¹ In addition, in February 1933, when the army decided to advance troops

⁹ Yamaura, *Mori Kaku*, pp. 786-787.

¹⁰ Terasaki and Terasaki Miller ed., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 28-30.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

in Rehe Province. the emperor who worried about Japan's violation of the Nine Powers Treaty. requested the Chief of the General Staff Prince Kan'in to stop the operation. Despite the emperor's request, the Kanto army launched military campaigns in Rehe Province.¹² In both cases, the emperor initially tried to organize Imperial Liaison Conference to discuss and control the military. But Genro Saionji, Makino, and Nara all advised him not to do so. They worried that radical officers and right-wingers would escalate their attack to the emperor if he checked the military advancement. Rather, they thought it better for the emperor to follow the cabinet decision.¹³ Eventually, without strong opposition from soft-liners, Japan continued to expand and left the League of Nations.

In conclusion, referring to the hypotheses and the case studies, I will present a summary of empirical findings and theoretical implications. Then, I will suggest a future research agenda in the field of Japanese security studies.

I. Summary of Findings and Theoretical Implications

Following are empirical findings and theoretical implications in this study.

1) Coalition Politics between Hard-liners and Soft-liners

Hypothesis 1: Japan's security policy outcome is the result of domestic political balance of power between soft-liners and hard-liners.

Hypothesis 2: Japanese political leaders have a greater impact on policy outcome when the emperor, the court members, and the military support politicians' policy principle. In contrast, without their support, Japanese political leaders' influence is rather weak.

¹² Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, pp. 507-511.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

First of all, empirical findings demonstrate that Japan's choice for international cooperation and conflict is a continuation of an internal struggle within the state--coalition politics between hard-liners and soft-liners in politics, the military and the court.¹⁴ Domestic balance of power among different groups influences international outcomes.

Thanks to a loose soft-line coalition among politicians, the navy and the court members, the Hamaguchi cabinet was able to argue against the hard-liners and ratified the treaty. The Hamaguchi cabinet was able to complete the arms reduction treaty. The navy experts such as Okada, Saito, Takarabe and Yamanashi all supported the government's decision. When Japan made a compromise with the United States and Great Britain in London in March 1930, Okada and Yamanashi persuaded the navy experts in the General Staff to accept the compromise plan. At

¹⁴ Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflicts among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 512-513. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.": Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert Putnam eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics.*: On economic issues. Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Information, and Institutions: International Relations and Domestic Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). In the words of Snyder and Diesing,

The most obvious link is that internal bargaining produces decisions about strategy and tactics to be employed by the state in its bargaining with other states. Responses of other states are similarly the product of "pulling and hauling" between individuals and agencies with different interpretations of the first state's move, different interests, different influence bases, etc. From this perspective the process and outcome of international bargaining is more the adventitious result of configurations of attitude and influence within states than of the "balance of bargaining power" between the states....the central decision maker's problem of choosing between, or mixing, these external options is paralleled by his internal problem of building a majority coalition or compromising divergent advice.

the Privy Council. Takarabe defended Hamaguchi's position and agreed on ratification of the treaty. As for the role of the emperor and the court, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki delayed Kato's meeting with the emperor so that Prime Minister was able to talk with the emperor frankly in advance. The emperor encouraged Hamaguchi to complete the treaty when hard-liners opposed his decision. He also sent Nara to Fleet Admiral Togo to accept the treaty.¹⁵ When the delegation returned from London, he offered special gifts to them for their contribution to the treaty.

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, different responses to the Incident in the Wakatsuki and Inukai cabinets clearly demonstrate that domestic coalition politics shaped the state's choice. The Wakatsuki cabinet declared a non-enlargement policy soon after the breakout of the Incident.¹⁶ The cabinet started negotiating with China to settle the issue quickly.¹⁷ When the Kanto army advanced in North Manchuria late in November 1931, the Chief of the General Staff issued restrict orders repeatedly.¹⁸ The army headquarters also warned that they might punish officers who failed to follow the orders. Because the top army leaders accepted the Wakatsuki cabinet's policy principle, Japan did not escalate military advance in Manchuria.

¹⁵ Kawai, *Kawai Diary*, vol. 4, p. 93; Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, pp. 235-236.

¹⁶ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 375-377.

¹⁷ Shigemitsu, *Gaiko Kaiso Roku*, pp. 123-124.

¹⁸ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 245-247, 268, 276-278, 280-281.

Yet, no strong coalition existed in the Wakatsuki cabinet. In fact, the Wakatsuki cabinet was unable to complete the policy principle, since it gradually lost supports from the Foreign Ministry, the Imperial Court, and its own party.¹⁹ While agreeing on the non-enlargement principle, the army leaders and the emperor were not tough enough to punish rebellious commanders and officers and restore the discipline of the military. Facing a coup attempt, the court members also hoped to avoid severe confrontation with hard-liners. In fact, in the middle of the Incident, instead of supporting the Wakatsuki cabinet, they concluded that Wakatsuki was too weak to settle the Incident. Genro Saionji started inquiring possibility of the coalition cabinet between the Seiyukai and the Minseito. To make matters worse, Adachi came to decline to cooperate with the cabinet, believing that this crisis situation may give him an opportunity to be prime minister. Without a strong coalition, the Wakatsuki cabinet failed to implement the non-enlargement policy.

In contrast, the Inukai cabinet and the army pushed and endorsed the Kanto army's advance into North Manchuria in December 1931, although Prime Minister Inukai himself was not enthusiastic about it.²⁰ Early in January 1932, Araki started discussing administrative procedures to establish the state of Manchukuo with the Kanto army members.²¹ Mori organized meetings among civilian ministries and the army and implemented expansionist policy effectively. The strong coalition of

¹⁹ Harada, *Harada Diary*, vol. 2, p. 77.

²⁰ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 323-324.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 342-345.

hard-liners in politics and the military worked together and escalated Japan's expansionism in Manchuria.

Second, as far as political actors are concerned, the court and the military became important actors in the decision-making process early in the 1920s. Primary sources indicate that both the military and the court members became politicized late in the 1920s. Emperor Hirohito involved in politics much more than the Meiji and Taisho emperors did. As Emperor Hirohito recalled, Prime Minister Tanaka decided to resign because the emperor suggested him to do so in 1929. No emperor before Hirohito had such a large influence in domestic politics.²²

However, his power was not absolute. As the head of the state, the emperor's main concern was to maintain Japan's security in international politics. In the London Naval Conference, he expected that Japan would cooperate with the Great Powers on arms reduction. His endorsement on arms reduction helped Hamaguchi in the case of London Naval Conference. In the Manchurian Incident, he hoped that Japan would defend its position at the League of Nations and avoid a deteriorating relationship with the United States. But his request not to expand military action in Rehe was ignored in the Incident. The emperor considered that he would organize Imperial Liaison Conference and conveyed his opinion to the cabinet, hoping to avoid Japan's isolation at the League. But Genro Saionji, Makino, and Nara turned down his idea, because it would only worsen the radical officers' feeling toward the emperor. They thought it wise for the emperor to behave

²² Terasaki and Terasaki Miller, *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku*, pp. 22-25.

prudently.²³ Indeed, despite his wish, Japan left the League of Nations after it rejected the Lytton Report.

Besides the emperor, the emperor's aides such as Lord Keeper of Privy Seal and the Minister of the Imperial House were politically influential to some extent. In 1930, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki delayed the Navy Chief of Staff Kato's meeting with the emperor so that Prime Minister Hamaguchi was able to report to the emperor in advance about the government's position regarding the London Naval Conference.²⁴ In the Manchurian Incident, the Wakatsuki cabinet became weak as Genro Saionji and other court members started discussing any possibility about a new cabinet to settle the crisis. Although the court members were rarely involved in the decision-making process directly, they were able to control the political situation.

Like the imperial court, the military became politicized. In the middle of the 1920s, responding to strong pressure by party politicians, the army and the navy were forced to reduce its size. Despite opposition within the army, Ugaki decided to reduce four complete infantry divisions. The deactivation of these divisions abolished sixteen regimental area headquarters. In addition, the army cut other small units and headquarters. Four senior generals, about five hundred other officers, and thousands of noncommissioned officers entered a waiting list or were separated from the service.²⁵ Although the treaty hardly damaged the army's organizational

²³ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 514.

²⁴ Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 3, p. 217.

²⁵ Many officers pointed out that they criticized Ugaki because of his organization reform. Baba Tsunego, *Gendai Jinbutsu Hyoron* (Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 1930), pp.

interests in a direct way. some army leaders and young officers feared that soft-line coalition would initiate the army's arms reduction and organizational reform in the future.²⁶

It was in this period that military officers challenged civilian leaders. On the one hand, the hard-line officers were determined to carry out their own policy agenda on the Manchurian problem, creating a crisis. Once the Manchurian Incident broke out, they ignored the non-enlargement policy principle and advanced military action. On the other hand, radical officers, who believed that party politicians had threatened national security, planned a coup. They declared that they would terminate parliamentary politics and replace it with a military government.²⁷ Later, in the Inukai administration, these hard-line military officers and hard-line politicians worked together to execute expansionist policy. The three case studies imply that Japan's policy outcome is the result of coalition politics among these actors.

2) The Military as a Unitary Actor Assumption

Hypothesis 3: Not all the military officers share identical views of national security. Rather, soft-liners and hard-liners exist within the Japanese navy and army respectively.

252-253; Ito, *Gunbatsu Koboshi*, vol. 2, pp. 112-115; Boeicho Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu ed, *Daihonei Rikugunbu*, p. 267; Nakamura, *Showa Rikugun Hishi*, pp. 123-126; Joho, *Rikugunsho Gunmukyoku*, pp.303-308.

²⁶ In fact, Hamaguchi demanded Army Minister Ugaki to reduce the size of the army and re-organize the army structure at that time. In addition, an international conference on the army's arms reduction was expected to be held 1932 in Geneva. Nara, *Nara Diary*, vol. 4, p. 160.

²⁷ Takamiya, *Jungyaku no Showashi*, pp. 79-87. Koiso, *Katsuzan Koso*, pp. 489-515.

This study points out that relaxing the assumption that the military is a unitary actor may help us comprehend the dynamics of civil-military relations. Military organizations are often composed of officers that have different policy preferences; its officers may act differently because they have their own political agenda. Indeed, the case studies indicate that the military organization is far from monolithic, although many scholars of military organization often assume the military as a solid corporate organization that has a hierarchical structure.²⁸ The assumption that the military is a unitary actor allows scholars to make straightforward arguments about the military's influence on national security policymaking. But exploring an internal cleavage within the military organization would help analyze civil-military relations in detail.

The case study about the London Naval Conference demonstrates that two different opinions existed within the navy regarding naval armament. Those who worked for the military administration considered that Japan would be safe even if it agreed on the agreement. In their opinion, due to Japan's financial situation, Japan would not compete with the United States in arms buildup. Therefore, they agreed on the naval agreement with the United States and Great Britain.²⁹ In contrast, operation planners opposed any agreements because they felt it would weaken

²⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp.11-18; Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp.7-10; Van Evera, "Causes of War," chapter 7. It is important to note that Snyder and Legro recognized that many organizations have a multifaceted character which several cultures compete for policy outcomes. Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*, pp. 32-34; Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*, p. 20.

²⁹ Okada, *Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku*, p. 43.

Japan's capabilities in naval operations. The naval arms reduction was simply unacceptable.³⁰ The navy ultimately supported the agreement because soft-liners in the navy were able to persuade hard-liners to accept the compromise plan at the expense of their promising careers.³¹

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, the situation was much more complex.³² Although the army considered that the use of force would be necessary to solve the Manchurian problem, not all the officers shared identical policy preference. Before the Incident, on the one hand, the Issekikai members and army leaders contended that the army should take enough time to cooperate with the government, appeal to the mass and prepare for controlling Manchuria.³³ On the other hand, hard liners in the Kanto army, Ishiwara and Itagaki, considered that the army should create a crisis with military conspiracy and take the opportunity to control Manchuria.³⁴ Once the Incident broke out, even though they disobeyed orders from the above, they escalated military campaigns, participated in political activities and guided the state-building of Manchukuo. In Tokyo, the Sakurakai

³⁰ Kobayashi, "Kaigun Gunshuku Joyaku." p. 80.

³¹ Wakatsuki, *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 361-364.

³² Ogata's classic work on the Manchurian Incident and the army superbly analyzes the complexity within the army. See, Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria*.

³³ Inaba, Kobayashi, and Kojima ed., *Gendaishi Shiryo*, vol.11, p. 164.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

members planned a coup to overthrow the party cabinet and establish a military government.³⁵

Unlike these hard-line officers, the Chief of the Army General Staff and the Army Minister agreed on the non-enlargement principle and made the Kanto and Korea armies to follow the government decision. They banned any political activities by officers and restricted the military advancement.³⁶ In contrast, when Araki became the head of the army, he endorsed military escalation and the Kanto army's involvement in the state-building of Manchukuo.³⁷ Although no clear cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners existed in the army, not all the officers maintained the same policy preferences.

3) Civil-Military Relations and Interdependence between Civilians and the Military

Hypothesis 4: Civilian and military leaders are interdependent. Civilian leaders try to maximize their influence in the policymaking process by getting support from military leaders. At the same time, the military leaders work with them closely in order to implement policy as they hope.

This study contends that a simple bi-polar formula of civil-military rivalry is analytically misleading. Civilian and military leaders are interdependent. On the one hand, civilian leaders try to maximize their influence in the policymaking process by getting support from military leaders. Thanks to political coalition with the military, civilian leaders legitimize their policy choice and defend their position

³⁵ Nakano, *Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki*, pp. 151-184.

³⁶ Sanbo Honbu, *Manshu Diary*, p. 130.

³⁷ Kanto Gun Sanbo Honbu, *Katakura Diary*, pp. 342-345.

against any criticisms from the opposition groups. On the other hand, through cooperation with civilians, the military leaders try to implement the government policy in their favorable way.

In the case of the Hamaguchi administration, the Hamaguchi cabinet succeeded in not only accepting a compromise plan in April but also in ratifying the treaty in October, 1930. During this process, Prime Minister Hamaguchi was firmly determined to complete the treaty. The navy leaders who hoped to avoid confronting the cabinet endorsed the cabinet's position. This naval experts' endorsement was crucial for the Hamaguchi cabinet because it gave legitimacy to the government's decision to accept the compromise plan and to advance further procedures for ratification.³⁸ At the same time, while agreeing on the arms reduction, the navy clearly stated that further improvement of defense facilities would be necessary. That is, "acceptance of the present London Naval Treaty will cause shortcomings in the military strength required to support and implement the naval operational plans drawn up in conformity with the established policy. Therefore, if the present treaty should come into existence, we must, until 1937, adopt the countermeasures listed below in order to hold these shortcomings to a minimum."³⁹ While cooperating with the cabinet, the navy made sure that it would ensure the organizational interests after the treaty was ratified.

³⁸ Wakatsuki. *Kofuan Kaikoroku*, pp. 365-366.

³⁹ Kobayashi. "Kaigun Gunshuku Jyoyaku." p. 139; Kobayashi and Shimada eds., *Okada Diary*, p. 26.

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, it was the hard-line coalition between civilian and the military leaders that promoted Japan's domination in Manchuria. Many civilians did support the Kanto army in a number of ways. Both the hard-liners in the Kanto army and research staff members of the South Manchurian Railways Company studied together and developed a detailed plan for military campaigns and domination of Manchuria. The Seiyukai hard-liner Mori also visited Manchuria and exchanged opinions with the Kanto army leaders as local unrests deteriorated in Manchuria. When the Seiyukai took the office, Mori and the army engineered to build the state of Manchukuo. Japan's expansionism is the result of hard-line coalition between civilians and the military. Civilians and the military were interdependent.

4) Civilians, the Military, and Constitutional Authority

Hypothesis 5: Japanese political leaders are able to carry out security policy effectively when they have constitutional authority on the issue. The higher authority they have, the more successfully they execute their policy principle.

Hypothesis 6: Under the Meiji Constitution, Japanese military is able to influence issues of military affairs to a great extent because of its institutional autonomy and its professional expertise.

As far as constitutional authority is concerned, since national security covers a wide range of issues from narrow military tactics to grand strategy, there are areas in which both civilian and military leaders share authority. Surely, the military has prerogatives in the issue of narrow military affairs such as military tactics and operations. The military's personnel, education and justice systems are considered internal matters that civilians are rarely involved in. However, even though the

Japanese military enjoys institutional autonomy from civilians in the issues of military affairs, it was rare that the military solely decided military policy.⁴⁰

In the case studies, Prime Minister Hamaguchi considered that he had constitutional authority in the issue of arms reduction. Issues of international treaty, the peacetime military structure and diplomacy are under the jurisdiction of the government, not the military. Therefore, prior to the London Naval Conference, Hamaguchi appointed former Prime Minister Wakatsuki as the head of Japanese delegation. While the Navy General Staff and the Seiyukai hard-liners criticized that the Minseito leaders improperly intervened in the military readiness and operations, Hamaguchi understood that it was the government that was ultimately

⁴⁰ Indeed, generally speaking, civilian leaders maintain or share authority with the military in areas such as national budget, the peacetime military structure, and national strategy. According to David Pion-Berlin,

The military may have full authority over some decisions, shared authority over others, and little or no authority over still others. Defense-related issues first must be aggregated and then arrayed across the professional-political continuum to know precisely what the variations military autonomy is. Military control over internal or core professional function is on the whole considerable. Institutional reforms and the socialization and promotion of junior officers are prerogatives which have been preserved and protected from outside interference... The gray zone defines the murky middle ground between military and civilian authority where issues have both professional and political content. While all the functions at this decisional site are defense-related, at issue is who shall have decision-making powers. The general pattern seems to be that where domestic arms industries have been efficient, more or less self-sustaining and important earners of foreign exchange, the military has retained higher levels of autonomy. When such industries are poorly run and heavily subsidized, governments under fiscal pressures have reduced their defense spending burden by seizing control of these firms or selling them off.

David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," pp. 87-95.

responsible for negotiations on the arms reduction at the London Naval Conference.⁴¹

In the case of the Manchurian Incident, despite Minami's initial reluctance, the Wakatsuki cabinet decided not to escalate the Incident and settle it with China diplomatically. Once the cabinet adopted such a principle, the Army Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff agreed to cooperate with the cabinet. However, as pointed out, the cabinet was unable to control the military entirely because under the Meiji Constitution, prime minister was unable to punish rebellious officers who ignored orders directly. It was the army that was responsible for military operations, tactics, personnel and justice systems. In fact, despite rebellions in the Manchurian Incident, neither the Army Minister nor the Chief of the Army General Staff strictly punished these officers. Rather, those who advanced military action despite the strict order eventually received honor medals because of their victories in the battles.

⁴² Like the military leaders, the emperor was not so harsh to them. Such a treatment only deteriorated good discipline in the army in a long run and made it difficult for

⁴¹ Kato, "Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai no Ronri."

⁴² According to Endo Saburo, a military officer who worked in the operation section in the Army General Staff commented that: "the Kanto army started military operations without any authorization from central authority in Tokyo. Such an action was inexcusable. Yet, because the Kanto army achieved major victory, no one punished the Kanto army plotters. Rather, the commander in chief Honjo of the Kanto army got promotion as a general and became a baron. Manchurian Incident plotters also received special medals. Any soldier wants medals." Endo Saburo's comment in interview with Ando Yoshio, *Showa Keizaishi heno Shogen*, p. 297. As other studies of the military organization also imply, because promotion and personnel appointment are effective ways to check the military, civilian supremacy over the military is difficult to sustain if civilians are unable to influence these processes. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, pp. 19-20.

civilian leaders to control the military. Under such conditions, the cabinet was unable to maintain the non-enlargement principle.

	Political Leaders' High Constitutional Authority	Political leaders' Low Constitutional Authority
Strong Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<p><i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is large</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Hamaguchi Cabinet; Acceptance of Compromise Plan. Ratification of the Treaty ● The Inukai/Saito Cabinet; Recognition of Manchukuo. Withdrawal from the League 	<p><i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Inukai/Saito Cabinet; the State-building of Manchukuo. Military Campaign in Rehe
Weak Political Coalition among Politicians, the Military, and the Court	<p><i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is moderate</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Hamaguchi Cabinet; Chief Delegation Selection. Negotiation in London. ● The Wakatsuki Cabinet; Adoption of Non-enlargement Principle 	<p><i>civilian leaders' influence on policy outcome is weak</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The Wakatsuki Cabinet; No Punishment to Rebellious Officers

Table 6.1. Political Leaders' Influence on Policy Outcome in the Three Case Studies

II. Research Agenda

This dissertation examines sources of Japan's security policy and civil-military relations in the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident. It analyzes coalition politics between soft-liners and hard-liners. Since any security policy requires politics, investigating Japan's current civil-military relations will help us

understand origins of Japan's security policy. In the following, I will suggest future research agendas.

First of all, studying Japan's self defense forces is an important research agenda. What is the nature of military professionalism in Japan's self defense forces? What are core value and attitude of national security for them? Are there any different ideas about national security within the self defense forces? Do any hard-liners and soft-liners exist? Like any military organizations, do the Japanese ground, maritime and air forces compete with each other? What is Japan's military organization culture? Indeed, there are very few academic studies that have answered these important questions.

For a long time, most studies of Japanese public policies have heavily focused on economic-related issues. Many political scientists, who specialize Japan, have extensively studied relations between politicians and economic bureaucrats.⁴³ Even those who study Japan's security policy hardly examined self defense forces thoroughly. Rather, they tended to emphasize Japan's political culture, Japan's legal norms, or Japan's industry and technology. Thomas Berger, for instance, argues that Japan's anti-militarism culture maintains Japan as a peaceful country, surveying

⁴³ For example, Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Richard J. Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 2: The Changing International Context*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Daniel I. Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Frances M. Rosenbluth, *Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Junko Kato, *The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality: Tax Politics in Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994).

Japanese public poll over years.⁴⁴ In *Cultural Norms and Japan's National Security*, Peter Katzenstien also maintains that Japan's legal and institutional norms have significantly shaped Japan's choice of pacific security policy.⁴⁵ Richard Samuels and Michael Green both analyze Japan's security policy from the viewpoint of defense industry and technology.⁴⁶

As this dissertation has shown, the military is one of the central actors that shape the state's security policy. It is the expert of management of violence. Currently, Japan's self defense forces are, in fact, quite large organizations which consist of three services and about 250 thousand volunteer soldiers. Defense budget is one of the largest in the world. Exploring self defense forces' core values will be an important research agenda to understand sources of Japan's security policy.

Second, in addition to self defense forces, analyzing how Japan's political institutions shape Japan's security policy is another research agenda. As the case studies demonstrate, the military rarely makes a decision alone. Many political and bureaucratic institutions such as the Diet, Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the self-defense forces, and Japan's defense agency involve into the

⁴⁴ Berger, *Culture of Antimilitarism*.

⁴⁵ Katzenstein, *Cultural Norm and National Security*.

⁴⁶ Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nations, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

security policy making process. An institutional setting mediates political struggles. It also shapes the goals political actors pursue.⁴⁷

The case studies tell us that lack of coordination among different government branches is fatal. The Wakatsuki cabinet failed to respond to the coming crisis in Manchuria because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army hardly exchanged their information and opinions. On the one hand, as local unrests between Japanese and Chinese escalated in Manchuria in the summer of 1931, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiated with Chinese officials in order to settle these disputes. On the other hand, believing that the use of force would be necessary to solve the Manchuria problem, the army planned to attack Chinese. Even after the breakout of the Incident, this pattern continued. While the Foreign Affairs Office defended Japan's position at the League of Nations, the Kanto army escalated military campaign in Manchuria. Institutions may not determine policy outcomes, but they constrain politics. Therefore, in addition to self defense forces, analyzing Japan's political institutions and their impacts on security policy outcomes is an important research agenda.

Finally, assessing the degree of civilian control over the military helps comprehend sources of Japan's security policy. What is the definition of civilian

⁴⁷ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, no. 3, (September, 1984). Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." In Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth edited. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-32; Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 17-20, 276-286.

control in Japan? Do Japanese political leaders control the self defense forces effectively? Do both political and military leaders share security information equally? Is there any asymmetry of information between them?

Feaver and Avant have offered sophisticated civil-military relations analyses based on the principal agent theories.⁴⁸ They argue that current American civilian control is in danger because of delegation and hidden information problems. That is, once civilians delegate responsibility over the provision of security to military organizations, military organizations can use the delegated authority and resources to pursue their own agenda. Therefore, civilians think carefully and hard about how to select appropriate agents and monitor them to ensure that they act properly.

In the case of Japan, Japanese civilian leaders control the self defense forces on the issues of defense budget. They have also well-integrated the self defense forces into Japan's United Nations-oriented diplomacy, having the self defense forces participate in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations abroad. However, it is unclear to what extent they share information about North Korea and China with the self defense forces. Do they carefully monitor the self defense forces' practical defense plans in emergency cases in East Asia? Answering these questions is crucial to assess the degree of Japanese civilian supremacy and comprehend sources of Japan's security policy outcomes.

⁴⁸ Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations."; Avant, "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"

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